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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines tbe role of tbe state in redistributing income 
between social classes in New Zealand during tbe years 1949-1975. It 
applies an innovative methodology, developed by E. Ahmet Tonak, to a 
set of data drawn from New Zealand's national accounts and estimates a 
quantity labelled 'net-tax', defined as tbe taxes tbat the working class 
cede to the state less the expenditure that tbe working class receives 
from the state in tbe form of a social wage. A detailed tbeoretical 
discussion precedes tbe empirical analysis. Insofar as Tonak's method 
requires that the social wage (the portion of state expenditure consumed 
by the working class) be identified as an empirical quantity, the 
argument that all taxes, and hence all state expenditures, originate from 
surplus value is confronted. The views of the main representatives of 
tbis contemporary school of tbought are subjected to detailed scrutiny. 
They are rejected in favour of the views of a school which considers the 
portion of taxes funding the state expenditure that constitutes tbe social 
wage to originate in 'wages'. A model which theoretically 'grounds' the 
comparison of taxes paid to state expenditure received, effected in the 
remaining chapters of tbis study, is then formulated. In the empirical 
analysis, tbe empirical referent of the 'net-tax' concept is calculated for 
the years 1949-1975. The net-tax data set is then used to construct a 
transference ratio, which indicates the degree and direction of income 
redistribution effected by the state. The main finding to emerge is that, 
in all but one of the twenty-seven years surveyed in this study, the 
working class has surrendered more wealth in taxes to the state than it 
has received back from the state as a social wage. In light of these 
results, it can be concluded that the welfare state has not materially 
benefitted the working class in New Zealand. Moreover, insofar as 
income has consistently been redistributed from the working class to 
'non-labour' (the capitalist class and the state itself), the state can be 
considered to owe the working class a debt in the amount of 3671.26 
million (constant 1975) dollars. 
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In general, the art of goverrunent consists in taking as much money as 
possible from one class of citizens to give to the other. 
Voltaire. 
Chapter One: Welfarism on. Trial 
(1.1) Introductory Remarks 
An economic crisis is currently wreaking dramatic changes in the 
social organization of capitalist societies world-wide. New Zealand is 
no exception to this pattern; the crisis has asserted itself with a 
vengeance in this country. Ever since the oil shocks of the early 1970s, 
and Britain's entry into the EEC, New Zealand has experienced a steady 
deterioration on almost all economic fronts. The traditional bourgeois 
economic indicators paint a dismal picture: increasing balance of 
payments deficits; declining terms of trade; increasing leveb of 
overseas debt; increasing budget deficits; increasing unemployment; @. 
rate of inflation consistently higher than that of our trading partners; 
and a rate of economic growth consistently lower than the OECD 
average. 
The economic crisis has, in turn, elicited a response from the state in 
New Zealand. Gone is the social democratic interventionist state; 
ascendant is the monetarist state, albeit under the auspices of a 'Labour' 
Government. Since New Zealand's fourth Labour Government came to 
power in 1984, the state has wrougl1t changes in the fabric of New 
Zealand society on a scale and at a pace hitherto unimaginable. If the 
social democratic state had previously tried to 'tame the beast' of 
capitalism, the Labour Government purposely set out to uncage it. This 
Government has unleashed economic forces believed by many to have 
been permanently relegated to the darker days of the pre-Keynesian 
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era. At its hands, institutions once held to be inviolable are now fielding 
a succession of attacks. The mixed economy and its concomitant, the 
welfare state, are two such institutions. 
In an attempt to revitalize New Zealand's flagging economy, the 
Labour Government has dismantled almost every device designed to 
regulate the allocation of economic resources, leaving the warp and 
weft of market forces to hold sway, and has effected a number of other 
equally fundamental economic reforms in accordance with the 
indigenous application of monetarist dogma informing its policies. 
Numbered amongst the most significant reforms are: the abolition of 
subsidies and tax concessions to the agricultural sector; reduction of 
tariff barriers and removal ofimport controls protecting industry from 
foreign competition; introduction of a floating exchange rate; 
adherence to a tight monetary policy; deregulation of the financial 
sector; corporatization and privatization of large segments of the state 
sector itself; the imposition of a goods and services tax (GST); and tax-
cuts to the rich and big business.l The net effect of these reforms is an 
attenuation of the state's sphere of influence: the 'unmixing' of the 
'mixed economy'. 
In accordance with the imperatives of monetarism, the Labour 
Goverrunent's attacks on the welfare state have been manifested in the 
form of policies intended to squeeze welfare spending. The 
Government's efforts in this area include: the taxation of welfare 
1 B. Roper, 'Thatcherism in the South Paci fie?', .8rJlla. no. 84, 1988, pp.26-28. 
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benefits; the introduction of the 'user-pays' principle in education; the 
proposed introduction of 'work tests' for solo parents and invalids in 
order to restrict their access to welfare benefits; insufficient increases 
in health expenditure, which have forced hospitals to operate within 
restrictive budgetary constraints; harassment of welfare beneficiaries 
suspected of fraud; 'targeting' of unemployment benefits as opposed to 
them being universally provided; and as from April 1 1990 welfare 
benefits will be indexed to increases in the levels of prices or wages, 
depending on which of the two is the lower -which, given the condition 
of the labour market at present, will lead to cuts in the real levels of 
benefits. 
For those who consider the principles of social democracy (among 
which welfarism figures prominently) to be sacrosanct, these 
developments are all the more vexatious in that a Labour government is 
administering the monetarist tonic to this country's ailing economy. 
The transmutation of an erstwhile social democratic government, 
however, is by no means a phenomenon unique to New Zealand. As 
Clarke points out, also in Southern Europe and Australia: 
social democratic governments have taken it upon themselves to 
carry through the monetarist revolution, in the guise of a 
'politics of austerity', while social democratic parties around the 
world have capitulated to a 'new realism'.l 
1s. Clarke, Keunestanlsm. Monetarism and the Crisis of the State. Aldershot, 
Edward Elgar, 1988, p.2. 
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Although the global demise of social democracy is not wholly 
unexpected by Marxists, it raises a number of crucial issues tl1at demand 
their attention. Foremost among these is what attitude should be taken to 
attacks on the welfare state? Should the attacks be warded off? Or 
should the welfare state's opponents be allowed to consign it to the dust-
bin of history? 
Undoubtedly, the reaction by Marxists must ultimately be grounded 
in an understanding of the extent to which the state is able to override 
the economic contradictions intrinsic to capitalism by means of 
welfarism and Keynesian interventionism. Whilst the very crisis we ate 
at present experiencing suggests the state is UJzable to fulfil this role, 
even if the fate of social democracy is in the long term sealed, it is by no 
means certain that in the short term Marxists should allow attacks on 
New Zealand's welfare state to proceed unhindered. A conscious 
decision must be taken either to defend or not to defend the welfare 
state, but the decision must be just that: conscious, and based on sound 
empirical evidence. After weighing the evidence, it may well be decided 
that the attacks will not be warded off and that Marxists should focus 
their political energies elsewhere. But whatever the stance adopted, it 
must be based on an empirical examination of the historical 'track 
record' of the welfare state. 
This study aims not to specify what the 'correct' reaction should be; as 
the province of political organizations such a task necessarily falls 
outside t11e jurisdiction of an academic thesis. Rather, it attempts the 
more limited task of furnishing evidence with which to set the reaction 
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by Marxists on a surer footing. In light of this aim, at least part of the 
evidence to be taken into account is the extent to which the welfare state 
has provided palpable material gains to the working class. It is all the 
more important to subject to scrutiny the claim that the welfare state has 
enhanced wage-earners' living standards, insofar as social democrats 
use just such an argument to challenge the Marxist theory of the state. 
While it may be claimed that the impending demise of social democracy 
renders such assertions invalid, to dismiss them outright would not only 
be dogmatic, but downright unwise, insofar as some Marxists echo their 
claim that the welfare state has improved the material position of the 
working class. On the latter count alone, these matters warrant further 
consideration. 
(1.2) Delimitation of Problem 
That the bourgeois state is merely an expression of the class power of 
the bourgeoisie is an axiom fundamental to Marxism. For Marx, the 
state is no more than a medium through which the bourgeoisie 
perpetuates and bolsters its class power.l This is not to deny that the 
precise nature of the relationship between the state and the ruling class 
has long been at the heart of debate within Marxism. For instance, in 
attempting to explain lww the state acts in the interests of the capitalist 
class, Nicos Poulantzas assigned priority to the 'relatively autonomous' 
state in shaping civil society, and class relations therein, and in doing so 
1Marx writes: "[the state] is no more then the form of organization which the 
bourgeoisie necessarily adopt ... for the mutuel guarantee of their property end 
Interests." Marx end Engels on Economics. Po!itics and Socletu, ed. J. E111ot. Sante 
Moni ce, Goodyear Pub 11 sh1 ng Company, 1961, p.344. 
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almost reversed the polarity established by Marx.l Despite such 
differences, however, the classic and contemporary Marxist 
conceptualizations of the state possess a singular unity: they concur that 
in tl1e long run the state acts in the class interests of the bourgeoisie. 
A decisive shift of the state into new spheres of operation during the 
long boom experienced globally by capitalist societies posed a 
fundamental challenge to the way in which Marxists conceptualize the 
state. The principal features of this change in state function are 
succinctly summarized by Bullock and Yaffe: 
In all the major capitalist states today, a large proportion of the 
Gross Domestic Product, and in some cases the largest, is 
administered by the state itself. This development has proceeded 
throughout the post war boom - appearing as the growth of the 
so-called •mixed economy' and the •welfare state•. It finds its 
rationalization in the Keynesian notion of the state as mediator 
of the •uncontrolled• nature of capital. Its political 
representatives are the Social Democrats.2 
Social Democrats allege that the state, an institution Marx once labelled 
.. only an excrescence of society .. , underwent a qualitative 
transformation consequent upon these extensions of its sphere of 
operation. The emergence of the •welfare state• is said to refute the 
Marxist notion of the capitalist state as the institution through which the 
capitalist class exercises its political power. Workers purportedly 
lN. Poulenlzes, Political Power end Social Classes. London, New Left Books, 1973. 
The primacy Marx accorded civil society (the realm in which classes ere 
constituted) vis-a-vis the stele marks one of his major advances over Hegel. 
2p, Bullock end D. Yaffe, "Inflation, the Crisis end the Post-War Boom', 
Reyolutfoneru Communist, v.3/4, November 1975. p.33. 
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developed a material 'interest' in the state by virtue of the role of state 
welfare expenditure in enhancing their living standards. 
In New Zealand, social democracy found its initial expression in the 
policies of the first Labour Government. Through a range of 
interventions that created incentives and restrictions for the allocation 
of resources, the state undertook new ecoJ1o1nic functions.! Its new 
functions in the realm of social welfare involved the redistribution of 
income by means of fiscal policy, and the provision of 'free' and of 
subsidized social services, and monetary benefits.2 These latter changes 
fostered the social democratic belief that the first Labour Government 
launched a "workers' state". 3 
It was noted in the introduction that social democracy is presently 
meeting its fate at the hands of the fourth Labour Government, to wit 
the economy is becoming less 'mixed' and the state is shedding its 
welfare function. To the end of formulating a Marxist response to this 
latter development, the need to empirically ascertain whether the 
welfare state has provided palpable gains to the working class is 
heightened by t11e global claims of some Marxists that the welfare state 
lR. Chapmen, 'From Labour To National', The Oxford Hfstoru of New Zealand, ed. 
W. H. Olfver. We11fngton, Oxford University Press, 1961. 
2E. Hanson, The Polftlcs of Social Securttu. Auckland, Auckland University Press, 
1960, pp.41-96. It must be noted, however, that the 'welfare state' can be dated 
to the legislation introduced by the Liberal Government in the late nineteenth end 
early twentieth centuries. See: K. Slnclelr, A History of New Zealand. 
Hermondsworth, Penguin Books, 1960, pp.170-209. 
3B. Curtis, 'From Socialism To Opportunism', New Zealand MonthlU Review, 
no.317, April 1969, pp.13-16. 
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has indeed benefitted the working class- albeit in a manner assimilating 
workers into capitalism. 
While Marxists generally accept that welfarism was one of the key 
ingredients in the social democratic 'class compromise' at the heart of 
the long boom, some go so far as to suggest that that historic 
compromise was premised upon real material gains accruing to the 
working class. For instance, Lash and Urry argue that increased 
welfare expenditure was central to the 'corporatist solution' which 
'bought off' the working class, necessarily implying that the welfare 
state had played a part in materially improving the condition of the 
working class.l Central to what another author graphically labels the 
framework of "institutionalized class collaboration" at the heart of the 
Keynesian Welfare State 
was the increasingly systematic and pervasive involvement of 
the state, directly and indirectly, in the regulation of the 
reproduction of the working class through the wage, social 
insurance and social security, on the basis of a generalized 
expectation of rising wages, a guaranteed minimum subsistence, 
and a political commitment to full employment. 2 
Common to all such arguments is the notion that welfarism was an 
integral part of the post-war package of measures implemented by the 
state which, through enhancing or at least shoring up wage-earners' 
living standards, "bought off" or fostered the "class collaboration" of 
1 S. Lash end J. Urry, The End of Organized Cepltallsm. Madison, University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987, p.234. 
2cJerke, p.275. 
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the working class. As Clarke observes: 
the socialization of consumption was the liberal alternative to 
the socialization of production as the means of securing the 
social and political integration of the working class into the 
capitalist order.l 
However, it is not at all self-evident that the socialization of workers' 
consumption benefitted the working class as a wlwle. In other words, 
some segments of the working class may well have been 'bought off' at 
the expense of others. 
To assess the effects of the welfare state on the working class as a 
whole, it is not enough merely to point triumphantly at increased 
welfare spending, as Marxists even of Therborn's calibre have 
occasionally found themselves doing; the taxes paid by the working 
class must also be taken into account.2 More specifically, it is necessary 
to study empirically what the working class receives from the state 
compared to what it pays in. A seemingly simple enough proposition, 
yet few Marxists have bothered to consider it. 
Surprisingly enough, in a treatise on Marxist econo~ic theory, 
Gouverneur focuses upon the preceding point: 
In practice, products for collective use, intended in principle for 
all members of society, are financed by deductions from all 
incomes (National Insurance contributions and taxes, paid by 
1 Clerke. p.272. 
2G. Therbom. The Prospects of Labour and the Transformation of Advanced 
Cepftelfsm', New Left Reyfew, no.145, May-June 1984, pp.:26-:29. 
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wage-earners and capitalists alike). Hence the question: does the 
wage-earners' share in the fina.11ciJ1g of collective goods and 
services correspond to their share in the coJ1SUJnptioJ1 of these 
goods and services?l 
His answer to this question, however, is not as helpful as the manner in 
which it is posed. Gouverneur simply assumes that wage-earners 
finance the same proportion of collective goods and services as they 
consume. In his own words: "the wage-earners themselves finance their 
own (apparently 'free') collective consumption ( the consumption 
which they do not 'purchase' in the strict sense). "2 Under this 
assumption, the material position of the working class is neither 
enhanced nor worsened by the actions of the state. While this 
assumption suffices for Gouverneur's purposes (an exposition of 
Marxist tl1eory ) , insofar as there is no reason why it should hold 
empirically, it is inadequate for ours. 
If the share of collective goods and services (to which I will 
subsequently argue monetary benefits must be appended) workers 
consume is not proportional to the taxes they pay, some form of 
redistribution of wealth between the classes must necessarily occur. 
Logically, there are two possible scenarios: 
1J. Gouverneur, Contemoorerv Cepftellsm end Marxist Economics. Oxford, Merlin 
Robertson, 1983, p.69. 
2Gouverneur, p.69. 
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EITHER: 
Wage-earners contribute Jnore wealth in taxes to the state than they 
'consume' in collective goods and services, and monetary benefits. 
(Scenario 011e) 
OR: 
Wage-earners contribute less wealth in taxes to the state than they 
'consume' in collective goods and services, and monetary benefits. 
(Scenario Two) 
Each scenario is accompanied by a specific set of implications. In 
Scenario 011e, welfare expenditure received by wage-earners is funded 
entirely from their own taxes, the- state merely redistributing income 
witbin the working class to the value of the welfare ·expenditure 
received. Furthermore, the state effects a redistribution of income from 
the working class to the capitalist class (and/or the state itself) in the 
amount of the difference between taxes paid by wage-earners and the 
welfare expenditure they receive. In Sce11ario Two, the welfare 
expenditure received by the working class is funded partly from the 
taxes paid by the capitalist class. Thus, the state effects a redistribution 
of income from capitalists to wage-earners. 
For the welfare state to have enhanced the consumption and income 
levels of the working class as a whole, Scenario Two must obtain: wage-
earners must receive more from the state then they contribute to it. In 
13 
other words, the state must redistribute income from the capitalist class 
to the working class. Indeed, the situation depicted in Scenario Two is 
one of the perennial claims made by social democrats, according to 
whom a beneficent state acts to enhance the living standards of the 
working class. Subjecting the preceding propositions to an empirical 
test will therefore simultaneously afford a test of one of the 
fundamental tenets of social democracy. 
Similarly, if Marxists are to claim that the welfare state has enhanced 
the living standards of the working class as a wlwle (and some such as 
Therborn come perilously close to this), they commit themselves to just 
such a view, despite pointing to the deleterious effects of welfarism in 
assimilating wage-earners into capitalism. If it is found that Scenario 
One holds, then the state has 'bought off' the working class with 
increased welfare expenditures using wage-earners' own money. In 
other words, wage-earners will have funded their 'socialized 
consumption' tl1e1nselves. 
To establish which of the preceding scenarios holds, it is necessary to 
compare the amount of income workers receive from the state to the 
taxes they pay to the state.l A1tJ.10ugh this imperative may appear to be 
self-evident, surprisingly few Marxist studies have attempted to 
quantify in precise empirical terms the relationship between t11e state 
expenditure wage-earners receive and the taxes they pay. An empirical 
1Although It Is unllkely to obtain, Gouverneur's hypothesized situation, In which 
wege-eemers receive precisely the same amount of Income from the state as they 
pay in taxes, Is nonetheless possible end hence can be regarded as a third 
'scenario' .. 
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test of what appears to be an elementary set of propositions has certainly 
never been carried out before in New Zealand. This i~ not to say that 
there have not been studies of income redistribution; rather, most of 
these studies have other axes to grind. It will come as no surprise that 
the bourgeois literature in this area typically does not focus its attention 
at the level of social classes. 1 In this respect, the criticism Freeman 
incisively levels at 'conventional' (i.e. bourgeois) poverty studies 
equally applies to bourgeois income redistribution studies: "[they] 
concentrate on the differential effects of state policy on households of 
different wage levels. The quantity of income, rather than its source, is 
considered decisive. "2 This trend in research is illustrated well by some 
of the most recent studies by bourgeois scholars in New Zealand. 3 
Marxist studies are similarly lacking. On the one hand, Bedggood 
compares taxes paid and expenditure received by the working class as a 
whole, but does so only in general terms.4 In a neo-Weberian study, 
Pearson and Thorns do much the same. 5 Both studies suggest that 
income has not been redistributed from the capitalist class to the 
working class (implying that Scenario One obtains), but neither affords 
lsee: G. Westrete, 'An Estimate of the Magnitude of Income Redistribution In New 
Zeeland', The Economic Record, April 1957, pp.97-1 02. W. Rosenberg, A 
Guidebook to New Zeeland's Future. Christchurch, Cexton, 1966, p.1 03. 
2A. Freemen, The Effect of the State on the Living Standards of Wage-Earners In 
Brttafn 1969-1964. Unpublished Peper, n.d., p.2. 
3G. Buurmen, 'Issues on Social Welfare end Economic Equeiity' end 'Social Welfare 
Benefits end Income Distribution fn New Zeeland', The New Zeeland Economu: 
Issues and Policies, ed. S. Birks endS. Chatterjee. Pelmerston North, Dunmore 
Press, 1966. 
4o. Bedggood, Rich and Poor fn New Zealand. Auckland, George Allen end Unwin, 
1960, pp.95-113. 
so. Pearson end D. Thorns, Ecllose of Eaua11tu. Sydney, George Allen end Unwin, 
pp. 99-104. 
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a prec1se empirical quantification of the income-flows in question. 
Hence the preceding scenarios are not subjected to a rigorous empirical 
test. 
Then again, how to precisely quantify the impact of the welfare state 
in redistributing income between social classes is by no means obvious. 
Not only are there considerable difficulties associated with the task of 
empirically estimating the portion of state expenditure that accrues to 
workers, thorny problems are encountered in using the loaded term 
'welfare state'. Use of this term to denote the change in state function 
identified previously is not without its problems. As Gough points out: 
the very term 'welfare state' reveals the ideological nature of 
most writing about it. Put another way, the object of our study is 
defined in terms of a theoretical tradition which we reject.l 
The term 'welfare state' is entangled in bourgeois conceptual categories 
to the degree that it has resisted even the attempts of some bourgeois 
theorists to extricate it.2 Moreover, Marxist studies of the 'welfare 
state', insofar as they do surmount problems of definition, typically 
focus on welfare expenditure as a whole. 3 This approach sheds no light 
on the problem at hand. The focus of this study must be narrowed to the 
11. Gough, The Political Economu of the Welfare State. London, MacMillan, 1979, 
p.3. 
2such semantic difficulties are evident in the classic work of R. Iitmuss.See this 
author's: Essaus On The Welfare State'. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1956. 
3The most recent example in the New Zealand literature is: J. Martin, The Modern 
Welfare State and Expenditure in New Zeeland', State Papers. Department of 
Sociology, Massey University, Pelmerston North, 1962. 
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portion of welfare expenditure received by the working class: the social 
wage. 
(1.3) A Definition of the 'Social Wage' 
The social wage has been variously defined as monetary benefits 
received by workers, monetary benefits ru1d social services received by 
workers, and some even commit the error of using the term 
synonymously and interchangeably with 'welfare state' - returning the 
debate once again to the quagmire of bourgeois categories.! 
Under Gough's definition, for instance, the 'social wage' denotes only 
the Jno11etary be11efits that accrue to the working class. Social services 
such as education and health (or, as he puts it, 'benefits in kind') are 
labelled 'collective consumption'. In support of this distinction he 
argues: 
cash benefits augment money income and are used to purchase 
co1n1nodities. State-provided services are directly consumed as 
use values: no money payment is made as with the consumption 
of commodities.2 
But this definition is arbitrary, based as it is more on the semantic 
connotations of the term 'wage' than on criteria of any real significance. 
Gough narrowly construes the 'wage' to mean a distinct sum of money 
lR. Chernomes offends in this latter regard. See his: 'Is Supply-Side Economics 
Ret tonal For Capital?', Reytew of Radical Political Economy, v.19, no.3, 1967, 
pp.1-17. 
2Gough, p. 116. 
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either mediated by a market (the labour-market in the case of the direct 
wage) or taking the form of a transfer payment (the 'cash benefits' in 
question) with which wage-goods are purchased. 
He forgets, however, that state-provided collective commodities that 
are "directly consumed as use-values" are themselves ultimately funded 
from general taxation in the same manner as cash benefits. In this light, 
they can be considered "money payments" (Gough's term) returned to 
the working class in the form of use-values. Furthermore, insofar as 
collective commodities (i.e. social services) play a part in determining 
wage-earners' consumption levels, there.is no reason to exclude them 
from the social wage.1 Thus both the monetary benefits and social 
services that accrue to the working class will henceforth be denoted by 
the term 'social wage'. 
It must be noted that this definition is limited to what might be termed 
the 'state-provided' social wage.2 It could be argued that direct 
contributions by employers to employees' social security schemes, 
redundancy funds and so forth, are part of the social wage. The 
definition used in this work, however, will restrict the term 'social 
wage' to the fraction of taxes appropriated by tl1e state in providing 
social services and monetary benefits to the working class. 
1Russe111ncludes stete expenditure on soclel services- "subsistence use-values" 
es he terms them- in the social wege, purporting to follow Gough, when In point 
of feet the letter theorist omits this element of stete expenditure. B. Russell, The 
Politics of Labour-Force Reproduction: Funding Cenede's Soclel Wege 1917-
1946', Studies In Political Economu. v.14, Summer 1984, p.46. 
2-rhls term Is derived from Russell's study cited above. 
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(1.4) Problems in Identifying the Empirical Referent of the 
•social Wage• 
It is all very well to claim in theory that the social wage equals the 
portion of cash benefits and social services accruing to the working 
class, but in practice how does one decide which portion this is? After 
all, state expenditure is not differentiated in the national accounts 
according to the class that receives it. Whilst expenditures such as the 
unemployment benefit can be readily assigned i11 toto to the working 
class, expenditures which the capitalist class undoubtedly receives a 
portion of (health and education for instance) are more troublesome. 
Furthermore, the assumption involved in apportioning state 
expenditure to the working class as the social wage - that wage-earners 
in some way 'consume' state expenditure- is not at all non-contentious. 
Take for instance the notion that wage-earners consume state 
expenditure on education. A large body of Marxist literature suggests 
just the opposite occurs: the education system, in its capacity as a 
functional component of the capitalist system (a mechanism of social 
selection), 'consumes' wage-earners; or rather it consumes working 
class children, and churns out a future generation of wage-earners as 
veritable grist to the capitalist mi11.1 
The problems outlined in the two paragraphs immediately preceding, 
will henceforth be referred to respectively as the 'small' and 'large' 
1For instance, see: s. Bowles and H. G1nt1s, Schooling In Cap1tallst America. 
London, Routledge and Keg an Paul, 1976. 
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problems of estimating the social wage. The first is the problem of 
assigning specific compo11e11ts of state expenditure to wage-earners as 
the social wage; the second is the very notion that state expenditure can 
be assigned in this manner (i.e. that wage-earners 'consume' state 
expenditure). That this latter notion is contentious removes the 
identification of the social wage's empirical referent from the realms of 
a purely technical or methodological exercise, and requires that issues 
of an explicitly 'theoretical' nature be considered.! 
These issues are by no means only encountered in estimating the 
social wage. The tensions involved in the large problem of estimating 
the social wage are a reflection of a broader set of tensions that have 
long troubled Marxist theories of the state in general. Indeed, as 
Leonard insightfully remarks: 
All sensitive and careful Marxist writing on the state and on the 
'economy has to walk a tightrope between crude functionalism 
and starry-eyed voluntarism - at its extreme, between seeing the 
welfare state as wholly oppressive and seeing it as a bastion of 
socialism within a capitalist economy.2 
A response often invoked by Marxists is that such tensions in the realm 
of theory merely reflect actually existing contradictions in the real 
world. That such contradictions exist it is certain. For instance, to the 
1These labels should not be construed as Implying the relative 'size' of the two 
problems In any strict sense. It wfll be evident from the discussion In Chapter 
Three below that the small problem requires almost as much cogitation as the 
large problem. Rather, the labels chosen reflect that the large problem concerns 
fundamental theoretical Issues that cut to the very heart of Marxism, whereas the 
small problem concerns Issues that are largely methodological In nature. 
2p. Leonard, 'Editor's Introduction', The Political Economu of the Welfare State, I. 
Gough. London, MacMflJan, 1979, p.lx. 
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extent that state expenditure on health improves the health of wage-
earners, it also plays a part in creating a healthy supply of labour-power 
for the capitalist system.l 
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For empirical analysis to proceed at all, however, the tension between 
the notion that workers 'consume' state expenditure and the 'function' 
of state expenditure within the capitalist system must be circum vented 
by means of a set of assumptions, 'working hypotheses' if you will, that 
provide criteria with which to distinguish expenditures accruing to the 
working class from those accruing to the capitalist class, without 
regarding all state expenditure as expressly serving the immediate 
functional requirements of the capitalist system. This approach is 
neither insensitive nor lacking in care; rather it is necessary for 
empirical research of this type to be carried out. 
In light of the foregoing, the 'large' problem will be solved by means 
of a detailed theoretical analysis locating the social wage and its source 
of revenue in taxes within the conceptual categories of Marxist 
economic theory. The 'small' problem will be solved in the course of 
adopting a metl10dology to quantify the impact of the state on inter-class 
income redistribution. It is to identifying such a methodology that I now 
turn. 
1 For an 1ns1ghtfu1 discussion of the preceding set of contradict1ons, see: B. 
H1ndess, Freedom. EgyalltU and the Market. London, Tav1stock, 1987, pp.1 05-
119. 
(1.5) The Need For a Method 
Gauging the redistributive effects of the state in relation to the 
working class requires a methodology that performs two functions. 
First, it must supply a procedure to apportion state expenditure to the 
working class (i.e. to solve the 'small' problem mentioned above), 
thereby identifying the social wage's empirical referent. Second, the 
method must juxtapose the social wage in a meaningful way to taxes 
ceded by the working class to the state, preferably expressing this 
relation in a single synthetic index or measure of some form. This, 
however, is a tali order. 
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Empirical studies of this type by Marxists are rare. While there are a 
number of purportedly Marxist studies that focus explicitly on the 
redistribution of income by the state, most do not situate their analyses 
at the level of the working class as a whole. The work. of Drover and of 
Young is a case in point.l Insofar as they do not focus on the wlwle of 
the working class, these scholars do not confront the issues of estimating 
the social wage and its comparison to the taxes ceded by wage-earners to 
the state. By inferring from a limited number of sets of working class 
individuals, families and so forth, their studies closely resemble 
lG. Drover. 'Income Redistribution·. lnegualiHr Esseus in the Po11ticeJ Economu of 
Socfel Welfare, ed. A. Moscovltch end G. Drover. Toronto. Toronto University 
Press. 1981. See also: B. Voung. Taxation end the Capite Jist Stele', fn the same 
volume. 
bourgeois analyses of income redistribution such as van Arnhem and 
Schotsman's.t 
Macro-level studies of inter-class income redistribution are also 
notably sparse in the broader Marxist literature on the welfare state. 
An interesting though somewhat esoteric theoretical study that touches 
on the issue of income redistribution is the work of Wallerstein and 
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Przewors.ki, but it is of little use for the e1npirical task at hand.2 For 
that matter, there is a paucity of empirical work by Marxist political 
sociologists on the welfare state per se. Indeed, Goran Therborn argues 
that such a literature is only emerging now. In a recent article, 
Therborn identifies two 'phases' of neo~Marxist political theory; he 
argues that the first, whose progenitors were Poulantzas and Miliband, 
failed to adequately confront the welfare state. 3 A body of literature 
launching the second 'phase', he argues, bears witness to a "1980s 
renaissance of Marxist political analysis", characterized precisely by an 
"empirical focus ... [on] the welfare state" .4 This literature, however, 
lc. van Arnhem end G. Schotsmen, 'Do Parties Affect the Distribution of Income?: 
The case of Advanced Cepitelfst Democracies', The Impact of Parties, ed. F. Castles. 
London, Sage, 1982. 
2M. Wallerstein end A. Przeworskf, 'Workers' Welfare end the Socialization of 
Capital', RotjonalitU and Revolution, ed. M. Taylor. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988. 
3G. Therborn, 'Karl Marx Returning: The Welfare State and Neo-Marxlst, 
Corporatist and Statist Theories', International Political Science Review, v.7, 
no.2, April 1986, p. 133. 
4rherborn, p.133. He claims that "e new ... class theory of polftlcs end states" 
has recently begun to assert Itself, one of the distinguishing features of which Is 
"its Inspiring commitment to the working-class movement"(p.133). Foremost 
among this literature he Identifies the work of Korpi. See: W. Korpi, Ihe. 
Democratfc Class Struggle. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. 
is of no assistance in assessing the state's impact on inter-class income 
redistribution. 
The relationship between t11e welfare state and the economy is a more 
fertile area of debate, characterized by considerable diversity. 
According to Rowthorn's 'profit-squeeze' argument, for instance, state 
welfare expenditure retards capital accumulation, suggesting that the 
relationship between the capitalist state and society is not nearly as 
symbiotic as Marxist economists of Laurence Harris's ilk would have us 
be1ieve.1 On the other hand, 'functional' arguments such as Moscovitch 
and Drover's suggest that in the long run welfare expenditure cannot 
have this effect.2 
The preceding studies are only the veritable 'tip of the iceberg', the 
two poles of a debate which has spawned a vast literature largely dealing 
with agendas other than the state and inter-class income redistribution. 
Nevertheless, two empirical studies that focus on this issue have been 
1 B. Row thorn, 'Late Capltalfsm·, New Left Review, no.96, July-August 1976, 
pp.71-73. Harris writes: 'The relationship between the state and civil society is, 
In normal times, two-way. In terms of this economy the state In capitalist 
societies (and others) depends upon the private sector for the taxes and Joens to 
pay its employees and buy resources, but the private sector itself depends upon 
the state for many of the conditions that enable it to operate: for laws defining and 
protecting property, for guaranteeing the stability of money, and for regulating 
competition at the very least"(p.53). L. Harris, 'State and Economy in the Second 
World War', State and Societu In Contemporaru Britain: A Cr1tlcal Introduction, 
ed. G. Mclennan, D. Held and s. Hall. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1964. 
2-rhey write: "the economic conditions In society are themselves In the last resort 
determining of social welfare measures In any period of time. Generally, 
therefore, fiscal welfare measures such as Income redistribution, taxation, or 
social expenses will bolster, or at least not threaten, the accumulation of profits 
and capital." Editor's Preface, lnegyalltu: Essaus In the Political Economu of Social 
Welfare, eds. A. Moscovltch and G. Drover. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
1961, p.viil. 
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drawn from this literature: the first by an American Marxist economist, 
E. Ahmet Tonak, and the second by Ian Gough in his landmark 
'Political Economy of the Welfare State'. The rationale for utilizing 
Tonak's method, in testing which of the previously identified scenarios 
obtains in New Zealand, will be outlined by means of a critique of the 
methodology used by Gough to crudely fashion British national 
accounts data into a study of the state's impact on income redistribution. 
(1.6) How Does Gough•s Methodology •Measure Up•? 
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In an attempt to understand the impact of taxation and of state 
expenditure in Britain, Gough constructs some interesting empirical 
indices to trace "the flows of taxes and social benefits between the state 
and all 'households' in the economy" .1 To this end, he divides the 
economy into t11e state sector and the 'personal' sector, and calculates in 
several stages the flows of income between the two sectors for the year 
of 1975. The product of his labours is the discovery that "The net 
financial result of ... state intervention [to modify initial incomes] in 
1975 was a flow of £5 billion from the 'personal' sector to the state. 
This contributed to t11e cost of other items of state expenditure, on arms, 
infra-structure and . . . on aid to the capitalist sector of the economy. "2 
In other words, the 'personal sector' paid £5 billion more in taxes than 
was received back from the state in the various forms of state 
expenditure. On the basis of this finding, he concludes: "the state has 
1 Gough, p. 1 08. 
2Gough, p. 11 0. 
transferred substantially more from the personal sector than it has 
transferred back via the welfare state .... "1 
Gough's study, although producing results appealing to Marxists, is 
limited in that the 'personal' sector is in reality divided along the lines 
of class and must be so treated. He does not determine the extent to 
which flows of taxes from the 'personal' sector to the state sector derive 
from capital as opposed to labour, nor does he differentiate those in 
receipt of state expenditure in this fashion. Hence, he does not actually 
estimate the social wage (at least not in terms of the definition adhered 
to in this work). 
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Gough himself cautions that his study "treat[s] the whole personal 
sector as a homogeneous unit and do[es] not distinguish the major social 
classes within it. "2 He notes that his 'temptation' to engage in an analysis 
taking this distinction into account was curbed by the "amount of extra 
work" involved. He proceeds to develop an elaborate conceptual model 
which registers this distinction, but still does not provide any way of 
empirically discerning classes within the 'personal' sector. Nor does he 
provide any means of empirically identifying the effects of the state in 
redistributing incomes between classes- only 'sectors'. 
Gough attempts to supplement his study with an analysis of tax-
1 Gough, p. 11 0. 
2Gough, p. 114. 
incidence. On the basis of government data he argues: 
the welfare state is primarily an agency for redistributing 
income 'horizontally' between families of different types and in 
different situations .... In other words, the welfare state 
redistributes income within the wage and salary-earning class 
(the working class, broadly conceived), not from the upper and 
upper-middle classes downwards, and certainly not necessarily 
from profits to wage incomes.! 
Despite the appeal of this conclusion to Marxist scholars, the empirical 
analysis from which it is drawn is inadequate in that it is not situated at 
the level of social classes, instead considering only a handful of 
households of differing income-levels. 
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Gough does not adequately provide a means of empirically 
differentiating between state expenditure received by the classes witl1in 
the personal sector, nor the taxes they pay. This crucial weakness 
renders his study worthless for proving anything in relation to the role 
of the state in redistributing income between social classes. In this 
respect, Gough's problems are primarily methodological: his study 
lacks a method affording an empirical quantification of the 
redistributive activities of the state in relation to social classes. Tonak's 
contribution is to develop such a method. 
1 Gough, p. 1 14. 
(1. 7) A Methodological Innovation: The Work of Tonak 
Tonak's study focuses on tl1e United States in the years 1952-1980 and 
aims to investigate: 
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how the state directly participates in the distribution process vis-
a-vis the working class and what effect such participation has on 
the wages of workers.l 
He adopts a novel empirical approach to this problem by developing the 
concept of 'net-tax', defined as "taxes paid to the state minus benefits 
and income received from it". Empirically calculating a 'net-tax series', 
that identifies the amount of net-tax the working class pays, forms the 
bulk of his paper. 
Tonak's subsidiary interest is to empirically identify workers' 'true 
wage' by· adjusting nominal wages for the effects of the income flows 
associated with welfare expenditure. This involves "the theoretical 
construction and empirical estimation of an appropriate measure of 
wages, adjusted for the net effects of state taxes and expenditures" .2 
This measure he terms the 'true wage', its empirical estimate he labels 
the 'observed true wage'. 
Tonak differentiates between two stages of analysis that measure net-
tax incidence. First is the analysis of 'Type One' incidence, which is 
1E. A. Tonak, The U.S. Welfare State and the Working Class 1952-1980', Rey1ew 
of Radical Poltt!cal Economy, v.19, no.1, 1987, p.47. 
2ronak, p.48. 
characterized by "The difference between the measure of the nominal 
wage of workers and the[ir] true wage .... "1 Second is the analysis of 
'Type Two' incidence, which entails "comparison of [the] observed true 
wage with [the] estimated true wage which would occur under some 
hypothesized alternative conditions .... "2 Tonak, however, restricts 
bis study to Type One incidence. Analysis of Type Two incidence is 
ruled out of Tonak's study on tbe grounds tbat it would require 
development of sopbisticated Marxist macro-economic models. 
Tonak.locates bis analysis at the level of the working class as a whole, 
and sets forth a methodology with which to assign state expenditure to 
wage-earners. In so doing, he takes a methodological 'quantum leap' 
over Gough's study, and simultaneously solves the small problem of 
estimating the social wage. This study will empirically operationalize 
Tonak.'s concept of 'net-tax' by using his methodology to configure a set 
of data drawn from New Zealand's national accounts. Empirically 
operationalizing 'net-tax' will facilitate a test of the propositions 
developed earlier: whether the state in New Zealand has redistributed 
income to the working class, or away from the working class. 3 
(1.8) Aims and Scope of Thesis 
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At the outset of tl1is cl1apter, it was argued tbat the reaction by 
Marxists to attacks on the welfare state must be based on a thorough 
lronek, pp.46-49. 
2ronak, p.49. 
3Jnsorer as this task Is the main focus or this study, the strand or Tonak's work 
concerning the Incidence of net-tax will not be developed any further. 
grasp of the actual empirical effects of the welfare state on the living-
standards of the working class. This involves testing the social 
democratic-proposition (seemingly adhered to by some Marxists) that 
the welfare state ltas benefitted the working class. Having arrived at a 
broad conception of the manner in which welfarism in New Zealand 
will be put 'on trial' -assessing the state's impact on inter-class income 
redistribution - these concerns were crystallized into a set of 
empirically testable propositions, or 'scenarios', each with a specific set 
of implications. 
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It was established that the only way that the working class as a whole 
can. benefit from the state-provided social wage is if the state 
redistributes income from capitalists to wage-earners (or, in other 
words, only if wage-earners pay less in taxes than they receive in state 
expenditure). Whether the state has enhanced the living standards of the 
working class as a whole, or whether it has merely shuffled income 
witl1i11 the working class, will be empirically ascertained by testing the 
set of propositions developed previously. 
Only two empirical studies which attempt to precisely quantify the 
impact of the state on inter-class income redistribution have been 
identified. Of these, only one was deemed to have a methodology 
suitable for evaluating the extent to whicl1 the scenarios outlined above 
hold in New Zealand. Undoubtedly, other approaches may exist, but tlte 
rapidity with which Tonak's methodology has been seized on and 
applied by Marxists the world over suggests that his work represents 
one of the first real attempts to grapple with these issues.! 
The overriding aim of this thesis is to use Tonak•s method to 
empirically quantify the degree of inter-class income redistribution 
effected by the state in New Zealand. Hence, this study proceeds as an 
attempt to address a largely unexamined empirical problem using an 
innovative methodology, rather than a test of some or other theory or 
•model• as such. In this .light, a further aim of this thesis is to evaluate 
the efficacy of Tonak•s method in illuminating the redistributive 
activities of the state. 
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The scope of this study has been largely determined by the availability 
of the national accounts data used in applying Tonak•s method to New 
Zealand. The constraints imposed by the data will be elaborated further 
in Chapter Three; suffice to say at this point that a standardized data-set 
is only available for the years 1949-75, and these years have been 
assigned as the parameters of the time-period that will be considered. 
The task of delimitation completed, it remains only to provide a brief 
overview of the structure of the thesis. Chapter Two will present a 
theoretical discussion which will clear away the debates associated with 
the large problem of estimating tbe social wage, in order for tbe 
empirical analysis to proceed. Chapter Tl1ree will outline Tonak's 
method and establish the foundation for its application to a data-set 
lsee the remerk by Tonek cited on p.32 below. 
drawn from New Zealand's national accounts. A considerable portion 
of tilis chapter will deal witil tile 'small' problem of estimating tile social 
wage. Tonak's methodology will be used to allocate specific 
compone11ts of state expenditure to the working class, in order to 
construct tile social wage's empirical referent. Particular attention will 
also be paid to tile applicability of Tonak's method to New Zealand and 
the strategies employed in its adaptation: 
On tile basis of the framework developed in Chapter Three, Tonak's 
category of 'net-tax' will be empirically operationalized in Appendix 
One. The resulting data will be presented and analysed in Chapter Four; 
which of the two 'scenarios' specified previously hold in New Zealand 
will be ascertained in this chapter. Chapter Five will draw tile tilesis to a 
close, by presenting a global assessment of the findings and the 
methodology. 
Marxists have not carried out studies such as t11is mainly because of 
the lack of a method with which to empirically quantify the 
redistributive activities of the state. Insofar as these are primarily 
failings of method, when a new method comes to light it must be used. 
That Tonak's work represents a major methodological advance is borne 
out by tile speed with which Marxists around the world have adopted it. 
He remarks: "As an on-going collective research activity, similar 
frameworks have already been applied to the United Kingdom and 
other European countries" .1 An application of Tonak's framework to 
lronek, p.71, n.13. 
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New Zealand is well overdue; this study will attempt to remedy this 
state of affairs. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Considerations in 
Identifying the Source of State Revenue and 
Expenditure 
(2.1) Introductory Remarks 
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Wl1ile Tonak' s method solves the small problem of allocating specific 
components of state expenditure to wage-earners, the large problem 
(the notion that wage-earners 'consume' state expenditure in the first 
place) remains to be dealt with before the social wage can be estimated, 
and thus before Tonak's 'net-tax' category can be empirically 
operationalized.1 To solve the large problem, this chapter will be 
devoted solely to the task of locating the social wage and its source of 
revenue in taxes within the conceptual categories of Marxist economic 
theory. As a theoretical 'ground-clearing' exercise, it will not only 
form the foundation of the empirical analysis subsequently attempted in 
Chapter Three, but also provide the very rationale for an empirical 
analysis. 
The principal concern at this stage of the analysis is not to determine 
which of the specific components of state expenditure are 'consumed' 
by wage-earners. The task of identifying the empirical referent of the 
social wage will be held over to Chapter Tl1ree. Rather, it will be 
lronak does not deal wfth this Issue fn the published text on which I rely, simply 
taking for granted the notfon that wage-earners consume a portfon of state 
expenditure. Although his doctoral dissertation may contain such a discussion, It is 
not as yet available for public dissemlnatfon: E. A. Tonak, A Conceotuallzatlon of 
State Revenues and Expenditures. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Incomplete), 
Department of Economics, New School For Social Research, New Vork. 
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established that for the working class to be considered to consume a 
portion of state expenditure at all, regardless of its specific empirical 
content, requires the income-flows involved to be conceptualized as 
originating in variable capital. More precisely, the empirical analysis 
can only proceed if an argument can be sustained that the source of the 
taxes that fund the social wage is variable capital. To this end, it is 
necessary to refute the arguments made by some Marxists that all taxes 
ultimately derive from surplus value. 
(2.2) Do Wage-Earners 'Consume' State Expenditure? 
The relation of state expenditure and revenue to Marx's value-
categories has engendered a fundamental disagreement within Marxist 
theory. Any attempt to conceptually identify the source of state 
expenditure inevitably requires an examination of Marxist debates over 
taxation. On the one hand, some Marxists maintain that the source of all 
taxes is surplus value. 1 That" a portio11 of taxes are surplus value is a 
singularly non-contentious proposition - all self-respecting Marxists 
would agree that taxes used fund the overtly repressive elements of the 
bourgeois state apparatus (military, police, courts and so forth) are 
derived from surplus value. Indeed, this relation forms the material 
basis of the bourgeois state: the capitalist class yields a portion of 
surplus value in the form of taxes to fund the state.2 However, the claim 
1see section 2.3.1 below. 
2E. Mandel, 'Methodological Issues In Defining the Class Nature of the Bourgeois 
State', Marxlsmus und Anthropologle, Bochum, Germinal Verlag, 1980 (Trans!. J. 
Bendien, August 1985), pp.21-24. 
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that all taxes, and by implication all state expenditures, are funded 
from surplus value is decidedly controversial.! 
It is essential to examine this set of debates, for if all state expenditure 
has its source of revenue in surplus value (which is the necessary 
corollary of the claim that all taxes derive from surplus value), a 
portion of state expenditure cannot be regarded as being 'consumed' in 
any strict sense by wage-earners. Insofar as the expenditures that might 
otherwise be regarded as being consumed by wage-earners (a portion 
of state-provided social services and monetary benefits) are funded 
from surplus value, they must be assumed to unambiguously serve the 
functional interests of the capitalist system, and to be 'repressive' in the 
immediate sense, because it is precisely by virtue of the repressive state 
apparatus being funded out of surplus value that provides the material 
basis to its 'repressive' character. From this perspective, wage-earners 
do not consume a portion of state expenditure, therefore it is 
meaningless to attempt to empirically quantify a 'social wage'. To 
assume otherwise is to pose a fundamental challenge to the internal 
coherence of the Marxian framework. 
To assist in clarifying a somewhat convoluted debate, it will prove 
useful at this point to scl1ematize its main lines. To this end, the state and 
taxes will be located within the capitalist circuit- but even this l1as its 
attendant difficulties. A common misconception one author points to is 
1The debates over this Issue found their fullest expression In Britain In the 
1970s. Ben Fine, Laurence Harris and len Gough figured prominently amongst the 
protagonists In this theoretical affray. Their work Is discussed below. 
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the notion "that since taxes . . . are not governed by the market, or at 
least by tl1e simple laws of commodity exchange, they fall outside the 
scope of value-analysis. "1 As a consequence, "The enquirer is tempted 
to treat the state as an agent 'external' to the circulation of value".2 A 
moment of reflection, however, leads one to recall that the state must 
levy taxes in order to exist, and necessarily enters the realm of the 
"circulation of value" (to use Freeman's phrase) in doing so. The latter 
theorist himself makes the point well: "State taxes and spending do not 
lie on a circuit of use-value external to the market but are a component 
of tl1e overall circuit of annually-produced value. "3 
Therefore it is possible to locate within the capitalist circuit the 
impact of the state in levying taxes. 4 
M - C(LP.MP) ... P ... C' - M' 
The foregoing figure is a standard schematic representation of the 
capitalist circuit. A brief description of the manner in which it operates 
is in order. M corresponds to the money capital advanced by capitalists 
at the beginning of a production cycle to purchase the commodities (C) 
labour-power and meruzs of productio11 (respectively capital in its 
variable and constant forms). Both are combined in the process of 
1 Freemen. p.9. 
2Jbfd .• p.9. 
3Jbfd .• p.9. 
4rhe following discussion of the capitalist circuit is based on Marx's own 
discussion of the subject In Capital Volume Two. particularly Chapter One The 
Circuit of Money Capital'. For reasons of brevity It has been streamlined to a 
degree. K. Marx, Ceoitel: A Critjgue of Po11tjcal Economu. Yolyme Two. 
Harmondsworth. Penguin Books Ltd, 1 965. 
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production (P) to produce commodities of greater value (C') than the 
commodities that initially went into their production. The newly 
produced commodities (C') are then exchanged for a greater amount of 
money (M') than was originally laid out at the beginning of the circuit. 
This figure does not, however, readily lend itself to locating the state 
and taxes. Nor for that matter does it demonstrate the precise 
mechanism by which the valorization (increase in value) of capital 
represented by the difference between C and C' (equally between M and 
M') occurs. Both problems can be solved by examining the aggregate 
exchange-value output (C') of t11e circuit in greater detail. 
The component C' represents the total exchange-value of 
commodities produced in a single cycle of production, comprising the 
constituent components of capitalist production thus: 
C'=(c+v)+s. 
The components constant capital (c) aq.d variable capital (v) represent 
the total input costs to capitalists at the beginning of the production 
cycle. In Marx's words, constant capital is: 
That part of capital . . . which is turned into means of 
production, i.e. the raw material, the auxiliary material and the 
instruments of labour, [and] does not undergo any quantitative 
alteration of value in the process of production. 1 
1 K. Marx, Capital: A Crjligue of Political Economu. Volume One. Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books Ltd, 1962, p.317. 
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It is precisely because the value of this portion of capital is not 
'quantitatively altered' in the production process that Marx labels it 
'constant'. Variable capital, on the other hand, is the part of capital 
exchanged for the labour-power of members of the working class - it is 
the input cost to capitalists, represented by workers' wages. Hence, 
Marx defines variable capital as: 
that part of capital which is turned into labour-power ... [and] 
undergo[ es] an alteration of value in the process of production. 
It both reproduces the equivalent of its own value and produces 
an excess, a surplus value.t 
In the latter respect, this portion of capital is truly 'variable'. 
As the total input costs, constant capital and variable capital 
correspond to the the component M at the beginning of a production 
cycle. The component (s) represents the surplus value extracted from 
wage-earners - the new value they create over and above the value of 
their labour-power. It is by the amount of this 'surplus' value that C' 
(the aggregate exchange-value output) exceeds C (the input costs at the 
beginning of the production cycle), thereby representing the 
valorization of capital.2 It will be noted that C' is equal to gross 
exchange-value output in the sense that iJlter alia the wealth 
1 Marx, 'Capital Volume One·, p.317. 
2Cepite1 accumulation occurs when a portion of surplus value Is productively 
reinvested In extra labour-power and means of production In the next production 
cycle. See Chapter Two The Circuit of Productive Capital' In Part One of Capital 
Volume Two, and Pert Three of this same work, particularly Chapter 21 
'Accumulation end Reproduction on en Expanded Scale'. 
40 
appropriated by the state in the form of taxes has not been deducted. 
Indeed, tl1e schema C'=(c+v)+s assumes there is not a state, which of 
course is a grossly unrealistic assumption. The state, as an intrinsic 
feature of capitalism, must be inserted into this model. More 
specifically, the source of taxes levied by the state must be identified. 
It should be noted that the bracketing off of constant capital and 
variable capital in the preceding model emphasizes that ~ese are the 
• input costs to capitalists. The next 'moment' in the circuit after constant 
capital and variable capital have been advanced is the creation of new 
value. Workers create new value in the amount of variable capital laid 
out by capitalists in purchasing their labour-power, and surplus value-
the source of the capitalists' profit.l Equally, therefore, a slightly 
different notation can be used to signify variable capital and surplus 
value as the two components of new value created: 
C'=c+(v+s). 
As such, taxes must ultimately have their source in one or other - or 
botl1- of these categories. There simply is no other source from whence 
they can originate.2 Identifying which of these categories taxes do 
actually derive from is the crux of the argument under consideration. 
1Hence, the amount of surplus value created is a function of variable capital. Its 
determinants need not concern us here. 
21t wfll be recalled that constant cepHal (the portion of capital used to purchase 
the means of production) does not have the potential to create new value. 
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Reviewing the entire corpus of Marxist literature on taxation is a 
lengt11y task quite beyond the scope of this chapter. Considerable 
diversity of opinion exists within the two contemporary schools of 
thought, one of which claims that all taxes derive from surplus value, 
while the other bifurcates taxes into a surplus value component and a 
variable capital component. The arguments of a selection of theorists 
from each of these tendencies will be examined, using the foregoing 
schematic summary of the debate to orient the review. It is my intention 
to develop a critique of the argument that all taxes are derived from 
surplus value. 
(2.3) From Whence Do Taxes Originate? 
(2. 3.1) Tendency #1: All Taxes Originate From Surplus 
Value. 
Fine and Harris 
Exposition 
In the view of Fine and Harris, all taxes have their source in surplus 
value. They contend: 
In Marx's value analysis ... all taxes are taxes on capital and the 
source of all tax revenue is surplus value .... While taxes on 
labour may temporarily redistribute from labour to capital, the 
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normal situation will be for a restoration of the (net) value of 
wages to the value of labour-power.l 
The impact of a tax, even though it may fall immediately on workers, in 
the long term falls on the capitalist class because of subsequent wage 
increases this latter class must inevitably concede to the former. This 
claim entails a corollary: 
In Marx's value analysis, a tax on wages cannot effect a 
redistribution of values toward capital, for wage revenues equal 
the value of labour power and the net value of wages cannot be 
permanently depressed below it.2 
Their argument is deceptively plausible: when a tax increase, or the 
imposition of a tax, depresses money wages (the price of labour-
power) below the value of labour-power, a counter-tendency is set in 
motion which ultimately results in wages gravitating upwards to the 
value of labour-power.3 Any such tax is passed onto the capitalist class 
through their ha~ing to pay increased wages. Hence the true burden, or 
(in parlance of bourgeois economics) the incidence of taxation, falls on 
capitalists insofar as they ultimately have to concede increases in wages, 
which ceteris pmibus reduces the share of new value accruing to them 
as surplus value (the source of their profits). In this view, even if taxes 
levied on the working class are used to fund welfare expenditure, 
workers do not in tlte long run actually 'pay' (in the immediate sense) 
la. Fine end L. Herrls, 'Stete Expenditure In Advanced Cepltellsm: A Critique', NIDY. 
Left Review, no. 98, July-August 1976, p.l 06. 
2Fine end Harris, p.l 06. 
3For one of the clearest introductions to the concepts of value end price in the 
work of Merx, see his 'Weges, Price end Profit', Merx Engels Selected Works. 
Volume One. Moscow, Foreign Languages Publfshfng House, 1958. 
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for the social services and monetary benefits provided, because of the 
increase in wages which will inevitably result. They are still ultimately 
'taxes on capital'. Fine and Harris assert: 
The imposition of a tax on wages (or wage goods) must lead to a 
rise in gross wages; it is, therefore, in fact a tax on capital which 
is collected through the wage mechanism.l 
From the point of view of Marxist economic theory, it is the case that 
the wage, as the price of labour-power, fluctuates around the value of 
labour-power in the short term in accordance with the warp and weft of 
the trade cycle.2 This mechanism gives rise to movements in the prices 
of all commodities in accordance with the forces of supply and demand, 
and the price of labour-power (the wage) is no exception. Insofar as the 
trade cycle gives rise to changes in the supply of and demand for 
labour-power, the size of the reserve army of labour, mediated by the 
class struggle (the activities of trade unions and so forth); is the key 
variable in determining wage levels. In periods of prosperity, given 
low rates of unemployment, the demand for labour-power exceeds the 
supply of labour-power, hence its price- the wage- rises. In periods of 
economic crisis the opposite occurs: high rates of unemployment result 
in the supply of labour-power exceeding the demand for this 
commodity, and wage levels consequently fall. 3 
1Fine end Harris, p.106. 
2E. Mendel, 'Introduction', Capital: A Critique of Po11tjca1 Economy. Volume One, K. 
Marx. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd, 1982, p.68. 
3Mandel, 'Introduction', Capital Yolyme One, p.67. 
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A closer inspection of the relationship between the value and price of 
the commodity labour-power, however, reveals that Fine and Harris's 
argument is flawed. It is not at all the case that wages must necessarily 
increase to offset increased taxes, because of the dependence of wage 
fluctuations on a series of intermediary variables - foremost among 
these are movements in the value of labour-power itself. In the long 
term, wage fluctuations reflect movements in the value of labour-
power, which in turn are shaped by the accumulation of capital.! 
The accumulation of capital affects the value of labour-power in 
several key respects. First, as a result of the introduction of new and 
more efficient techniques, borne of competition between capitalist 
firms, increasing productivity of labour in the consumer goods sector 
(or department) reduces the value of labour-power (conceived as the 
value of a finite number of wage goods).2 Second, the tendency for the 
accumulation of capital to decrease the value of labour-power is 
accompanied by an increase in the actual number of wage-goods 
produced, which may through the process of class struggle come to be 
included in the moral-historical component of the value of labour-
power (tl1e consumption norms historically estab1isl1ed and accepted by 
wage-earners, as opposed to the component set by their pl1ysiological 
requirements). 3 This countervailing tendency augments the value of 
labour-power in the amount of the newly-included goods. Other t11ings 
being equal, an increase in the moral-historical component of the value 
1Mendel. 'Introduction·, Caoltal volume One, p.68. 
2tbid., p.68. 
3tbld., p.68. 
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of labour-power is more likely if the supply of labour-power is greater 
than the demand for labour-power.t 
Thus, given an increase in the productivity of labour and a 
consequent increase in the mass output of consumer goods, the value of 
labour power need not auto1natically decrease. If the productivity of 
labour increases and real wages (the nwnber of wage-goods the money 
wage buys) increase at too great a rate, workers simply purchase a 
greater number of wage-goods, maintaining the value of labour power 
at the same or a higher level than prior to the increase in productivity. 
An increase in the rate of exploitation does not therefore result -the 
latter may even decrease. Gouverneur concisely identifies the 
conditions required to bring about a decrease in the value of labour 
power in the foHowing manner: 
it is necessary (and sufficient) that the number of necessaries of 
life consumed should increase less than the fall in their average 
value. In other words, it is necessary (and sufficient) that the 
workers' level of consumptio11 slwuld increase less rapidly than 
productivity in the (direct and indirect) production of their 
means of subsistence.(emphasis in text)2 
To effect a decrease in the value of labour power, and therefore an 
increase in the rate of exploitation, requires that increases in the real 
1 Mendel, 'Introduction', CepJtel Yolyme One, p.68. 
2Gouverneur, p.167. Under these circumstences wage-earners cen both 
experience en Increase In reel wages, enabling them to buy e greeter number of 
consumer goods end thereby enjoy e higher standard of living, et the same time es 
they ere exposed toe higher rete of exploitation. The mechanism Marx Identified to 
explain this phenomenon is 'relative surplus value·. See Capital Volume One, Pert 
Five 'The Production of Absolute end Relative Surplus Value'. 
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wage be constrained. This may be done either directly, or by such 
means as inflation. 
There is in evidence from the preceding discussion a dialectical 
effect: the trade cycle not only conditions the price of labour-power, 
but also its value. Just as the moral-historical component of the value of 
labour-power and real wages can be boosted in favourable socio-
economic conditions, in unfavourable conditions both can be reduced. 
In an economic crisis, unemployment (the size of the reserve army of 
labour) will increase, exerting a downward influence on wage-levels. 
Thus, it is the case that 
capital can successfully force the price of the commodity of 
labour-power down to a level below its value, when the 
economic relationship of forces is particularly disadvantageous 
to the working class.l 
Furthermore, given certain conditions, the moral-historical element of 
the value of labour-power could itself be whittled away. Mandel 
germanely observes: 
when the political and social relationship of forces is 
disadvantageous to the working class, capital can successfully 
lower the value of labour-power by annihilating a series of 
workers' historical or social achievements, i.e., by partially 
eliminating commodities which cover their needs from the 
'standard of life' regarded as normal.2 
1 E. Mendel, Late Cepit ell sm. London, Verso, 1987, p.151. 
2Mendel, 'Lete Cepftellsm', p.151. 
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Hence, the value of labour-power is indeterminate, dependent as it is 
on the prevailing conditions of capital accumulation, class struggle and 
so forth. Insofar as increased taxes cause wages to drop below the value 
of labour-power, wages need not 11ecessarily gravitate back upwards to 
that same level of the value of labour-power. Given certain conditions 
(an economic crisis, for instance, or the smashing of trade unions, or an 
ebb in the class struggle), tl1e moral-historical component of the value 
of labour-power could decline, leading to an overall drop in the value 
of labour-power itself. 
In other words, although wages do indeed fluctuate around the value 
of labour-power, the value of labour-power is not a fixed or static pole, 
but itself an inconstant quantity. Therefore, the argument that wages 
will always return to the value of labour-power as a result of capitalists 
being forced to concede wage increases cannot be advanced as an 
immutable mecl1anism to account for why all taxes are derived from 
surplus value, for it overlooks a whole series of subtle and intricate 
interconnections between the value and price of the commodity labour-
power. 
Unless it could be empirically proven that, when increased taxes 
depress wages below the level of tl1e value of labour-power, wages will 
always leap back to this level, (thereby impinging on capitalists' profits) 
this argument does not constitute sufficient evidence to unambiguously 
assert that all taxes are derived from surplus value. One of the 
outcomes which may result is an increase in wages to the value of 
labour-power, but it is only one among many; a number of 
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determinations may come into play. In any case, Fine and Harris do not 
provide such evidence. I It is all very well to invoke the standard 'other 
things being equal' disclaimer, but in t11e long term other things are 110t 
equal, and it cannot be assumed t11at in all cases the value of labour-
power remains static - it does not. 
Additionally, it should be noted that Fine and Harris's argument 
implies that workers are not paid the true value of their labour-power, 
insofar as it is "topped up" by the state from surplus value in the form 
of subsidized or free social services and monetary benefits.2 This view 
contradicts Marx's claim that in all cases workers are paid the value of 
their labour-power. Indeed, this discovery marked the scientific 
advance Marx made over Ricardo's notion of the 'value of labour' and 
1Although not spec1f1ce11y addressing F1ne end Harris's argument, Wright hes 
suggested thet en empfrlcel test of the proposition thet ell taxes derive from 
surplus value might Involve: "An exemtnetlon of how much money wages tend to 
Increase with Increases In the rete of texetlon .... If money wages Increase exactly 
In step with Increases In total texetion so thet reel wages ere never reduced by 
taxes, then It would be reasonable to sey thet most taxes ere taxes on existing 
surplus [veluel." E. 0. Wright, C]ass. Crisis and the State. London, Verso, 1979, 
p.155, n.50. Nonetheless, Wright does not attempt such e test; s1m11arly,1t is 
beyond the scope of this study to do so. 
2Fine end Harris elso reject the concept of the 'social wage' outright. Insofar as 
they do not consider it to approximate a real income-flow (I.e., social services end 
monetary benefits do not constitute e 'socfel wege'fn eny wey correlative with 
direct wages), they regard It an 1111cit ebstrectfon to be excised from the 
conceptual repertoire of Merxfst theory. Although this metter Is largely tengentfel 
to the one et hend, It Is Interesting to note thet their rejection of the concept does 
not, In the reasons they cite, flow from their view thet the monetary benefits end 
socfel services denoted by the 'social wege' ere funded out of surplus value. Rather, 
they reject ft on the bests of the leek of 'exchange reletfonshfps' fn the realm of 
the state, whfch they build fnto en argument emountfng to little more then 
structuralist obscurantism. Thus, Fine end Herrfs reject the 'socfel wege' for the 
wrong reBsons. They do not fumfsh setfsfectory evidence to reject this concept, 
whfch Is tronfc because the very contredfctfons contefned wfthfn thefr own 
argument constitute such evidence. There cen be no socfel wege ff the stele 
expenditures ft denotes ere funded from surplus value. 
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was instrumental in his discovery of surplus value. 1 A whole raft of 
subsidiary issues are tltereby raised, which ultimately result in tlte need 
to substantially revise Marx's categories in order to maintain such an 
argument.2 It is not the intention of this author to engage in, nor 
anticipate tlte success of any such revision. 
Summary and Critique 
While Fine and Harris's explanation of why all taxes (and thereby 
state expenditures) have their source in surplus value may at first 
appear to be plausible, it is flawed in one crucial respect: an overly 
simplistic explanation of fluctuations in wages is invoked to support it. 
Insofar as the mechanism Fine and Harris put forward to account for all 
taxes originating in surplus value is faulty, the possibility of sustaining 
an argument to the contrary may at least be entertained. Indeed, the 
sheer simplicity and invalidity of the assumptions at the base of their 
argument buoys our attempt to advance the notion that a portion of 
taxes are funded from variable capital, rather than surplus value. As 
slmll be seen below, another brace of Marxist scholars within the same 
tendency admit this possibility. 
lsee Chepter Nineteen of Cepltel Volume One, The Trensformetlon of the Yelue 
(end Respectively the Price) of Lebour-Power Into Weges'. Also see section seven 
of 'Weges, Prfce end Profit'. 
2some of the more sophlstlceted feminist critics of Merxlsm ettempt to reject the 
concept of 'lebour-power'. It Is lmportent for them to be eble to prove (or et leest 
essert) thet workers ere not peld the velue of their lebour-power lnsofer es this 
provides pertfel justification for 'revising' Merx. See, for exemple, R. Steven, 'A 
Glorious Country Fore Lebourlng Men', Rece/Cless/Gender, v.1, no. 1, July 
1985, p.56, n. 14. 
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Bullock and Yaffe 
Exposition 
Bullock and Yaffe's discussion of taxation and state expenditure 
elaborates an argument presented in an earlier landmark essay by 
Yaffe, that all taxation has its source in surplus value.l Similarly, in ti1e 
text under consideration here, Bu11ock and Yaffe maintain: 
Taxation is a deduction from tile mass of surplus-value (profits) 
in the hands of private capital.2 
Their's is a 'softer' argument than Fine and Harris's in that they admit 
an exception to this rule, to wit a fraction of taxation has its source in 
variable capital (the source of productive workers' wages). Bullock 
and Yaffe's argument is not, however, 'soft enough' for them to be 
located in the second tendency insofar as they restrict the fraction of 
taxation originating from variable capital to the portion of health and 
education expenditure that enhances the value of productive workers' 
lab our-power. 
While they note that "There are other items of state expenditure 
which can contribute to the reproduction costs of labour power", 
mentioning subsidized wage-goods and various forms of subsidized 
lo. Veffe, The Merxien Theory of Crisis, Cepitel end the Stele', Economu end 
Socletu, v.2, no.2, Mey 1973, p.218. 
2p, Bullock end D. Veffe, 'lnfletion, the Crisis end the Post-War Boom', 
Reyolulloneru Communist, v.3/4, November 1975, p.31. 
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housing, they focus attention solely on health and education.t For 
Bullock and Yaffe, the debate over the source of taxes and the 
productive/unproductive labour debate are inextricably intertwined. 
There is a slight difference in tl1e way they deal with health expenditure 
and education expenditure, so each will be treated separately. 
On the effects of health expenditure on productive workers they 
write: "in so far as the state health facilities are applied to productive 
labour, they increase the value of labour-power without increasing the 
mass of surplus value, so reducing the rate of profit."2 In other words, a 
decrease in the rate of profit (SIC+ V) results from an increase in V 
(variable capital) relative to C (constant capital) and S (surplus value) 
which, ceteris paribus, causes the ratio to decline. 
On unproductive workers, Bullock and Yaffe write: "If they [state 
health facilities] are applied to unproductive labour they are a deduction 
from the growing mass of surplus value and so reduce the rate of profit 
.•.. "3 In t11is case, the decrease in the rate of profit (SIC+ V) is brought 
about by a decrease inS (surplus value) relative to C and V. In effect, 
their argument ties the proportion of taxes that are funded out of 
surplus value to the number of unproductive workers, and they 
conclude: "As a growing proportion of society's labour is unproductive 
it means that more and more health care is unproductively consumed. "4 
1 Bullock end Veffe, p.34. 
2fbfd., p.33. 
3tbfd., p.33. 
4tbfd., p.33. 
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In other words, progressively more of the taxes which fund health 
expenditure are derived from surplus value. 
They make a similar argument vis-a-vis state expenditure on 
education. Regarding the effects of this expenditure on productive 
workers, they write: "In so far as basic training (a very small part of 
education in the state sector) augments the value of labour power of 
productive labour, it reduces the rate of profit .... "1 Thus, in the same 
manner as health expenditure, the decrease in the rate of profit results 
from an increase in V relative to C and S. The crucial difference is that 
education expenditure may counterbalance this decrease in the rate of 
profit by increasing the "productivity of the labour which has been 
trained. "2 Nonetheless, more restrictions follow: 
The compulsory nature of education in fact means that only the 
smallest fraction of this education actually raises the value of the 
labour power consumed productively by capital.3 
In this light, only the 'smallest fraction' of taxes funding education 
expenditure can actually be said to originate in variable capital, and this 
portion is declining in the same maru1er as health expenditure, insofar 
as "a growing proportion of education will be consumed 
unproductive1y with the increasing proportion of unproductive1y 
1 Bullock end Veffe, p.33. 
2Jbfd., p.34. This has Interesting Implications for workers In the state sector: 
"the labour power of those Stele employees who contribute to the reproduction of 
the special commodity labour power, of the productive labourers, is Included in 
variable cepltel but produces no surplus velue"(p.17). 
3Jbfd., p.34. 
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employed labourers in society. "1 Thus a 'growing proportion' of state 
expenditure on health and education, and the taxes funding these 
expenditures, will originate from surplus value. By making their 
argument on the source of taxes empirically contingent on the relative 
numbers of productive and unproductive workers, as the number of 
unproductive workers i11creases (and the number of productive 
workers decreases), the proportion of taxes - and therefore state 
expenditure - originating from surplus value also i11creases. 
Furthermore, if the bulk of monetary benefits and social services 
originate as surplus value, ceteris paribus, cuts in welfare expenditure 
will decrease the rate of exploitation (S/V). Consequently, if the 
organic composition of capital (CN) remains static, the rate of profit 
(SIC+ V) will similarly decrease.2 The foregoing analysis yields 
interesting results in relation to struggles for increases in welfare 
expenditure. It can reasonably be asked how workers could ever be 
expected to support increases in welfare expenditure, given that these 
are ultimately financed from surplus value extorted from the 
productive sector of the working class. 
1 Bullock end Veffe, p.34. 
2-rhls point cen be Illustrated using e simple elgebretc exemple. If the elgebreic 
expression of the rete of profit (S/C+V) Is divided by V, it cen slmilerly be 
expressed es: 
fd::i.. which reduces to: 5./..Y 
C/V+V/V, C/V+l. 
Using this letter notetlon, the rete of exploitation eppeers es the numerator, end 
the orgenlc composition of cepltel eppeers In the denominator. other things being 
equel, en Increase In the rete of exploltetlon (the numerator) Increases the size of 
the frectlon end thus the rete of profit, wherees en Increase In the orgenlc 
composition of cepltel w111 decrease the size of the frectlon end the rete of profit. 
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In this respect, it is somewhat contradictory that Bullock and Yaffe 
laud struggles to halt attacks on welfare expenditure. In the same breath 
as claiming: "As a growing proportion of society's labour is 
unproductive it means that more and more health care is 
unproductively consumed" (in other words more and more health 
expenditure is surplus value), they state: "The call to get rid of the 
private sector within the ltealth service and make it into an adequate 
service for the needs of the working class, strikes a blow for all 
workers against the interests of the bourgeoisie." 1 How can it strike a 
blow for all workers if, by the very fact of an increase in welfare 
expenditure, productive workers will simultaneously be subjected to a 
higher rate of exploitation? 
Summary and Critique 
Bullock and Yaffe commit two fundamental errors. First, their 
argument is based on the fallacious assumption that unproductive 
workers' wages are funded out of surplus value.2 Therefore the taxes 
they pay and the state expenditure they receive are also considered to 
originate in surplus value. Second, and not unrelated to the first, they 
overly restrict the components of state expenditure which augment the 
value of labour-power in a double-sense: they include too little state 
expenditure in the value of productive workers' labour-power and no 
state expenditure at all in the value of unproductive workers' labour-
1 Bullock and Vaffe, p.33. 
2-rhey edmlt adhering to this view elsewhere In their paper: "the wages of 
unproductive labourers ere In reality e pert of surplus velue"(p.17). 
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power (even though unproductive workers actually 'receive' this 
expenditure). 
They readily admit: "the central elements of the 'welfare state' only 
contain a small contribution to the value of labour-power itself." 1 This, 
they claim, is one of the insights afforded by t11eir "central focus ... 
remain[ing] on t11e process of capital accumulation itself. "2 But this 
focus effectively results in them ignoring the bulk of welfare 
expenditure wage-earners receive and might otherwise be regarded as 
consuming. Indeed under tl1eir argument unproductive workers 
consume no state expenditure at all! This argument has drastic 
implications for any attempt to estimate the social wage. Under the 
assumption that wage-earners do not consume state expenditure 
deriving from surplus value, the portion of state expenditure they do 
actually consume (i.e. tl1e social wage) shrinks in proportion to the fall 
in the number of productive workers. 
Specifying the elements of state expenditure which augment the value 
of labour-power will be held over to Chapter Three and carried out 
using Tonak's method, which affords a broader definition of the 
components of state expenditure that enhance the value of productive 
workers' labour-power. Their first error, however, requires a brief 
detour into the productive/unproductive labour debate. Interestingly 
enough, Bullock and Yaffe conclude the section of their paper dealing 
with welfare expenditure by cautioning: 
1 Bullock end Yaffe, p.34. 
2fbfd., p.34. 
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The refusal to distinguish between productive and unproductive 
labour leads directly to a failure to understand tbe elements of 
state expenditure and their overall effect on capital 
accumulation. Inevitably, this position must lead to the 
reformist conception of the state.l 
But their admonition needs to be tempered in one crucial respect: to 
have this distinction clearly in view while arguing that unproductive 
workers wages originate in surplus value, has equally if not even more 
serious consequences. Not only is the empirical referent of the social 
wage severely limited, the whole Marxian framework is thrown into 
disarray. 
The Productive/Unproductive Labour Debate. 
It will be recalled from the preceding discussion that variable capital 
denotes the wages of productive workers. Marx writes 
Productive labour, in its meaning for capitalist production, is 
wage-labour which, exchanged against the variable part of 
capital (the part of the capital that is spent on wages), reproduces 
not only this part of the capital (or the value of its own labour-
power), but in addition produces surplus value for the 
capitalist. 2 
1 Bullock end Vaffe, p.34. 
2K. Marx, Theories of Surolus Yelue. Pert One. Moscow, Progress Publishers, 
1975, p.152. Here he lauds Adem Smlth for the letter's definition of "productive 
labour as labour which Is djrectlu exchenged with ceo! tel; that Is, be defines It by 
the exchange through which the conditions or production or lebour, end value In 
general, whether money or commodity, ere first trensrormed Into 
capltal.. .. "(p.157). 
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While the labour-power of productive workers is exchanged against 
capital, unproductive labour "is labour which is not exchanged with 
capital, but directly with revenue, that is, with wages or profit .... "1 
The wages of unproductive workers are also an input cost to the 
capitalist, but because they are funded out of 'revenue', and not capital, 
unproductive wage-labour does not produce surplus value, and in this 
sense is 'unproductive'. 
It has been established that the wages of productive workers and 
unproductive workers are funded from different sources: variable 
capital for productive workers, and 'revenue' for unproductive 
workers. The productive/unproductive labour debate essentially 
concerns the source of the 'revenue' funding unproductive workers 
wages. If unproductive workers are paid out of the surplus value 
component of the new value created by productive workers, as Bullock 
and Yaffe claim, enhancement of the material position of the former 
group is necessarily predicated upon increased exploitation of the latter 
group. Unproductive workers appear to have an objective interest in 
increasing the rate of exploitation of productive workers to augment 
their (the unproductive workers') wages. A most incongruous situation 
results. As Ernest Mandel asks: 
does there not arise a major conflict of interest between 
productive and unproductive labour, the first seeking to reduce 
surplus value to a minimum, the second wishing it to be 
increased? How can such a basic conflict of interest be 
1 Marx, 'TSV", p.157. 
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reconciled with the inclusion of both sectors in the same social 
class?l 
To reiterate, in the capitalist circuit new value is apportioned between 
variable capital and surplus value, and all subsidiary income-flows must 
necessarily be derived from one of these two sources. But if 
unproductive workers' wages are not derived from variable capital, 
must they not be derived from surplus value? Mandel solves this 
problem in the following manner. He argues that unproductive workers 
in the finance and service sectors, for instance, are "paid not out of 
currently produced surplus value, but out of that portion of social 
capital which is invested in these sectors. Only the profits of these 
capitals form part of currently produced surplus value" .2 In other 
words, the source of the revenue funding the wages of unproductive 
workers in these sectors is simply a fraction of 'M' - the money capital 
laid out at the beginning of each cycle of production. Admittedly, 
where exactly to slot this fraction into the total exchange-value output 
of an economy (i.e. the C'=c+(v+s) schema) is more difficult, but the 
main point to grasp "is t11at since wages and salaries in all t11ese sectors 
are not drawn from curre11tly produced surplus value, tl1eir payme11t i11 
110 way reduces tbe curre11tly paid wages of productive workers". 3 
lE. Mendel, 'Introduction', Capital: A Crltlgue of Polltfcel Economu. volume Two. 
Hermondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd, 1985, p.4B. 
2Mende1, 'Introduction', Cepltel volume Two, p.49. He clerlffes this point by 
adding: "It Is true that social capital Is the result of past extortion of surplus 
value. But this epplles elso to variable cepltel, I.e. to wages currently pefd out to 
productive workers"(p.49). 
3fb td., p.49. Some unproductf ve workers ere nonetheless pef d out of 'current! y 
produced' surplus value; namely, workers In the state sector. In this case -
Mendel argues- the view that, because these workers ere so peld, en fncreese In 
state expenditure necessitates a rise In surplus value end e decrease fn reel wages 
could only be proven empirically. Such proof would require "e very detailed 
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The difficulties encountered in classifying t11e source of taxes paid by 
unproductive workers reflects the problems in identifying the source of 
their wages proper, and the ambivalence of the literature on the 
productive/unproductive labour debate. It is partly in response to this 
dilemma that Mandel argues: "In Marx's theory all revenues are traced 
back to wages or surplus value (empl1asis added). "1 A final solution to 
this debate is not likely to be forthcoming in the near future, and one 
will not be attempted in this study. Instead, the generic category of 
'wages' will simply be substituted for 'variable capital', while 
recognizing that this is not entirely satisfactory. 
Bullock and Yaffe's argument that the bulk of welfare expenditure is 
surplus value, in the main, results from their view that unproductive 
workers' wages are paid out of surplus value. It has been demonstrated 
that unproductive workers' wages are not paid out of surplus value, 
and thus there is no reason to assume that the state expenditure received 
by them is funded out of surplus value eitller. Therefore tile portion of 
state expenditure that is not funded out of surplus value need not be 
restricted to the expenditure which augments the value of productive 
workers' labour-power. Thus tl1e question is put: can an argument be 
sustained that the portion of taxes used to fund the components of state 
analysis of the trend of the rete of exploftetfon end of workers llvfng standards end 
needs sf nee the 'explosion' of state expenditure "(p.49). 
1Mendel, 'Late Cepftelfsm', p.176, n.66. 
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expenditure accruing to workers (both productive a.11d unproductive) 
are funded from wages?l 
(2.3.2) Tendency #2: Taxes Originate From Surplus Value 
and 'Wages' 
It was argued in the preceding section that wage-earners can be 
considered to consume a portion of state expenditure only if a consistent 
and coherent argument can be made that the portion of the tax-take used 
to fund tl1is expenditure originates in 'wages'. Having gauged the 
strength (or weakness) of the 'opposition', one of whom actually 
concedes - albeit in an extremely restrictive fashion - that a fragment of 
taxation is 'variable capital', there is good reason to align this study with 
the views of the second tendency. This discussion will move from 
Gough, a theorist who only weakly adheres to the position that not all 
taxes are a 'drain on surplus value' (but nonetheless adheres to it more 
strongly than Bullock and Yaffe), through to Russell and Mandel who 
are strong adherents. 
lit Is necessary to reiterate thet the Intention of this discussion Is not to 
determine which components of stele expenditure do ectuelly enhance the value of 
labour-power- these will be Identified In the following chapter. Rather, It will 
be demonstrated thet the taxes funding whichever components ere so Identified cen 
be regarded es originating In wages end not surplus value. 
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Gough 
Exposition 
It is necessary to qualify the inclusion of Gough in this category by 
noting that he does not explicitly state tltat tlte taxes which fund tlte state 
expenditure received by wage-earners have their source in wages, but 
in the course of his analysis problems are manifested that lead to 
implicit acceptance of this position. These tensions are evident in his 
initial statement on the source of taxes: 
The belief that all taxes are deductions from surplus value 
implies that the remainder - the value of labour power - is 
conceived net of all taxes and of all state benefits.! 
This argument is based on Marx•s definition of the value of labour-
power as the sum total of socially necessary labour entailed in the (re)-
production of labour-power. Marx writes: 
The value of labour-power is determined, as in the case of every 
other commodity, by the labour-time necessary for the 
production, and consequently also the reproduction, of this 
specific article .... the value of labour-power is the value of the 
means of subsistence necessary for tlte maintenance of its 
owner.2 
Gouglt includes in tlte value of labour-power 11 tlte actual commodities 
purchased by the worker and 1tis/her family out of wages ... 3 Insofar as a 
1Gough, 'Polltlcel Economy·, p.116. 
2Merx, 'Cepltel Volume One', p.274. 
3Gough, 'Polltlcel Economy', p.116. 
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portion of these commodities are bought with state-provided benefits 
and many are furnished by the state, he rightly argues that monetary 
benefits and social services must be included in the value of labour-
power. He identifies the value of labour-power as "the private a11d 
collective consumption of the employed population in capitalist 
economies. "1 
This analysis leads Gough to entertain the view that at least a portion 
of taxes and therefore state expenditure has its source in wages. 
Whether he makes the link between a portion of state expenditure partly 
constituting the value of labour-power, and the incongruity of labelling 
the taxes which fund it 'surplus value' is known only to himself, for it 
cannot be fathomed from his writings. He writes: 
If the cost of the welfare state could be borne by the household 
sector, predominantly the broad working class, then its 
expansion would not necessarily harm surplus value and capital 
accumulation. But this is one extreme case. On the other hand, 
the opposite situation, where all taxes are ultimately borne by 
capital and thus reduce remaining surplus value, is an equally 
unlikely one.2 
Gough's comment specifically on tl1e issue of taxation illustrates that he 
attempts to sit on the conceptual fence, as it were. For purposes of this 
1Gough, 'Poltttcel Economy', p.117. On the letter, Gough states: "these services 
contribute to the detly end generational reproduction of the working class in just 
the same wey es commodities. If they ere excluded from the value of labour-
power, 1t is clear that the letter is progressively diverging from its original 
definition- the totellebour necessary to reproduce the worker end his/her 
femi 1 y"(p. 117). 
2Jbld., p, 126. 
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study, the foregoing open-ended and vague formulation is singularly 
inadequate. 
Again Gough's ambivalence is apparent: 
In the real world the final burden of taxation is determined by 
the ebb and flow of class conflict, and will vary with the 
economic and political strength of the contending classes.t 
This is in essence correct, but the more fundamental question 
concerning the source of the taxes that fund state expenditure received 
by wage-earners is left unanswered. Gough's statement above implies 
that taxes are at certain junctures funded out of wage revenues and at 
others surplus value, depending on the vicissitudes of the class struggle. 
Nonetheless, some consistent position on the source of taxes, and 
thereby the social wage, must be arrived at. That the source alters in 
tune with the warp and weft of class struggle is not sufficient. 
Summary and Critique 
Gough does not provide the conceptual tools with which to ascertain 
(in relation to Marx's value-categories) the true 'burden of taxation'. He 
reaches no substantive conclusions and thus a more refined theory of 
taxation is required. The point to be taken from Gough's work is that it 
is possible to conceive of a portion of taxes being funded from wages, 
1Gough, 'PoiHfcel Economy', p. 126. A sfmfler argument cen be found fn the 
controversfel essay whfch served es the precursor to hfs memorable 'Polftfcel 
Economy of the Welfare Stele'. See: I. Gough, 'Stele Expendflure fn Advanced 
CepHelfsm', New Left Review, no. 92, July-August 1975. 
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and indeed a larger portion than Bullock and Yaffe allow. It remains 
now to develop a more sophisticated and coherent expression of this 
argument. 
Russell 
Exposition 
Russell engages in a conceptual discussion of the source of taxes prior 
to embarking on an empirical analysis of the role of the Canadian state 
in facilitating the reproduction of labour-power. In this discussion he 
takes as his starting-point the source of the taxes that fund state 
expenditure received by wage-earners (the social wage). Are these taxes 
derived from wages or surplus value? Russell answers this question at 
the outset: "the creation of a system of social wages rests squarely upon 
the partial socializatio11 of wage i11come. "1 This claim seemingly 
permits a precise definition of the social wage with regard to Marxian 
value-categories (the social wage is funded out of wages), but it will 
subsequently be demonstrated that this claim is, in fact, restricted 
merely to the empirical point of origin of tlte taxes in question. 
Russell teases out the consequences of the "partial socialization of 
wage income" for the understanding of taxation by engaging in a 
critique of the argument propounded by some Marxists that all taxes 
have their source in surplus value. He rightly notes that his "proposition 
1Russell, 'Funding Cenede's Soc1el Wage', p.47. 
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whereby state interventions are tied to a prior socialization of working-
class income - and t11e implications it has for a theory of capitalist 
taxation - will be controversial. "1 The principal aspect of Russell's 
critique is the need "to distinguish between taxation as a forJn of 
surplus value, and taxation as a deductio11 from surplus value".2 This 
seemingly arcane distinction will be explicated, for it provides the key 
to the argument that the taxes funding the social wage originate in 
'wages'. 
Russell notes that income taxes may enhance profitability when spent 
on 'social capital'. Alternatively, if these taxes are repatriated back to 
workers in the form of a social wage, profitability is not so enhanced. 
He argues that "In neither case ... must such taxation constitute a 
deduction from existing surplus value". 3 Taxes paid by wage-earners 
are taken by the state regardless of how they are classified conceptually, 
and are not a potential source of profit unless, instead of being 
repatriated back to workers in the form of a social wage, they are used 
to subsidize capital either through expenditure on 'social capital' or 
directly. As long as they are levied on wage-ear11ers, these taxes do not 
impinge on the potential profits of capitalist enterprises. 
Within Marxist theory the general category of surplus value is sub-
divided into profit, interest and rent. Each is a fonn in which surplus 
value is realized and therefore, in a sense, eacl1 is a deduction from t11e 
1 Russell, 'Funding Cenede's Soclel Wege', p.47. 
2fbfd., p.48. 
3tbfd., p.48. There Is e slight difference In the wey he deels with direct end 
Indirect texes, but It need not concern us here. 
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mass of surplus value. In Russell's argument, however, taxes can 
originate from surplus value coJzceptually (i.e., as a fonn of surplus 
value), but do not have to "constitute a deduction" for the purposes of 
capital accwnulatjo11. In other words, such taxes do not reduce tl1e total 
mass of surplus value potentially able to be realized as profit, interest 
and rent. 
However, Russell does not take this distinction to its logical 
conclusion by applying it to wages. It is implied that the social wage in 
Canada is funded out of wages because taxes on workers' income 
financed it- in other words, because the empirical point of origin of the 
income used to fund the social wage was located in taxes paid by the 
working class. Thus, Russell deals only with the socialization of wage 
incomes by means of taxes on workers. He does not entertain the 
possibility that wages may be socialized through taxes on the capitalist 
class. Thus if a portion of the taxes on the capitalist class (for instance, 
income taxes paid by companies) were used by the state to fund the 
social wage, in Russell's view this class 'paid' for the social wage out of 
surplus value. While arguing that a portion of taxes are surplus value 
regardless of their manifest source (i.e. that taxes can represent a fonn 
of surplus value when levied on workers), he fails to draw tl1e logical 
conclusion that equally a portion of taxes levied on capitalists could 
likewise be a form of wage revenues if they are used to fund the social 
wage, insofar as they do not represent a deduction from the 'current' 
wages of workers. 
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Summary and Critique 
By not taking his form/deduction distinction to its logical conclusion, 
Russell fails to move beyond the empirical point of origin of the taxes 
used to fund the social wage. He does not realize that the empirical point 
of origin of the taxes used to fund the social wage is inconsequential to 
t11e way in which they are conceptually classified. As we shall see, 
Mandel's contribution is to make this very point. 
However, it will subsequently be demonstrated that if the problem of 
ascertaining the source of taxes used to finance the social wage is 
approached from a purely analytical point of view, which is the level at 
which Mandel deals with it, t11e rationale for an empirical analysis of the 
type attempted in this study disappears altogether. In order to keep the 
need for an empirical analysis clearly in view, it is necessary to 
supplement Mandel's position with the distinction between taxes as a 
for1n of wages and taxes as a deductio11 from wages developed from 
Russell's work. 
Mandel 
Exposition 
An expression of t11e argument that tl1e taxes which fund the social 
wage have their source in wages, more sophisticated in some respects 
then Russell's, is set forth by Mandel. He goes straight to the heart of the 
matter: 
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the concept of 'gross wages' (i.e. wages before tax) has no 
meaning in Marxist economic theory. Wages are means of 
reconstituting the worker's labour-power through the purchase 
of commodities and services. Thus mciney deducted from the 
workers 'gross wage' to help the state buy aeroplanes has 
nothing at all to do with wages. It is from the outset part of 
social surplus value.l 
In this example, the money deducted by means of taxation from 
workers' wages to buy 'aeroplanes' is a fonn of surplus value (in the 
terminology of Russell's argument) and, in the short term at least, is not 
a deduction for purposes of capital accumulation. 
Extrapolating his argument further, Mandel remarks: 
Similarly it would be absurd to construe state medical , 
educational or transport services which help reconstitute the 
worker's labour-power (or maintain his family under normal 
living conditions) as derived from surplus value: they represent 
rather a socialized portion of the wage, regardless of whether it 
'originated' in 'gross wages' (taxes paid by the worker), 'gross 
profits', (taxes paid by the capitalist), or the 'gross income' of 
independent middle classes.2 
For Mandel, "the total price of labour-power" is equivalent to 
"individual plus 'socialized' wages" .3 This argument requires that a 
conceptual distinction be made between a component of the total tax-
take that represents socialized wages and a component that represents 
surplus value. In drawing this distinction, the source of taxes is 
1Mendel, "Introduction', Ceoltel volume Two, p.49. 
2Jbfd., p.50. 
3Jbfd., p.50. 
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classified by tlte use to which they are put, rather than their empirical 
point of origin. It is of no consequence whether these taxes derive from 
wage-earners or capitalists: insofar as they partially constitute the value 
of labour-power they must be considered 'socialized' wages and not 
surplus value. 
Thus, the empirical source of taxes used to fund the social wage is 
inconsequential to the manner in which they are conceptually classified, 
because taxes can (in terms of the distinction developed from Russell's 
work) either be a form of, or a deduction from wages. The taxes which 
fund the social wage are a deductio11 from wages when paid by 
workers, and are a fonn of wages when paid by the capitalist class (a 
socialized segment of the wage collected by means of taxes on 
capitalists). In light of this argument, the state expenditure accruing to 
wage-earners as the social wage is not under any circumstances 
considered to originate in surplus value, even when a portion of this 
expenditure empirically originates in taxes paid by the capitalist class. 
It is readily apparent tltat the political implications of this position are 
more consistent with the Marxist conceptualization of the bourgeois 
state than those of the former school, wltich run counter to the basic 
tenets of the Marxist framework. The notion that the social wage has its 
source in surplus value gives rise to questions concerning the class 
character of the state. Tltat the social wage is funded out of surplus 
value, and hence paid for by the bourgeoisie, implies that the state 
redistributes wealth from tlte bourgeoisie to the working class on a 
permanent basis. Such an argument is more often advanced to obscure 
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the class character of the state than to reveal it, and is more consonant 
with the bourgeois-liberal view of the state than its Marxist counterpart. 
On the other hand, if the social wage is funded by means of state-
mediated i11tra -class flows of income (from workers to workers), 
rather than state-mediated i11ter -class flows of income (from capitalists 
to workers), the working class pays for the social wage. Such is the case 
even though prima facie a portion of the social wage is financed out of 
taxes levied on the capitalist class. This view is more consonant with the 
Marxist view of the bourgeois state qua bourgeois state, insofar as the 
state merely redistributes wealth among workers, and does not 
intervene in a redistributional way on behalf of workers. 
Summary ll11.d Critique 
Mandel's argument could, however, be taken as a justification for not 
being obliged to examine from whence the taxes in question empirically 
originate. If the taxes funding the social wage are wages, regardless of 
the class on which the taxes are levied, the state could be deduced as only 
ever effecting an intra-class redistribution of income. The state simply 
redistributes wealth witl1il1 the working class. If the empirical point of 
origin of taxes is lost sight of altogether, the rationale for an empirical 
analysis disappears along with it. Thus, it is necessary to keep in sight 
where taxes empirically originate from, witl10ut lapsing into acceptance 
of "the 'bourgeois' ideology that taxation falls on the individuals wl10 
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pay it", as Fine and Harris put it so we11.1 The form/deduction 
distinction d~veloped from Russell's work allows us to do just that. 
Claiming that the taxes which fund the state expenditure accruing to 
wage-earners originates in wages does not mean that we have to 
'theoretically foreclose' on the issue of inter-class income 
redistribution, as Mandel's argument would lead us to. It is precisely 
because these taxes may be a form of wages or a deductio11 from wages 
that it is necessary to carry out an empirical analysis. 
(2.4) Where Do We 'Draw The Line'? 
One further matter needs to be dealt with: wit11in the 'pool' of taxes, 
how do we identify wl1ich taxes are a form of wages and which are a 
deduction from wages? Where the 'line is drawn', as it were, has 
implications for the manner in which the empirical comparison of taxes 
paid by workers to expenditure received by workers is carried out. A 
simple hypothetical example will serve to illustrate the two possible 
approaches to this problem. 
Let us assume for the sake of simplicity that tbe total tax-take in an 
economy is $200, of wbicb wage-earners pay $100 and capitalists pay 
$100. Tbe proportion of total taxes used to fund state expenditure 
accruing to workers is 40% (or $80), and as such is the 'wages' 
component of tbe tax-take. Tbe remaining 60% (or $120) of total taxes 
1Ftne and Harris, p.106. 
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is used to fund state expenditure accruing to the capitalist class, and as 
such is the surplus value component of the tax-take. The boundary 
between the taxes that are a form of wages and tl1e taxes that are a 
deduction from wages may be drawn in two ways. 
Model One 
In this model, the distinction between wages and surplus value in the 
total tax-take is merely reproduced within the taxes paid by wage-
earners and the taxes paid by capitalists: 
Model Two 
(a) $40 of wage-earners' taxes are derived from wages and 
$60 from surplus value. 
(b) $40 of capitalists' taxes are derived from wages and $60 
from surplus value. 
In this model, lwwever, the proportion of total taxes used to fund 
expenditures accruing to wage-earners are conceived of as originating 
solely within the taxes paid by wage-earners themselves. 
(a) $80 of wage-earners' taxes are derived from wages and 
$20 from surplus value. 
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(b) $100 of the taxes paid by t11e capitalist class derive from 
surplus value. 
In model one, $40 of the taxes paid by the capitalist class are 
redistributed to workers as a form of wages, and $60 of workers' taxes 
are redistributed to tlte capitalist class as a form of surplus value. Thus 
workers lose $20 to the capitalist class. Whereas in model two, $20 of 
workers' taxes are redistributed to the capitalist class as a form of 
surplus value, and notl1ing is redistributed to the working class from the 
capitalist class. The net effect is still the same: workers lose $20 to the 
capitalist class, but only this $20 is considered a form of surplus value, 
instead of $40 as in model one. The same applies in t11e case of workers 
paying less in taxes than they receive in state expenditure, that is, if a 
redistribution of income from the capitalist class to the working class 
occurs. 
It is apparent that the portion of taxes that are surplus value (as 
opposed to wages) differs according to tlte model that is chosen, and that 
the magnitude of inter-class income redistribution differs in like 
fashion. Notably, in Model Two, a redistribution of income only occurs 
when the amount of the total tax-take used to fund social wage 
expenditures is greater than t11e sum total of taxes paid by workers. This 
model underpins the empirical analysis in Chapter Three. 
Undoubtedly, there is a tension in comparing the state expenditure 
wage-earners consume to t11e taxes t11ey pay, because if t11ey pay more in 
taxes t11an t11ey receive in state expenditure, the 'excess' taxes must be 
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automatically classified as a form of surplus value- which wage-earners 
presumably have no interest in retrieving. In resolving tbis dilemma, it 
is useful to draw attention to a comment by Gouverneur: 
Let us remember that the taxes (direct and indirect) paid by ... 
wage-earners are supposed to be used, like . . . National 
Insurance contributions, for the financing of collective products 
consumed by ... wage-earners.! 
The assumption tbat wage-earners' taxes should only be used to fund tbe 
'collective products' they themselves consume provides tbe justification 
for claiming there is 'injustice' in the situation where wage-earners pay 
more in taxes tban they receive in state expenditure, that is, when wage-
earners' taxes are used for purposes other than their own 'collective 
consumption' (even though, ipso facto, these taxes become a form of 
surplus value). Furthermore, these 'excess' taxes would enhance 
workers' living standards if received back, and would be automatically 
classified as originating in 'wages'. 
(2.5) Summary 
It was argued at tbe beginning of tbis chapter tbat it is meaningless to 
speak of a social wage (i.e. tl1e portion of state expenditure consumed by 
wage-earners) if the taxes which fund it originate in surplus value. Tl1is 
necessitated tl1at tl1e arguments made by a tendency witl1in tl1e Marxist 
camp, that all taxes derive from surplus value, be rejected. The 
arguments of the main representatives of tbis tendency were confronted 
1 Gouverneur, p.B2, n.32. 
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and found to be remarkably weak. Fine and Harris's argument is 
premised on a naive understanding of the mechanisms governing wage 
fluctuations. Bullock and Yaffe's position largely derives from their 
wrongful assumption that unproductive workers' wages are funded out 
of surplus value. 
In summary, the argument that all taxes are funded out of surplus 
value is inconsistent with Marxist theory on a number of counts. Indeed, 
the weakness of the arguments of those Marxists who hold to this view 
provides justification for rejecting it in favour of the view that the taxes 
that fund state expenditure received by wage-earners originate in 
variable capital (subsequently amended to the generic category of 
'wages' in light of the productive/unproductive labour debate). 
The form/deduction distinction developed from Russell's work, when 
combined with Mandel's argument that the social class on which taxes 
are levied is inconsequential to the conceptual classification of the taxes 
in question, allows all taxes funding state expendit-ure accruing to wage-
earners (irrespective of the techniques employed in identifying which 
portion of state expenditure this is) to be considered as originating in 
'wages' rather than surplus value. This is the case even when a portion 
of the taxes paid by capitalists are used to fund this expenditure. Thus, 
under no circumstances is surplus value considered as being 
redistributed back to wage-earners. While this may appear to some 
readers to be an exercise in conceptual gymnastics, it is essential in 
order to preserve the logical consistency of the Marxian framework. 
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However, tbis argument has tbe associated risk of negating tbe need 
for an empirical analysis, insofar as the state in financing the social 
wage only ever appears to effect an intra-class redistribution of income 
(i.e., a transfer of wealth from wage-earners to other wage-earners). 
But it is precisely because tbe taxes funding the social wage may be a 
deduction from wages or a form of wages (i.e., respectively tbey may 
empirically originate in taxes paid by wage-earners or taxes paid by 
capitalists) that an empirical analysis is required in the first place. It is 
therefore meaningful to compare taxes paid by wage-earners to tbe state 
expenditure they receive. In other words, it is relevant to carry out an 
an empirical study of inter-class income redistribution, empirically 
quantifying the magnitude of t11e discrepancy between tbe financing and 
consumption of the social wage by the working class. Such is the task 
attempted in t11e remaining chapters of tbis study. 
Chapter Three: An Exposition and Adaptation of 
Tona.k.•s Net-Tax Methodology 
(3. 1) Introductory Remarks 
The previous chapter carried out the arduous task of putting a layer 
of Marxist theory beneath the study of income redistribution attempted 
in this and the following cl1apters, by relating the income-flows 
involved to the value-categories of the Marxian conceptual framework. 
This should serve to forestall prospective criticisms that this study is 
closer to a neo-Ricardian 'income-shares' analysis, than something 
strictly Marxist in nature. It also solved the large problem of estimating 
the social wage by demonstrating that wage-earners can be considered 
to consume a portion of state expenditure; at the same time it reaffirmed 
the need for an empirical analysis of inter-class income redistribution 
on the basis that the taxes used to finance the social wage can be a form 
of, or deduction from, wages. 
77 
The aim of this chapter is to use Tonak's method to configure New 
Zealand's national accounts, in order to generate the basis from which 
to empirically operationalize the concept of 'net-tax' for the years 
1949-75. To this end, Tonak's method will be used to establish the social 
wage as an empirical quantity, along with the sum total of taxes (direct 
and indirect) surrendered by the working class to the state. Applying 
Tonak's method in tl1e context of New Zealand will allow us to ascertain 
whether, historically, the state has redistributed wealth to the working 
class or away from tl1e working class. 
Tonak's net-tax methodology has in turn been modified by Alan 
Freeman (one of the pioneers in transposing sets of national accounts 
into Marxian categories) in relation to Britain. Freeman's study is 
particularly useful in that it outlines the strategies used to reshape the 
British national accounts to 'fit' Tonak.'s categories. Given international 
variation in systems of national accounts, the same task will be 
confronted in this chapter in relation to New Zealand's national 
accounts. 
At the outset, it is necessary to emphasize that this study at best only 
approxi1nates the category of 'net-tax'. This is so for two reasons. 
First, the national accounts, given their low level of detail, only indicate 
trends in national income in broad brushstrokes. Second, as mentioned 
above, the national accounts must be adapted to fit the task at hand, 
which necessarily entails some loss of accuracy. 
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The first matter is not a source of concern because Tonak's method 
does not require a greater level of detail than that provided in the 
national accounts. The second matter, however, is of greater 
importance, for Tonak's categories must be mirrored as closely as 
possible. Necessarily, this requires that modifications be made to the 
data. Again, however, tl1is is nothing out of the ordinary in that much of 
this type of research involves developing techniques to enable use to be 
made of otherwise inc'ompatible data.t The approach adopted in this 
study is to be as rigorous as the data-base allows. 
In light of the foregoing, one of the main tasks of this chapter will be 
to develop empirical indicators of the categories being sought, when the 
categories tl1emselves cannot be identified in the national accounts. 
Additionally, insofar as it is unclear from Tonak's paper as to how to 
deal with certain components of national income (notably government 
capital expenditure), a portion of this chapter will be devoted to 
deciding whetl1er to include or exclude such items. 
(3.2) The Estimation of Net-Tax 
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It will be recalled from Chapter One that 11et-t.ax equals the sum total 
of taxes ceded by the working class to the state, less state expenditure 
received (i.e. consumed) by the working class. Tonak separates his net-
tax methodology into six distinct stages. The actual calculation of net-
tax is carried out in Phases One through Five. Phase Six involves 
empirically estimating the 'true wage' of workers by adjusting nominal 
wages using tl1e net-tax estimates, but Tonak does not engage in t11is task 
in t11e text used as a model for t11is study. Insofar as the primary aim of 
this study is to establish net-tax as an empirical quantity, only Phases 
One to Five will be operationalized. 
lsee: B. Hlndess, The Use of Offfclel Statistics In Soclologu. London, MecMi11en, 
1973. 
Natio11al l11coJne at Factor Cost (henceforth 'NIFC') is tile aggregate 
of national income used to estimate a net-tax time series for New 
Zealand.l The scope of this study is limited by the availability of NIFC 
data, a series of which only sporadically appears in tile National Income 
and Expenditure Accounts from 1938 to 1949, thereby ruling this 
period out of consideration. This study focusses on the years 1949 to 
1975, for which a consistent data-set is available. Most of the period of 
the long boom in New Zealand (1946-73) is thus incorporated, along 
with the initial years of the economic crisis ushered in at its end. It 
would of course be particularly relevant to examine the redistributive 
activities of tile state in the lengthy period of crisis following 1975, but 
tilis is precluded by a change in tile system of national accounts. 2 
BO 
Tonak includes in his study the taxes levied by and expenditure of 
local government (in terms of tile American federal system, state and 
local government). While an argument could be made that this study 
should be restricted to tile fiscal activities of central government, as the 
true 'location' of tile bourgeois state, local autilorities must be included 
two reasons. First, in New Zealand's national accounts, direct taxes 
1 Official Estimates of National Income end Expenditure 1957-58. Department of 
Statistics, Wellington, p.6. Notional Income at Foetor Cost Is defined es "private 
Income plus Government trading Income less transfer lncomes"(p.6). In turn, 
private Income Is defined as "the aggregate of earned Incomes and transfer Incomes 
(before payment of direct taxation) received by or accruing to persons and 
companies as distinct from Income of government and local authority trading 
enterprl ses"(p.6). 
2-rhe National Income and Expenditure Accounts used In this study were superseded 
by the New Zealand System of National Accounts (NZSNA) In 1976, a system based 
on the recommendations of the United Nations. The principal change was a shift In 
emphasis from Income In the former set of accounts, to production in the latter. 
New Zeeland sustem of Netlonel Accounts: Concepts end Design 1971-72 to 1980-
.61. Department of Statistics, Wellington, 1963, pp.5-6. No attempt w111 be made 
to configure the NZSNA using Tonak's method. 
subtracted from each of the categories of private income (salary and 
wage payments, pay and allowances of armed forces etc.) include tbose 
levied by local authorities. The amount of direct tax levied by local 
authorities on each category of private income cannot be separately 
identified and systematically excluded. For instance, it is not possible to 
ascertain the amount of rates paid by salary and wage-earners. Second, 
the aggregate figures for total indirect taxes listed in the national 
accounts include indirect taxes levied by local authorities (mainly 
licence fees), which again cannot be separately identified and 
systematically excluded. For the sake of consistency, on botb counts, 
revenue and expenditure of local authorities must be included in this 
study. 
(3.3) The Net-Tax Methodology 
Bl 
The five 'phases' of Tonak's method of estimating net-tax will be 
outlined, and. supplemented where relevant with Freeman's 
interpretation and application of each phase to Britain's national 
accounts. The principal categories of New Zealand's national accounts 
required for each phase will then be identified and defined, and 
configured so as to mirror Tonak's categories. A summary statement of 
the resulting net-tax methodology is located in Appendix 3.1. The 
methodology is then applied to tbe data set in Appendix One. 
Phase One: Tonak 
The primary aggregate measure of national income drawn from the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIP A) of the United States and 
used to generate net-taxes is Net Natio11al Product, which Tonak 
subdivides into Gross Labour lJ1coJne (GLI) and Gross No11-Labour 
h1come (GNLI). He develops these secondary aggregates by classifying 
each category of Net National Product into either GLI or GNLI. Gross 
Labour Income "consists of wages and salaries, other labour income 
and employer contributions for social insurance", while Gross Non-
Labour Income comprises "proprietors income, corporate profits, rent, 
net interest, indirect business taxes, and business transfers. "1 
Phase One: New Zealand 
The measure of national income chosen as a starting-point is that of 
Net National Income at Factor Cost (NIFC), from which are derived 
Gross Labour Income (GLI) and Gross Non-Labour Income (GNLI).l 
1ronek, p.49. 
Net Natio11al I11Come at Factor Cost 
(1) Gross Labour I11come 
-Salary and wage payments 
2A fter Tonek, p.49. 
B2 
(2) Gross No11-Labour Income 
-Company Income 
-Other personal income 
-Pay and allowances of armed forces 
-Government and local authority trading income 
-Rental value, owner occupied houses 
B3 
Gross Labour l11come is composed solely of salary ru1d wage payme11ts, 
the nature of which are self-evident, except insofar as they include 
"payments in kind (food, quarters, etc.) . . . [and] payments to workers 
under the Workers Compensation Act and contributions by employers 
to superannuation schemes" .1 It is important to bear in mind the issue 
raised by Tonak, as to "whether ... inclusion of all salary earners as 
members of the working class produces any substantial bias in the 
results, given that some of the salary earners are actually non-workers, 
e.g. executives, etc. "2 Undoubtedly, an element of bias along these lines 
is likely to be present in the data used in this study. To take just two 
examples, it is likely that the category of Labour includes some 
individuals whose salaries are high enough to allow tl1em the 
opportunity to accumulate capital, and salary and wage-earners who 
own businesses that afford them an independent source of income. 3 
Given t11at members of t11e working class cannot be separately identified 
in the NIFC data, a solution to t11is problem is not forthcoming. Thus, it 
1 OENIE 1957-56, p.2B. 
2-ronek, p.54. He subsequently concludes that his date is not substantially biased. 
3As Ernest Mendel notes, "All owners of capital belong to this [the capitalist] 
class, Including rentters end ell those who could live on the Interest of their 
capital end do pocket this Interest, regardless of whether they additionally also 
happen to exercise a professlon"('Methodologlcel Issues', p.27). 
is sufficient to note that in tlte context of this study Labour refers to the 
working class broadly defi11ed as all salary and wage-earners, and to 
bear this in mind wlten analysing tbe data. 
Gross No11-Labour I11come , on the other hand, comprises several 
elements. The category of compa11y 111come is relatively 
straightforward: 11 Net income of companies before distribution; profits 
and dividends remitted abroad are deducted II .1 
Otlwr perso11al i11co1ne is defined as 11 The aggregate income of 
unincorporated businesses, farmers and professions as well as net rent, 
interest and income derived from overseas by households 11 .2 As such, 
this category properly belongs in Gross Non-Labour Income insofar as 
its constituent components do not accrue to workers. 
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Pay a11d allowrulCes of armed forces located in this country and 
overseas is included in the GNLI portion of national income insofar as 
tbe armed forces are part of tbe bourgeois state apparatus, and for tltis 
reason armed forces personnel cannot be regarded as 'workers' in the 
strict sense. Thus, the payments maintaining them cannot be considered 
as income accruing to labour. 
Re11tal value of OWJ1er-occupied lzouses is II an estimate of net rental 
values (before payment of rates, but after deduction for depreciation, 
mortgage interest, insurance, and repairs and maintenance) of all 
1 DEN IE 1957-58, p.28. 
2tbfd., p.28. 
owner-occupied houses except farmhouses." 1 This is a troublesome 
item. Pearce, for instance, regards this category as merely one of the 
many groundless abstractions used by bourgeois economists.2 If his 
argument is accepted, it should be excluded from this analysis 
altogetlter. However, in estimating the incidence of direct taxes, 'Rental 
Value of Owner-Occupied Houses' is added to 'Other Personal Income' 
in tlte national accounts, and direct taxes on botlt are combined. Thus, it 
is not possible to separately identify the amount of direct taxes 
attributable to 'Rental Value', independent of 'Other Personal Income'. 
Insofar as the amount of direct taxes on 'Other Personal Income' is 
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crucial to the estimation of net-tax, 'Rental Value' must be included in 
this study, albeit as a form of non-labour income in the same fashion as 
'Other Personal Income'. It should be noted that inclusion of 'Rental 
Value' in Gross Non-Labour Income works to bias the results in the 
opposite direction to the incorporation of all salary earners in the 
working class. To some extent, these assumptions must counterbalance 
one another. 
Gover111ne11t tUld local autlwrity tradi11g i11co1ne represents: 
The net total of profits and losses of all General Government 
and 1ocal authority trading undertakings before transfers by 
1 GENIE 1957-58, p.28. 
2G. Pearce, Where ts New Zeeland Gotng? Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Department of Sociology, University of Canterbury, p.112. He pointedly notes: 
'This fictitious entry represents either en Income thet ~accrue If the owner 
let the property, ore cost thet ~be Incurred 11 the owner hed to rent ft. The 
Inclusion of Imputed rent Is erbltrery; no figures ere Imputed for the 'rental 
velue' of private cers (which could be leased), washing machines (which could be 
laundries), kitchens (which might be restaurants) or eny number of other assets 
thet 'could' generate lncome"(p.112). 
way of interest on capital liability, direct taxation, etc. to the 
General Government or particular local authority. I 
Government trading departments are treated in this study. as ultimately 
being "forms of capitalist property" (to borrow a phrase from 
Freeman). Thus, the profits of trading departments can be classified as a 
form of Gross Non-Labour Income. 
Lump sum payme11ts from tbe U1lited Ki11gdom gover111ne11t: 
These payments, made by the United Kingdom .Government 
during the war and immediate post-war years, represent income 
accruing to New Zealand but not expressed in prices, and so are 
shown separately in the National Income accounts.2 
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Only categories of natio11al income will be considered in this study, and 
this category is omitted from the analysis on the basis that it marks no 
real addition to national income. 3 
1oENIE 1957-58, p.28. This category Is subdivided In Table 7 Into General 
Government Trading lncom.e (Item 3) end Local Authority Trading Income (Item 
16). Both sum to Item 6, Table 3. That this category represents the profits of 
trading departments Is evident In that the category 'Cost of Government-Provided 
Goods end Services' (Table 3, Item 16) excludes "Expenditure by Government 
trading departments ... their profits appearing as Hem 6 on the Income side of the 
eccount"(p.29). 
2QENIE 1957-58, p.31. 
3peerce makes the argument that this revenue Is not "e direct reward toe factor of 
production", nor was It "'eemed' through active perticlpetlon In the nation's 
economy", end Is not generated "In current output of goods end services produced 
for sale In markets" (p.136). It must be noted that he also make the same 
argument for pay and allowances of armed forces. This letter category has, 
however, been Included In the present study on the grounds that the taxes paid on 
this Income mark en addition to the tex-poolln New Zeeland available to be 
redistributed by the stele. 
Public debt i11terest paid i11 New Zealf111d, the remaining category of 
NIFC, represents "Total interest paid in New Zealand on General 
Government and local authority debt." 1 It is subtracted from the sum 
total of the preceding categories to arrive at the aggregate NIFC figure. 
Although it was established in relation to the preceding item that this 
study is restricted to categories of 11ati01ml income, insofar as it is not 
aim of this phase to precisely measure the level of national income, this 
category will be omitted and subsequently dealt with in the analysis of 
government expenditure. 
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In summary, Gross Labour I11c01ne is composed solely of salary and 
wage payments, while the components included in Gross No11-Labour 
I11Co1ne are company income, other personal income, pay and 
allowances of armed forces, government and local authority trading 
income, and rental value of owner occupied houses. 
Phase Two: Tona.k. 
The second phase requires that taxes be apportioned between labour 
and non-labour. To determine the proportion of personal income tax 
paid by members of the working class, Tonak uses "the ratio of total 
labour income to adjusted personal income" .2 This ratio expresses the 
'labour share' of income in 'adjusted' personal income and is taken as an 
indicator of tl1e portion of income tax paid by workers. For instance, 
1 DEN IE 1957-56, P.2B. 
2ronak, p.52. Personal Income is 'adjusted' in the sense that Imputed income is 
subtracted from lt. 
Tonak calculates the labour share in 1980 to be . 71, and on this basis he 
assumes the working class paid 71% of personal income tax.l In the 
text, on which this study relies, he provides little justification for this 
somewhat arcane procedure, and in the absence of further information 
on the U.S. system on national accounts, it cannot be explicated any 
further. This is unfortunate because 'Labour Share' is a crucial variable 
in Tonak.'s analysis, for on the basis of this quantity he subsequently 
allots certain indirect taxes and state expenditures to Labour and Non-
Labour (these will be identified in due course). 
Freeman calculates the labour-share of taxes on income as the 
proportion of income-tax paid by wage-earners, which is directly listed 
in the British national accounts. The same calculation is carried out by 
Freeman for 'property' (the equivalent of Tonak's 'non-labour'). In the 
same fashion as Tonak, he then proceeds to allocate indirect taxes and 
elements of state expenditure to Labour on the basis of wage-earners 
'share in income tax'. 
Phase Two: New Zealand 
Direct Taxes 
The amount of direct tax paid on each of the components of GLI and 
GNLI is available in the national accounts. A similar approach to 
Freeman's is used in calculating a quantity comparable to Tonak's 
tronek, p.53. 
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'Labour Share'. Insofar as the amount of direct tax paid out of salary 
and wage payments is directly listed in the national accounts, there is no 
need to make assumptions in the manner Tonak has in establishing the 
'Labour Share'. Total direct taxes are available, from which the 
percentage paid by labour can be established. This constitutes the 
'Labour Share' of direct tax. 
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Whereas Tonak and Freeman use the labour share of i.t1coJne tax, the 
labour share of direct tax will be used in this study to apportion certain 
elements of state expenditure to labour.l However, it is evident from 
Graph 3: 1 that income tax is the main constituent element of direct 
taxation anyway.2 Company and personal income tax consistently 
constitute more than 80% of direct tax over the time-period surveyed in 
this study. Land tax is only a very small component in percentage terms 
of total direct tax. Land tax is at its highest level at 1. 02% in 1950 and 
1954, thereafter it does not exceed 1% of total direct tax. In any case, by 
its very nature, it is reasonable to assume that workers did not pay land 
tax. Similarly, estate and gift duty, which it is assumed workers did not 
pay either, is only a small component of total direct taxes. At its high 
point in 1961 at 6.68%, from the late 1960s this component does not 
exceed 3% of total direct taxes. 
llndlrect texes ere elloceted to lebour using e different procedure to Tonek end 
Freemen, who simply essume thet the seme proportion of Indirect texes ere peld 
by lebour es the lebour shere of income lex. See the discussion of Indirect texes 
below. 
2rhe dele for this greph, end ell subsequent grephs, ere loceted in Appendix Two. 
The grephs ere numbered in eccordence with the tebles from which the dele ere 
drewn. 
Direct Taxes on Government and Local Authority Trading 
Income 
The national accounts deduct direct taxes from central government 
trading income, but not from trading income of local authorities.! It is 
assumed that no direct taxes are in fact paid on trading income of local 
authorities. This has been cross-checked with figures from the Planning 
Council, who calculate 'Total Trading Income' which comprises 
trading income both of Central Government and Local Authorities. 
From this category they subtract 'Direct Tax Paid by Trading 
Departments', which corresponds exactly to the figures for the same 
category in the national accounts.2 This is taken as confirmation that no 
direct taxes are paid on local authority trading income. 
Indirect Taxes 
Total indirect taxes are listed in the national accounts. Of this total, it 
is necessary to estimate the portion attributable to labour. Faced with 
lin the 1957-58 National Income end Expenditure Accounts, Table 13 Prtvate 
Income and Incidence of D;rect Taxation deals only wlth private Income, and thus 
"Excludes direct taxes paid by Government trading departments"(p.24). Direct 
taxes paid on central government trading Income Is avallable In the revenue 
accounts of the central government (Table 7. Item 4). Tables 13 and 7 are 
balanced In the following way. The direct tax totals that appear for each year in 
Table 7 (Item 1) Include direct taxes paid on trading income by central 
government trading departments. Said taxes are listed again as Item 4 and are 
deducted from total taxation Insofar as they have already been Included In Item 1. 
Table 13 lists private Income minus direct taxes, excluding direct taxes on central 
government trading Income. Therefore: Direct Taxes (Table 13) + Direct Taxes 
Paid by Trading Departments (Table 7, Item 4) = Total Direct Tax (Central+ 
Local Government) (Table 7). 
2New Zealand Planning Council, Public Expenditure and Its Financing 1950-79. 
June 1979, pp.46-50. 
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the same problem, Freeman simply assumes that workers pay the same 
percentage of indirect tax as their 'share in income tax', and he allocates 
indirect taxes to the category of 'Labour' on that basis.l Insofar as this is 
a somewhat crude assumption, a technique is required that allows 
greater precision in estimating the impact of indirect taxes on the 
working class in New Zealand. 
Interestingly enough, until recently there has been a paucity of studies 
in New Zealand in this area. In 1980, Bedggood drew attention to the 
sinister implications of this state of affairs: 
The fact that no reliable information on the impact of indirect 
taxation upon income distribution is available in New Zealand is 
itself evidence of the bias in favour of the myth of 
redistribution. 2 
In a similar vein, Macrae notes: 
It is a reflection of tl1e ostrich-like attitude of New Zealanders to 
income distribution questions that no research on the incidence 
of indirect taxation has been carried out for the post-war 
period.3 
1Tonek tekes the seme epproech fore portion of Indirect tex (although 1t Is not 
reedlly epperent from his peper which portion this Is). the remainder he 
ellocetes fn toto to non-labour. 
2Bedggood, p. 1 00. 
3J. Mecree, 'Income Distribution end Poverty in New Zeeland', Soctel Closs In New 
Zeeland, ed. D. Pitt. Auckland, Longmen Paul, 1977, p.49. 
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Graph 3:2 Labour Share of Consumpt1on Expend1ture 
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Indeed, it is only since the advent of GST in 1986 that much work on the 
incidence of indirect taxes has been done.l The data in such studies, 
however, is not aggregated at a level which is useful for the task at hand, 
and in any case the time-periods they cover fall outside the years under 
consideration here. 
To solve this problem, wage and salaty payments as a percentage of 
total consumption expenditure, labelled Labour Sl1are of Co11sumptioJ1 
Expe11diture , is calculated and used as an empirical index of the amount 
of indirect tax paid by labour. It is assumed that the whole of salary and 
wage payments are spent on consumption goods i.e. that the payments 
wholly comprise coJlSUJnptioJl expe11diture. The percentage of indirect 
taxes incurred by workers each year is taken to be the same as their 
share of consumption expenditure. 
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Given that indirect taxes are levied predominantly on· coJ1sumer 
goods, using the labour share of total consumption to calculate the 
share of indirect taxes paid by workers is a valid procedure. It is, 
however, unsatisfactory in two respects. First, as is evident from Graph 
3:2, it undoubtedly overestimates the portion of indirect taxes paid by 
salary and wage-earners, and this will distort the results to some extent. 
For instance, it is unlikely that salaty and wage-earners did in fact pay 
over 90% of indirect taxes in 1973. But it is apparent from Graph 3:3 
1c. Scott, P. Goss end H. Devls, The Incidence of Indirect Texes Volume One. 
Wellington, Victorte University Press, 1985. See elso A. Broed end L. Bee tee, Ih.e. 
Incidence of Indirect Texes Volume Two. Wellington, Vlctorle University Press, 
1985. It should be noted thet both studies were ectuelly written tn entlclpetlon of 
the lmplementetion of GST. 
tlmt 'Labour Share of Indirect Taxes' as a percentage of 'Total Taxes on 
Labour Income' declines through time anyway. Thus, even if the level 
of 'Labour Share of Consumption Expenditure' in the early 1970s leads 
to the assumption that over 90% of :indirect taxes are paid by labour, :in 
any case 'Labour Share of Indirect Taxes' only constitutes around 40% 
of 'Total Taxes on Labour Income'. 
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Second, the subsidiary effects of indirect taxes on the working class 
are not taken account of. Take the case of indirect taxes on new cars. 
Even if workers do not buy new cars, the level of indirect taxes is 
reflected in the price of second-hand cars bought by workers. To 
capture the true incidence of indirect taxes would prove a difficult task 
indeed, and this study does not purport to do so. Nonetheless, the 
procedure adopted here at least provides some indication of the 
proportion of total indirect taxes paid by the working class, and indeed 
it is more accurate than the indication that would be afforded by 
Freeman's technique. 
Phase Three: Tonak and New Zealand 
The third phase involves a simple operation: taxes calculated in the 
preceding phase are subtracted from gross incomes (GLI and GNLI) to 
give 'Labour Mter-Tax Income' (LATI) and 'Non-Labour After-Tax 
Income' (NLATI).l Depreciation allowances are also deducted from 
NLATI for the following reason. 
lronek, p.51. 
The estimates of company income taken from the national income 
accounts require adjustment, for as Horsman points out, "The cost of 
capital goods and their replacement must be taken into account when 
considering profit from an enterprise. "1 Herein lies a problem: capital 
goods wear out at different rates and hence do not "fit conveniently into 
any given accounting period. "2 As a solution to this problem, "An 
estimate is therefore made of the cost of capital equipment used up in 
any one year, and this is the ... depreciatio11 allowance . "3 Thus the 
depreciation allowance is the "part of the current years G. D.P. set aside 
for capital replacement. "4 
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Although estimating the true level of net non-labour income has no 
actual bearing on the calculation of net-tax, it will nonetheless be 
carried out for the sake of interest. To this end, depreciation allowances 
must be deducted from GNLI. The justification for this course of action 
is presented by Freeman, who criticizes Tonak for not deducting 
depreciation allowances: 
Tonak records profit, botb before and after taxes and benefits, 
without deducting capital consumption (depreciation). Tbis 
procedure thus allocates gross, as opposed to net, domestic 
product to the two major classes.s 
1J. Horsman, Economics: An Introductory Graphic Analysts. Auckland, Longman 
Paul, 1984, p.264. 
2tbfd., p.264. 
3Jbid., p.264. 
4/bfd., p.264. 
SFreeman, pp.31-32. 
Freeman seeks a precise estimation of profit, and he criticizes Tonak•s 
procedure because it .. overstat[es] profit ... by an amount equal to the 
fixed constant capital consumed during a year• s production ... 1 In light 
of this argument, Freeman deducts depreciation estimates listed in the 
British national accounts from company profits. 
Depreciation allowances are defined in the New Zealand national 
accounts as: 
An estimate of the depreciation allowed as a deduction from 
gross incomes for taxation purposes. Also includes depreciation 
charges on owner-occupied houses and financial provision for 
depreciation by non-tax-paying Government trading 
undertakings. No allowance is made for depreciation charges on 
other national assets, e.g. roads, bridges, irrigation schemes, 
etc.2 
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The definition suggests that two •rogue • items are present: depreciation 
charges on owner-occupied houses, and a portion of the depreciation 
allowances of government trading departments. Owing to the fact that 
these items cannot be separately identified and systematically excluded, 
depreciation allowances deducted from non-labour income will be 
overestimated in their amount. However, insofar as NLATI is not a 
crucial variable in the calculation of net-taxes, this is not a cause for 
concern. 
1Freemen, p.32. Fixed constant cep1lelis simply the Marxian term for the portion 
of cep1lelleid out etthe beginning of each production cycle to purchase cepltel 
goods. 
2QENIE 1957-56, p.2B. It should be noted that depreciation allowances ere 
excluded from NIFC. 
Phase Four: Tonak 
The fourth phase involves the task of apportioning government 
expenditure to Labour (thereby estimating the social wage) and Non-
labour. Tonak allots each of the items of government expenditure set 
out in the U.S. national income statistics either to Labour or Non-
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labour, or to both. In apportioning government expenditures, Tonak 
emphasizes that "non-labour" and "net-tax paid by non-labour" includes 
botlz "government transfers to the capitalist class" and "the state's own 
absorption of tax revenues for defraying costs of social reproduction as 
wetl" .1 This procedure is of considerable significance. Inclusion of 
these revenues (which as Tonak notes essentially take the form of the 
"government surplus or deficit") in the category of 'non-labour', 
imposes certain limits on his study.2 Notably, he does "not attempt ... 
to distinguish empirically between benefits/costs to capital and general 
social reproduction expenses". 3 This, he stresses, "is a very critical 
distinction in terms of its impact on capital accumulation". 4 
Empirically identifying net-tax paid by the capitalist class 
i..11depe11deJ1t of t11e state would shed light on the extent to which the state 
'subsidizes' the capitalist class by redistributing income to this class. 
Insofar as such a task requires a more sophisticated methodology, it is 
held over by Tonak to a subsequent investigation. The same 
methodological constraint applies to this project. Therefore, it is not 
1Tonak, p.51. 
2 . Ibid., p.51. 
3Jbfd., p.51. 
4Jbfd., p.51. 
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possible to analyse the effects of the redistributive activities of the state 
on capital accumulation. The picture will not be complete until this task 
is carried out, but it awaits further methodological innovations on the 
part of Tonak or theorists building on his work. 
Tonak's analysis of government expenditure (and his solution to the 
small problem of estimating the social wage) is based on the following 
assumption: 
we can regard state activities and expenditures as directed 
towards the conditions of social reproductions [sic]. Within this, 
we can designate two types of activities: one set includes those in 
which the state directly supports reproduction of the working 
class, a second set of activities reproduces capital and the 
capitalist class.l 
Tonak concentrates solely on the "first set of activities which directly 
support labour income and consumption through various kinds of 
government expenditures".2 Labour income and consumption are not 
directly supported by the second set of activities, which are regarded by 
Tonak as faux fraix of the capitalist system. 3 
The categories of the American national accounts bear sufficient 
resemblance to the New Zealand system to allow for an adaptation of 
1Tonak, p.5B. 
2Jbfd., p.5B. 
3Jbfd., p.5B. By way or an astde, Tonak explains the origin and meaning or the term 
'faux fraix', which literally translates as 'false costs'. Havtng originated in the 
work of Adam Smith, the French pre-Marxtan political economists used it to 
designate "expenses not directly incurred in the course or production"(p.71, 
n. 1 0). 
Tonak•s method of dealing with government expenditure, but his 
categorization is largely based on an analysis previously undertaken by 
Shaikh.l Such a Marxist analysis of the items of government 
expenditure presented in New Zealand•s national accounts has not been 
undertaken before. In the absence of such a study, criteria must be 
established by which to judge whether these items accrue to labour, 
non-labour, or are shared both between labour and non-labour. 
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Government expenditure is not classified in the national accounts 
according to the class which receives it.2. On the one hand, categories 
such as government expenditure on unemployment benefits are easily 
dealt with. It is a modest assumption to regard workers as the group of 
individuals that bear the brunt of unemployment, insofar as the 
capitalist system requires a reserve army of labour, as is evident in the 
case of recurrent structural unemployment in periods of capitalist 
crisis. Hence, state expenditure in the form of unemployment benefits 
can be regarded as accruing solely to the working class- in this case the 
broad category of •labour•. 
1A. Shaikh, Merxjen Categories and National Income Accounts. Unpublished Peper, 
1980. 
2Freemen writes: "State spending differs from state income in one fundamental 
respect, which Is that the Identity of the beneficiaries cannot be determined 
economically. By this we mean that there is no stele account, no set of ledgers in 
which we can find entered the amount of service each citizen or guild has had from 
the state, In the same way that we can ascertain how much tax they have paid. This 
Is not just a failure of accounting method. The reel difficulty arises because the 
state forms its Income into a common fund. The identity of the private contributors 
to the state Is destroyed In the process of selling up this fund. We cannot say that 
one pert of the fund is reserved for Income from wage-earners, or spending on 
wage-earners, and another for property-owners"(pp.18-19). 
Similarly, military expenditure may be regarded as accruing solely to 
non-labour insofar as its object is to secure the existence of the capitalist 
system. Cases such as health expenditure are, however, more difficult; 
only the portion of state spending on health coJ1sumed by tl1e working 
class can be regarded as part of the social wage. A technique is 
therefore required to differentiate health and similar expenditures into 
a working class (labour) component and a capitalist class (non-labour) 
component. 
Freeman argues that state expenditure is governed by political 
decisions at the level of the state, and not by taxes paid, nor in the 
immediate sense by the law of value (although in the final instance the 
law of value must set the limits within which state expenditure is 
disbursed).l There being no strictly 'economic' solution to this 
problem, "it is only possible to ascertain which classes receive which 
benefits ... by studying the functions of state expenditure"2 Thus 
Freeman, after Tonak, divides state spending into three categories on 
the basis of its function: 
(1) Spending exclusively benefitting property [non-labour], 
such as state grants, military spending, and also . . . spending on 
the police, etc., whose function is tl1e protection of property. 
(2) Spending exclusively benefitting wage-earners, such as [the] 
unemployment benefit. 
(3) State spending on the 'public as a whole'; such as health, 
education, etc. 3 
1 Freeman, p.19. 
2Jbfd., p.19. 
3Jbfd., p.19. 
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The third category is labelled 'Shared' expenditure (in the sense of 
being shared between labour and non-labour). As Freeman notes: "This 
transfers value to both classes, and we have to estimate what proportion 
goes to which class. "1 Tonak estimates the proportion of shared 
expenditures (education, health and so forth) accruing to labour on the 
basis of the same figure he uses to calculate the labour share of total 
personal income tax, namely the "share of labour income in adjusted 
personal income" .2 Freeman follows suit: these expenditures are 
divided in his study according to the 'income tax ratio', i.e. the labour 
share of income tax.3 In this study, 'shared' expenditures will be 
allocated to labour according to the labour share of direct tax, which is 
plotted in Graph 3:4. To illustrate this technique, insofar as the labour 
share of direct tax is 52% in 1975, workers are considered to have 
consumed 52% of 'shared' state expenditures in that year. This 
procedure is followed for each year in the data series; while it is 
somewhat crude, it is necessary in order for the empirical analysis to 
proceed. 
The foregoing framework is sufficiently general for all items of 
expenditure by the New Zealand state to be subsumed into one of the 
three categories. The criterion employed by Tonak in classifying the 
components of state expenditure included either completely or partially 
in the category of labour is that they must "directly support labour 
1 Freemen, p.19. 
2Tonek, p.59. 
3Freemen, p.39. 
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income and consumption" .1 This rule of thumb will be applied to the 
categories of New Zealand state expenditure. State expenditure which 
partially supplements labour income and consumption is classified as 
being shared between labour and non-labour, insofar as this 
expenditure represents "social consumption in general" .2 The 
classification adheres to Freeman's approach 1n classifying "all 
government spending which is not specifically allocated to wage-
earners as a residual and part of property [non-labour] income".3 
Tonak.'s method solves the small problem of estimating the social 
wage in every respect except whether state capital expenditures are 
consumed by wage-earners. It is not immediately apparent from 
Tonak's and Freeman's analyses whether government capital 
expenditure is apportioned to labour and non-labour in the same fashion 
as current expenditure. For example, Freeman merely cites the general 
categories of 'Health', 'Education' and so forth without stating whether 
they include capital expenditure or are restricted merely to current 
expenditure. Similarly, Tonak. makes no mention of government capital 
expenditure - whether he includes it in his study is a moot point. 
A cursory inspection of the American National Income and Product 
Accounts and their British counterparts would of course reveal the way 
in which each theorist deals with goverrunent capital expenditure. In the 
absence of these accounts being available, however, the strategy that has 
1Tonak, p.SB. 
2sheikh, p.37 (in Tonak, p.59). 
3Freeman, p. 14. 
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been adopted in this study is to exclude government capital 
expenditure. The reasons for this are twofold. First, constraints 
imposed by the data available in New Zealand's national accounts 
prevent government capital expenditure from being included in the 
social wage. Second, it is in any case conceptually incorrect to include 
government capital expenditure in the social wage. These points will be 
elaborated, each in turn. 
It was established previously that items of capital expenditure do not 
necessarily wear out in the year in which they are funded. To take an 
arbitrary example, assume that five million dollars is spent in a given 
year- by the state on the construction of a road, but that the road does not 
wear out for a further 20 years. Abstracting from whether workers 
'consume' government capital expenditure (it will subsequently be 
argued that they do not), this public asset is not wholly 'consumed' in 
the year in which the expenditure that finances it is laid out. It will be 
recalled that the yearly rate at which a capital item wears out is given by 
the depreciation allowance (at least it is approximated by the 
depreciation allowance). Thus, only the portion of the depreciation 
allowa11Ce reflecting workers' consumption of the item in question 
should be allocated to labour. 
The national accounts revenue account lists and itemizes only curre11t 
expenditure, "and therefore excludes capital receipts and payments of 
all kinds" .1 Gross capital formation (expenditure on capital goods) both 
1 DEN IE 1957-58, p.14. 
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government and private is available in the national accounts under the 
category of 11 Gross Capital Formation in New Zealand".! However, 
depreciation allowances on government capital expenditure are not 
available. 
Even if the problem of estimating depreciation allowances is 
temporarily disregarded, another arises: gross capital formation by the 
government is not functionally classified in the national accounts. If 
total government capital expenditure was to be included in this study, 
Tonak's method requires that it be functionally classified in the same 
manner as curre11t expenditure, and apportioned to 'Labour', 'Non-
labour' or 'Shared', on the basis of its function. 
Functional estimates are attempted by the Planning Council in their 
publication entitled "Public Expenditure and Its Financing: 1950-
1979", but the calculation of capital formation poses thorny_problems. 
The Planning Council have used estimates independently assembled, 
which, though providing general trends in capital formation, must be 
treated with caution. As they themselves note: "The fact that the 
Government Statistician does not publish a functional analysis is an 
indication of the difficulty of putting together consistent, reliable and 
1This category "Represents the value of gross investment by private enterprise 
and by government In durable capital goods In New Zeeland, Including In this 
sense, capital Improvements to lend. It also includes net investments in stock in 
any given year, i.e. the change in stocks of goods and materiels between the 
beginning and end of each year .... The valuation ts gross, i.e. before deduction of 
allowances for depreciation and obsolescence"(OENIE 1957-58, p.29). This 
category Includes capital expenditure by local authorities, the amount of which is 
separated out In Table 6, Item 46. 
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comprehensive estimates" .1 This said, the sources of the estimates used 
are mainly reports by government departments. 
Furthermore, it would be necessary to discover the rate at which at \-
which each category of public capital goods depreciates. Given the 
lengths the Plaruting Council went to in arriving at their functional 
estimates of gross capital formation (which in any case are not very 
accurate), estimation of depreciation allowances would prove a 
formidable task. There appears to be no basis from which this could be 
done, beyond arbitrarily assu1ni11g rates of depreciation. Such 
speculative activity is beyond the scope of this study. 
The more fundamental obstacle to the inclusion of government 
capital expenditure in this study is the whole notion that workers 
'consume' a portion of this expenditure- which, it will be argued, is an 
incongruous proposition. It is useful at this point to draw an analogy 
between capital expenditure by the state, and capital expenditure by 
industrial capitalists. In the private sector, the wearing out of capital 
goods is incurred by the owners of these goods (i.e. the capitalist class) 
as a necessary expense in the course of capitalist production. As fixed 
consta11t capital, these goods depreciate by "transfer[ring] value 
to ... product[s] over time".2 Similarly, whether to include government 
1NzPC, p.67. The Planning Counc11 note: "No attempt is made to reconc11e the 
official aggregate with the sum of identified functional estimates. Instead any 
dollar discrepancy is simply included in 'other' as a residual"(P.67). The 
category of 'Other' therefore includes Inter BlfB the difference between the capital 
formation aggregate in the National Accounts and the Planning Council's own 
figures. 
2freeman, p.29. 
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capital expenditure must be decided on the basis of the class that is 
considered to own state property. Workers can only be considered to 
'consume' government capital expenditure if they own the state 
property in question. This proposition, however, contradicts the 
fundamental tenets of Marxist analysis at every point. 
Even though Freeman makes no mention of government capital 
expenditure, he does draw attention to the difficulties involved in 
identifying the owners of state property: "The private origin of its [the 
state's] income has been obliterated and those who have paid its taxes 
have no individual claim on what they have paid. "1 This raises problems 
in deciding the class to which state property belongs: 
If ... [state property is] neither owned by the wage-earners nor 
by property-owners, then we have to conclude either that the 
state's employees are in fact its owners, an independent class or 
estate in its own right, or that the state is in some sense the joint 
property of all taxpayers.2 
The former conclusion is absurd, and the latter is essentially bourgeois 
ideology. Nonetheless, insofar as the state is under the control of the 
capitalist class, Freeman "conclude[s] that state property ... [is] in the 
last analysis a form of capitalist property. "3 For the purposes of this 
study, it will be assumed in like fashion that state property is indeed 
'capitalist property'. 
1Freemen, p.13. 
2fbfd., p.13. 
3fbfd., p.13. 
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In light of the foregoing, even if depreciation allowances were 
available (wl1ich they are not), an argument could be made that 
government capital expenditure still ought to be excluded from this 
study. Undoubtedly, to some readers the decision to exclude capital 
expenditure from the social wage will be contentious. Certainly, it is 
not without problems. For instance, the outlay -by the state in providing 
a social wage necessarily includes both current and capital expenditure. 
To take just one example, the provision of a social wage in the sphere of 
education (so-called 'free' education) requires not only current 
expenditures such as the wages of teachers, but also capital expenditure 
in the form of the land on which schools are built and the school 
buildings themselves. Suffice to say that it is necessary to return to the 
issue of ownership of these forms of property, and in this study they are 
regarded as being owned by the capitalist class. 
Phase Four: New Zealand 
Classification of Government Expenditures by Function 
All government expenditures are classified according to the three 
categories proposed by Freeman, using the criteria established 
previously. 
(1) No11-Labour 
General administration 
Interest on general government debt paid overseas 
Law and order 
Development of primary and secondary industries 
Defence and war 
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Interest on general government debt paid in New 
Zealand 
Subsidies 
Interest on local authority debt paid in New Zealand 
Net transfers to rest of world 
(2) Labour 
Monetary social security benefits and pensions 
(3) Sl1ared 
Health 
Education 
Non-monetary· social security benefits 
Other social services 
Rehabilitation 
Maintenance of public works and services 
Local authority cost of provision of goods and services 
Transfers to local authorities 
Family benefit advances. 
(1) State Expenditure Benefitting Capital (designated 'Non-labour') 
Ge11eral Ad1ninistratio11 represents the use of taxes to meet expenses 
incurred in maintaining the state. These funds do not accrue to labour in 
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the form of income, nor are they, to use Tonak's phrase, part of 
"workers' consumption". 
Interest 011 tJ1e Ge11eral Gover111nent Debt Paid Overseas is listed in the 
national accounts "as a payment for a final service". 1 It does not mark 
an addition to income accruing to workers, nor does it increase their 
consumption levels. Following Tonak, tbis category is considered to be 
part of t11e costs met by the state in effecting social reproduction. 
Law and Order. This category represents state expenditure directed to 
the end of safeguarding private property. As such, it "represents 
protection of private property, (persons) and social rules and not 
consumption of any use-values as such".2 
Develop1ne11t of Primary and Secondary l11dustries may be regarded as 
a form of payment to the capitalist class. It does not augment workers' 
income nor their levels of consumption. 
Defe11ce a11d l-'Var. Periodic wars are necessary aspects of the 
functioning of capitalism. This category represents expenditure 
directed to the end of defending private property by military means. 3 
Interest 011 Ge11eral Goven11ne11t Debt Paid i11 New Zealand is classified 
in the national accounts as a transfer payment. The Planning Council 
lQENJE 1957-58, p.31. 
2sheikh, p.36 (in Tonek, p.59). 
3ronek, p.59. 
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argue it could equally be "regarded as a payment for the service of 
money advanced to the public sector by the private sector and therefore, 
a part of public consumption. "1 In this view, a portion of this interest 
could conceivably return to workers indirectly, depending on how the 
debt is financed and where workers lodge their savings. Insofar as this 
study is not concerned to precisely "'close the circuit' of income 
circulation", to use Freeman's phrase, it is assumed that this category 
does not influence the income or consumption levels of workers.2 
Subsidies are payments by the state to various fractions of the capitalist 
class to the end of reducing their input costs. The various types of 
subsidies are classified in the national accounts as follows: (a) shipping, 
transport and incidental (b) coal production and distribution (c) 
primary production (d) essential clothing and foodstuffs (e) 
Miscellaneous (f) housing suspensory loans. By lowering input costs, 
subsidies give rise to a reduction in the price of commodities produced 
by the subsidized industry. It could be argued that subsidized industries 
producing wage-goods effectively subsidize workers' levels of 
consumption and increase their discretionary income. This would, 
however, prove exceedingly difficult to estimate. Furthermore, the 
increase in workers' levels of consumption (or discretionary income) is 
only an i11direct reSl.llt of state spending, insofar as the initial payment is 
made to the capitalist class. 
1 NZPC, p. 1 0. 
2Freemen, p.4. 
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I11terest 011 Local Autlwrity Debt Paid i11 New Zealand is designated a 
transfer payment in the national accounts. It is classified on the same 
basis as the item 'Interest on the General Government Debt Paid in New 
Zealand', as a cost incurred by the regional arm of the state in effecting 
social reproduction. 
Net Trru1sfers to Rest of vVorld represents the dealings of the bourgeois 
state at an international level, albeit for so-called 'humanitarian' 
concerns (foreign aid and so forth).1 
(2) State Expenditure Benefitting Labour (designated 'Labour'), 
Mo11etary Social Security Be11efits a11d Pe11sio11S includes 
unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, age benefits, family 
allowances, and so forth. As transfer payments, benefits and allowances 
"represent direct cash payments to the individual for no current service 
to the state. "2 They directly augment labour income, and are assumed to 
accrue only to labour. 
In the same manner as Freeman's study, monetary social security 
benefits are the only components of state expenditure regarded as 
unambiguously accruing to labour. This approach differs from that of 
1The following description of this category Is given In the national accounts: 
'Transactions Included herein concern Government contributions to Colombo Plan, 
assistence end relief supplies to verious tntemettonel relief orgenlzettons end 
subscriptions to the Unfted Nations, its agencies end similar organlzations'"(OENIE 
1973-74, p.:21). The cetegory eppears es early es 1938 (eccording to the 1964-
65 eccounts) but Is listed systemeticelly only from 1950 onwerds. 
2QENIE 1957-58, p.31. 
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Tonak, who is able to itemize expenditures witl1in the broad category 
of benefits and pensions, excluding some of the sub-categories from 
Labour Income.l It is necessary to briefly outline the reasons Freeman 
cites for his own approach, and the justification for adopting it over 
Tonak's. 
Freeman notes that there are two types of social security payments in 
the U.K. and U.S.: 
(1) Pensions, unemployment benefits etc., which represent "a 
return of income given to the state during a working life and 
[are] designed to provide a safety-net for illness or short-term 
unemployment, and some form of material support during 
retirement" .2 
(2) "'Supplementary benefits', which like welfare payments are 
designed to sustain people who have no other means of support, 
for whatever reason" .3 
The second type of benefit covers individuals in situations of chronic 
unemployment, those unemployed since leaving school (never having 
worked), solo parents and so forth. 
Freeman notes that Tonak, drawing on Shaikh's invaluable work, 
does not regard the second type of payment as accruing to workers 
insofar as these payments mark: 
1Tonak, pp.59-60. 
2Freeman, p.20. 
3fbid., p.20. 
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neither an addition to the income of employed workers and their 
families, nor a deferred portion of a worker's own past labour 
income which is now drawn on to mediate a temporary period 
of unemployment. [Instead these expenditures represent] a 
payment to those individual or families who remain separated 
from employment, and the payments themselves do not depend 
on any past contributions of the recipients.t 
In this light, Tonak excludes such payments from employed workers' 
income. Again relying on Shaikh, payments of the first type 
(unemployment benefits, pensions, etc.) Tonakregards "completely as 
labour income since 'they do represent a reflux of forced saving out of 
past labour income' in order to make both retirement and 
unemployment financially feasible for the capitalist state" .2 
On the basis of these assumptions, Tonak's procedure - which 
Freeman conveniently summarizes - is as follows: 
He constructs two indices of transfer ratio, .. . . one taking into 
account welfare payments as if they went to wage-earners [and 
one not]. Thus his main welfare ratio is designed to show the 
income specifically due to wage income, rather than to the 
working class or the wage-earning classes in a broader sense. 3 
Freeman argues that to place such emphasis on a transfer ratio which 
excludes those permanently out of work in Britain, would "seriously 
distort the economic effects of the crisis which have thrown a huge 
army of previously employed workers out of work, and which finances 
1 Shaikh, pp.36-37 (in Freeman, pp.20-21 ). 
2Tonak, p.60 (quoUng Shaikh, p.37). 
3Freeman, p.21. Note that the transfer ratio is merely another means of 
expressing the level of net-tax. A description of the manner in which the transfer 
ratio is constructed is given below. 
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them out of large welfare payments" .1 He further justifies his inclusion 
of social security benefits in the income of wage-earners on the basis 
that: 
social security benefits are directed to the reproduction of 
labour power in its broadest sense, because part of the 
maintenance of labour power involves maintaining a reserve 
army of the unemployed. 2 
On the basis of this latter point, it is valid to follow Freeman in 
including social security benefits in labour income. In any case, Tonak's 
procedure is not a viable option for the present study insofar as the 
government expenditure statistics are not differentiated in a way that 
would allow detailed sub-classifications of expenditure on benefits to be 
made. Whereas Freeman generates a second transfer ratio in 
accordance with Tonak's, it is not possible to do the same vis-a-vis New 
Zealand. One comparative element is thereby excluded, but the other is 
retained. Inclusion of social security payments in labour mcome yields 
Tonak's 'welfare-adjusted' transfer ratio, which accords with the 
transfer ratio constructed in this study and the transfer ratio constructed 
by Freeman, thereby establishing a strong empirical basis for 
comparison. 
(3) State Expenditure Shared Between Labour and Non-labour 
(desiinated by 'Shared'), 
1 Freemen, p.21. 
2Jbid., p.21. 
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To reiterate, the rationale for including the following items in the 
'shared' category is that they represent 'social consumption'. The 
following discussion is limited to a brief description of each of the non-
obvious items. 
Healt11 and Educatio11 are self-evident. 
Non-Monetary Social Security Benefits. It is noted in the national 
accounts: "The institution of these benefits merely represent a change 
from direct payment by the individual for goods and services 
purchased, to a system whereby the State, acting as an intermediary 
third party, collects the payments by way of taxation and pays it over to 
the supplier in return for goods and services provided to the 
individual. "1 These are primarily medical benefits, as demonstrated by 
their subsequent subsumption into the general category of 'Health' in 
1957. 
Otl1er Social Services is treated as a residual item. It is unlikely that 
these expenditures accrue solely either to labour or non-labour. 
Rel1abilitatio11 represents expenditure on rehabilitation schemes (e.g. 
farming and education) for war veterans. Even though it was argued 
above that members of the armed forces should not be included in the 
category of labour, the bulk of this expenditure undoubtedly accrues to 
veterans of the second world war, many of whom were conscripted 
1 DEN IE 1957-58, p.31. 
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workers. For this reason, it is appropriate to locate this item in the 
'shared' category. 
Mai.JiteJzruzce of Public ltVorks ruzd Services is classified as a current 
expenditure in that it represents "Maintenance of roads and public 
works as opposed to construction and renewal which is treated as capital 
expenditure. "1 This item is regarded as 'shared' expenditure insofar as 
workers as well as capitalists 'consume' roads and public assets such as 
bridges, through their use of vehicles.2 
Local Autlwrity Cost of Provision of Goods ruzd Services represents 
current expenditure by local authorities. This item is not classified by 
function in the national accounts. In allocating it to the 'shared' 
category, it has been assumed, on the basis that the current and capital 
expenditure of ge11eral. government intersect in similar areas, that the 
elements of current expenditure mirror local authority capital 
expenditure. The main compo~ents of local authority capital 
expenditure are identified by the Planning Council: "roading 
construction and maintenance, water supply, airport development, 
electricity supply, and public passenger tr~sport. "3 These fall largely 
into the category of shared expenditure, and in the absence of a detailed 
functional analysis, this item will be so classified. 
1 DEN IE 1957-58, p.3 1. 
2-fonak develops a 'petrol consumption ratio' as an indicator of the extent to which 
wear and tear on roads can be attributed to workers. Freeman ltkewise develops a 
'transport ratio'. Unfortunately, there is no comparable basis in the New Zealand 
data from which to develop a similar ratio. 
3NZPC, p.26. 
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Trru1sfe1·s to Local Autl10rities is composed of "Transfers to hospital 
boards by way of maintenance and capital subsidies .... Transfers from 
Consolidated Fund, Public Works Account, and National Roads Fund 
for maintenance and construction of highways and subsidies to various 
local authorities. "1 It is evident from this definition that the category 
includes an element of capital expenditure, the amount of which cannot 
be separately identified and systematically excluded. This item, 
therefore, is the only exception to the rule of excluding capital 
expenditure from the calculation of the net-tax time-series. It is 
classified as a 'shared' expenditure for the same reason as 'Maintenance 
of Public Works and Services' above. 
Frunily Be11efit Advru1ces. This item appears for the first time in the 
national accounts in 1959. The advance of family benefits by the state 
was provided for by the Family Benefits Act of 1958. It enabled parents 
with a minimum of two children to capitalize the benefitin order to 
buy, extend, or repay the mortgage on their first house. An amendment 
in 1962 allowed parents renting from the state the option of purchasing 
their houses.2 It is likely that a portion of the expenditure denoted by 
this item accrues to tl1e capitalist class, hence its inclusion in the 
category of 'shared' expenditure. 
1 DEN IE 1957-58, p.31. 
2The New Zealand Book of Events, ed. B. Fraser. Aucklend, Reed Methuen, 1986, 
p.318. 
117 
Phase Five: Tonak and New Zealand 
Calculation of Net-Tax 
Net-tax is calculated using the empirical results generated in Phases 
Two and Four. Government expenditure received by labour (the social 
wage) is subtracted from taxes paid by lab our, yielding net-tax paid by 
labour.! The net-tax data set empirically quantifies the amount of tax 
the working class pays to the state, relative to what this class receives 
back from the state in the form of the social wage. If government 
expenditure received (the subtrahend) is less than taxes paid (the 
minuend), net-tax paid by labour will have a positive value. If 
government expenditure received is greater than taxes paid, net-tax will 
have a negative value. 
A positive value indicates, as Tonak notes, "a net income transfer 
from labour to non-labour", to wit "workers paid more in taxes than 
they received in benefits or income from the state. "2 A negative value 
indicates the "net income transfer" has been in the opposite direction, 
i.e. from non-labour to labour. Net-tax can also be expressed in terms 
of a •transfer ratio•, by dividing taxes paid by labour by government 
expenditure received. A value in excess of unity represents a transfer of 
income from labour to non-labour, a value below unity the opposite. 
11t w111 be noted from Appendix 3.1 that the social wage is henceforth labelled 
'Labour Port1on of Total Government Expenditure' (LPTGE), end total taxes paid by 
labour is henceforth labelled Total Taxes on Labour Income' (TTL I). 
2Tonek, p.61. 
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In the case of net-tax having a positive value, Tonak. cautions: 
'non-labour', in this context, consists of not only the capitalist 
class and non-working members of the working class, but also 
the state itself: Therefore, the net income transfer from labour 
to non-labour does not imply that the net-tax paid by the 
capitalist class has always been negative. 1 
Similarly, Tonak's methodological caveat applies to this study (although 
it will be recalled that, insofar as working class individuals who do not 
work are included in the category of 'labour', 'non-labour' comprises 
only the capitalist class and the state). The capitalist class need not have 
paid less in taxes than they received in the form of state expenditure for 
net-tax paid by labour to have a positive value. To reiterate, this 
limitation allows a time series quantifying net-tax paid to be calculated 
only for labour, and not for the capitalist class. In any case, this is all 
that is required for our immediate purposes. 
(3. 4) Summary 
This chapter concludes by drawing attention to the main differences 
between the application of Tonak's net-tax methodology to New 
Zealand attempted herein and Tonak's own study, along with that of 
Freeman. This is of particular importance because the results of this 
analysis will be compared both to Tonak's and Freeman's results in the 
next chapter in order to shed 1igl1t on international similarities and 
differences in the state's impact on inter-class income redistribution. 
1ronek, p.61. 
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The differences between this study and Tonak.'s are threefold. First, 
on the basis of Freeman's argument, depreciation allowances have been 
deducted from company income. However, it was pointed out earlier 
that tl1is bas no real effect on t11e estimation of net-tax, but it does for the 
sake of interest provide a closer estimation of net non-labour income 
than Tonak's study. Second, again following Freeman, social security 
benefits are included in labour income. Tonak., on the other hand, 
excludes a portion of social security benefits from labour income, but 
he generates another data series in which they are completely included 
in labour income, thereby preserving a basis for comparison with the 
data generated in this study. Third, the labour sbare of indirect taxes is 
calculated in this study using a quantity termed 'Labour Share of 
Consumption Expenditure', whereas both Tonak and Freeman use the 
labour share of income tax for tl1is purpose. 
Additionally, it must be reiterated that the way in wbich government 
capital expenditure is dealt witb by Tonak and Freeman cannot be 
ascertained, and that it is in fact excluded from tbis study. Under tbe 
assumption that it is correct to do so, the differences between this study 
and Tonak.'s and Freeman's are not great. This enables tbe claim to be 
made tbat tbe time series generated on tbe basis of tbis chapter does 
correspond, if not to the letter tben at least as closely as the NIFC data-
base allows, to Tonak.'s innovative concept of 'net-tax'. 
Appendix 3.1: Net-Tax Methodology1 
Phase 1: Allocation of Gross Incomes to Labour and Non-Labou~ 
(1) Gmss Lnbout· I11come 
(fable 3) Salary and W~e Payments (11) 
GLI Gross Labour Income 
(2) Gmss Non-Lnbout· I11Come 
(Table 3) Pay and Allowances of Armed Forces (I2) 
+Rental Value Owner Occupied Houses (I3) 
+Other Personal Income (I4) 
+Company Income (IS) 
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+Goyt. & Local Authori~ TradiJW Income 06) 
GNLI Gross Non-Labour Income 
1The categories ere identffied end presented in e manner adapted from the works of 
Freemen end Tonek. The source of ell statistical categories is 'Official Estimetes of 
Net1onel Income end Expenditure 1957-58'. All tebles referred to derive from 
this source. Figures suches (11) refer to Hems within e table. 
2Figures for GLI end GNLI have been taken from the category of National Income et 
Factor Cost. from which have been excluded Item 7 'Lump Sum Payments', end 
Item 8 'Publfc Debt Interest'. Item 13, 'Deprecietfon Allowances·. though not e 
pert of NIFC, is deducted et Phase Three for reasons outlined previously. 
Phase 2: Allocation of Taxes to Labour and Non-Labour 
(1) Dil-ect Tax 
(1.1) (a) Total Direct Tax on GLI and GNLI 
(Table 13) Direct Taxes on Salaries and Wages 
±Direct Taxes on Pay and Allowances of Armed Forces 
±Direct Taxes on Other Personal Income (includes 
rental value of owner-occupied houses) 
±Direct Taxes on Company Income 
±Direct Truces on Centra! Govt. Tradi1Ji lncome Cfable 7. 14) 
TDT Total Direct Tax on GLI and GNLI 
(1.1)(b) Direct Taxes on Labour Income 
Direct Taxes on Salaries and Wa2"es 
DTLI Direct Taxes on Labour Income 
(l.l)(c) Direct Taxes on Non-Labour Income 
DTNLI 
Direct Taxes on Pay and Allowances of Armed Forces 
±Direct Taxes on Other Personal Income 
±Direct Taxes on Company Income 
±Direct Taxes on Central Govt. Tradi!li Income 
Direct Taxes on Non-Labour Income 
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( 1. 2) Labour Share of Direct Taxes 
DILl/ Direct Taxes on Labour Income/ 
..IDI Total Direct Tax on GLI and GNLI 
LSDT Labour Share of Direct Taxes 
(1. 3) Non-Labour Share of Direct Taxes 
DTNLII Direct Taxes on Non-Labour Income/ 
TDI Total Direct Tax on GLI and GNLI 
NLSDT Non-Labour Share of Direct Taxes 
(2) I11dit'ect Tax 
(2. 1) Labour Share of Indirect Taxesl 
TINT (fable 11) Total Indirect Taxes 
*L.SQE/100 
LSIT 
*Labour Share of Consumption Expenditure/100 
Labour Share of Indirect Taxes 
(2.2) Non-Labour Share of Indirect Taxes 
TINT Total Indirect Taxes 
-LSIT -Labour Share of Indirect Taxes 
NLSIT Non-Labour Share of Indirect Taxes2 
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l·Lebour Shere of Consumption Expenditure' is total salery and wage payments as a 
percentage of total consumption expenditure. 
2NLSIT is calculated as a residue! category, i.e., as the amount remaining after 
Labour Share of Indirect Taxes (LSIT) has been deducted from Total Indirect Taxes 
(TINT). 
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(3) DiJ:ect Tax + h1di1"ect Tax. 
DTLI (3.1) Direct Taxes on Labour Income 
+ LSII + Laboyr Share of Indirect Taxes 
TTL! Total Taxes on Labour Income 
DTNLI (3.2) Direct Taxes on Non-Labour Income 
+NLSIT +Non-Labour Share of Indirect Taxes 
TTNLI Total Taxes on Non-Labour Income 
Phase 3: Adjustment of Qross Incomes For Effects of Taxes 
(1) Labout" Aftet"-Tax h1eome 
GLI 
-ITLl 
LATI 
Gross Labour Income 
-Total Taxes on Labour Income 
Labour After-Tax Income 
(2) No11-Labour Afte1·-Tax Income 
(2.1) GNLI 
-TTNLI 
Gross Non-Labour Income 
-Total Taxes on Non-Labour 
NLATI(a) Non-Labour After-Tax Income( a) 
(2.2) NLATI(a) Non-Labour After-Tax Income(a) 
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-.I:!£AL -D~reciation Allowances Q'able 3. 113) 
NLATI(b) Non-Labour After-Tax Income(b) 
Phase 4: Allocation of Goyenunent Expenditure to Labour and Non-Labour 
(1) Gove111111ent Expenditute Acct11i1Jg to Labour Alone 
Monetary Social Securit,Y Benefits and Pensions 
GEALA Govenunent Expenditure Accruing to Labour Alone 
(2) Govetwne11t Expenditut·e AccruiJJg to No11-Labour Alone 
General Administration 
+Interest on General Govenunent Debt Paid Overseas 
+Law and Order 
+Development of Primary and Secondaty Industries 
+Defence and War 
+Interest on General Government Debt Paid in New Zealand 
+Subsidies 
+Interest on Local Authority Debt Paid in New Zealand 
+Net Iransfers to Rest of World 
GEANLA Govenunent Expenditure Accruing to Non-Labour Alone 
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(3) Gove1:t11ne11t Expenditu1·e Sluu·ed Between Labour ru1d Non-Labour 
Family Benefit Advances 
+Health 
+Education 
+Non-monetru:y Social Security Benefits 
+Other Social Services 
+Rehabilitation 
+Maintenance of Public Works and Services 
+Local Authority Cost of Provision of Goods and Services 
+Transfers to Local Authorities 
SGE Goverrunent Expenditure Shared Between Labour and Non-Labour 
(4) Labour Po11ion of Sl1ru·ed Gove111ment Expenditut·e 1 
SGE Goverrunent Expenditure Shared Between Labour and Non-Labour 
*LSIIT *Labour Share of Direct Taxes 
LPSGE Labour Portion of Shared Goverrunent Expenditure 
(5) Labout· Pottio11 of Total Govet:tlmeJ1t Expe11diture 
LPSGE Labour Portion of Shared Government :E;xpenditure 
+GEALA +Govenuneut Expenditure Accrui~ to Labour Alone 
LPTGE Labour Portion of Total Government Expenditure 
1SGE is apportioned to Non-Labour according to 'Labour Shere of Direct Texes' 
(LSDT). 
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(6) Tot.al. Govet'.111ne11t Expe11diture 
GEALA Goverrunent Expenditure Accruing to Labour Alone 
+GEANLA +Goverrunent Expenditure Accruing to Non-Labour Alone 
+SQE +Goveounent Expenditure Shared Between Labour & Non-Labour 
TGE Total Goverrunent Expenditure 
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Phase 5: Estimation of Net-Tax Paid by Labourl 
(1) Net-Tax 
(1) 
Tht.W. Govenunent 
Expenditure 
(fGE) 
(2) Transfer Ratio 
(1) 
Labour Portion Qf 
Thti!l QQyt. Exl2· 
(LPIGE) 
1 After Tonek, p.62. 
(2) 
Labour Portion Qf 
Tht.W. QQyt. Exll· 
(LPIGE) 
(2) 
Thtru~.Qll 
Labour Income 
(ITLI) 
(3) 
Tht.W. ~ .QJl 
Labour Income 
(fiLl) 
(4) 
Net-tax 
(3)-(2) 
(3) 
Transfer Rnti,Q, 
(2)/(1) 
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Chapter Four: Net-Tax As An Empirical 
Quantity 
(4.1) Introductory Remarks 
In the preceding chapter the methodology developed by Tona.k to 
calculate net-tax and the transfer ratio was outlined, along with the 
techniques used in applying this methodology to a data set drawn from 
New Zealand's national accounts. Having empirically operationalized 
the 'net-tax' concept, and having struck the transfer ratio, this chapter 
will be given over to reporting and commenting on the results obtained. 
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A remark is briefly required on the manner in which the data will be 
analysed. Tonak does not provide any basis from which to explain the 
direction and degree of income redistribution indicated by the transfer 
ratio constructed in his study, which proceeds as the development of the 
net-tax methodology and its application to a set of data, discrete from 
wider economic and political trends in the United States.l While the 
primary object of this thesis - tracing the pattern of inter-class income 
redistribution effected by the state in New Zealand - does not 
necessarily require fluctuations in the transfer ratio to be correlated 
with broader economic and political developments, the veracity of the 
1At least this Is the case In the published text on which I rely. Although his 
doctoral dissertation is unavailable as yet, its abstract suggests that he does not 
attempt to explain his data with reference to these variables, instead opting for a 
quantitative analysis of the Impact of net-taxes on the wages of productive 
workers. 
data and the overall utility of the method will be enhanced if this task is 
carried out. 
From a Marxist point of view, an explanation of trends in the transfer 
ratio requires a materialist analysis of the historical context in which the 
curve is 'located'. At the broadest level, the principles of historical 
materialism require that the historically contextualized links between 
the redistributive activities of the state (as an element of the 
superstructure) and the dynamics of capital accumulation in this period 
be drawn out. Thus, the multiplicity of events on which attention might 
otherwise be focussed will be set aside in favour of tentatively tracing 
the links between movements in the transfer ratio and economic 
fluctuations in the years 1949-75. In this task, the techniques developed 
by Pearce (on the basis of Trotsky's work) to 'synchronize' 
superstructural trends with the economic base will be utilized.t 
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The data analysis will be separated into four sections. First, the data 
will be graphically presented and analysed. Second, a rudimentary 
attempt at explaining the patterns identified in the data will be made in 
the manner outlined above. Third, the net-tax data will be used to re-
evaluate the historical 'track record' of the welfare state in New 
Zealand, and to reassess the findings in this area by other Marxist 
scholars. Fourth, the overall significance of the findings outlined in the 
previous sections in relation to the impact of the state on inter-class 
income redistribution in New Zealand will be teased out. Fifth, the data 
1 Pearce, pp.1 03-158. 
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generated in this study will be compared to Tonak.'s and Freeman's 
results. 
(4.2) Graphical Analysis of Results 
The most striking feature of Graph 4: 1 is that the transfer ratio is 
greater than unity over the whole time-period surveyed, excepting the 
year of 1962 in wbich the transfer ratio is equal to unity. The inference 
drawn from these results is that the state bas consistently appropriated 
more wealth in taxes from the working class than it bas returned as a 
social wage to this class in tbe years 1949-75, barring 1962 wben the 
working class 'broke even'. Logically, the same pattern is evident in the 
net-tax curve depicted in Graph 4:2. Apart from 1962, net-tax paid by 
labour bas a positive value in every year in tbe period under 
consideration.t Furtl1er analysis of the data will be based on the transfer 
ratio, thereby obviating tbe need to adjust tbe net-tax curve for tbe 
effects of price inflation. 
If sbort-term movements are momentarily ignored, three main 
periods are evident in the transfer ratio's progression. In tbe first, tbe 
years from 1949 to 1954, tbe ratio exhibits an overall tendency to 
increase, rising respectively from 1. 01 to 1.18. Tbe state increasingly 
effects a redistribution of wealtb from labour to non-labour in this 
period. In t11e second period, the transfer ratio displays a downward 
1The levels of TTLI end LPTGE ere respectively $323.37 million end $324.30 
million in 1962, yielding e net-tax figure of $-0.93 mlllion. Using these figures, 
note that the transfer ratio (TTLI/LPTGE) equals 1.00 when rounded to two 
decimal pieces. 
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trend, decreasing from 1.18 in 1954 to 1.00 in 1962- which, as the only 
year in which the state did not transfer income from labour to non-
labour, is the curve's lowest point. In the third period, the transfer ratio 
increases- albeit unevenly- from this low point in 1962 to 1.31 in 1974, 
the highest point in the curve, and then tapers off to 1.20 in 1975. It is 
readily apparent from these data that the years 1962-75 witnessed a 
marked change in the redistributive activities of the state. 
A more sensitive measure reflecting fluctuations witl1in the broad 
movements outlined above is provided in Graph 4:3, which registers the 
yearly percentage change in the transfer ratio curve.l Insofar as the the 
transfer ratio curve is given its shape by changes in the levels of Total 
Taxes on Labour l11coJne (henceforth 'TTLI') and Labour Portion of 
Total Governme11t Expe11diture (henceforth 'LPTGE'), the two 
variables of which the ratio is composed, it is necessary to examine 
trends in the absolute amounts of these variables. Consider for instance 
1962, the year in which the social wage was exactly equivalent to the 
amount of taxes the state appropriated from labour. The level of the 
transfer ratio (1. 00) is a product of the absolute levels of LPTGE and 
TTLI, but the absolute levels of the latter variables cannot be inferred 
from the ratio itse1f.2 
1The yearly percentage change is estimated using the following procedure: value at 
year x+ 1 minus value at year x (the preceding year) as a percentage of year x. 
Thus: percentage change= (x+1)-x/x*100. Note that a value cannot be calculated 
using this procedure for the first year in the data series ( 1 949). 
:2-rhe transfer ratio would equal 1.00 regardless of whether the amount of tax paid 
by the working class and the amount of the social wage received back was one 
dollar or one million dollars. 
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In examining the absolute levels of LPTGE and TTLI, price inflation 
must be taken into account by converting the figures from nominal to 
constant dollars. The Consumer Price Index is used to denominate both 
variables in 1975 dollars. 1 This procedure leaves the transfer ratio 
intact, yielding the same values as the nominal figures, while 
eliminating fluctuations in the TTLI and LPTGE curves owing merely 
to price inflation.2 The resulting curves are plotted in Graph 4:4, and 
the yearly percentage change in each is plotted in Graph 4:5. The trends 
evident in each of the three periods in the evolution of the transfer ratio 
curve identified above will first be traced and then accounted for in 
terms of fluctuations in TTLI and LPTGE. 
Trends in the Transfer Rat to: 1949-54 
In this period, the predominant trend is for the curve (depicted in 
Graph 4: 1) to increase, indicating that wealth was increasingly 
redistributed from labour to non-labour. The ratio begins in 1949 at the 
low point of 1.01. The transfer ratio rises from 1.04 in 1950 to 1.12 in 
1951, marking an increase of 7.69% in the latter year over the previous 
year. In absolute terms, the transfer ratio curve increases from 1.12 in 
1951 to 1.15 in 1952, the degree of increase slowing in 1952 to 2.68%. 
1Uslng the CPIIn this manner Is not entirely satisfactory. As Martin points out. 
the wage-goods whose price Increases ere registered In the CPI ere not 
commensurate with the components of state expenditure under consideration. 
Although he sets out e methodology for developing price Indices more appropriate 
to state expenditure, it is not empirically operetionelfzed (Martin, The Modern 
Welfare State', p.31). In the absence of more relevant Indices being evefleble. the 
CPI will be used in this study. 
2Hence the percentage c/1ange In TTLI and LPTGE calculated using reel values w111 
differ from that based on nominal figures. 
The transfer ratio then decreases to 1.10 in 1953 (marking an increase 
of -4.35% over the previous year). The following year (1954), 
however, the curve returns to 1.18, marking an increase of 7.27% over 
the previous year. 
Trends in TTL I and LPTGE: 1949-54. 
From an examination of Graph 4:4, it is evident that in this period the 
LPTGE curve is almost static in all years except for 1953, and the TTLI 
curve tends to increase. LPTGE remains relatively constant in the years 
1950-52. According to Graph 4:5, after decreasing by 5.61% in the 
years 1950-51, the cu~e increases by only 0.39% during 1951-52. On 
the other hand, TTLI increases in years 1950-52, although the degree of 
increase slows from 8.34% in 1950 to 2.19% in 1952. LPTGE increases 
by 2. 76% in 1953, while TTLI declines in absolute terms (-1.45%), 
which accounts for the marked downturn in the transfer ratio in this 
year. In 1954, however, TTLI increases by 8.29% and LPTGE by only 
0. 91%, which is reflected in a marked increase in the transfer ratio. 
Trends in Transfer Ratio: 1954-62 
In this period, as noted earlier, the transfer ratio tends to decrease. 
Although this period was ushered in with the transfer ratio at 1.18 in 
1954, marking a 7.27% increas~ over the previous year, the years 
1954-57 witnessed the transfer ratio enter a phase of decline. The 
transfer ratio decreases from 1.18 in 1954 to 1. 04 in 1957, marking an 
overall percentage cl1ange of -17.61%. The transfer ratio then increases 
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markedly in 1957-58, at 22.84% this is the sharpest upswing in 
percentage terms in the whole curve- though, in returning the transfer 
ratio to 1.17 in 1958, it is by no means the highest point in the curve in 
absolute terms. Then in the years 1958-59 the curve drops almost as 
sharply (-22. 75%) to a level of 1.05 in 1959, the fall slowing to -3.80% 
in 1960, with the transfer ratio declining to 1.01 in this latter year. In 
1961 the transfer ratio curve increases by 3.96% to 1.05, and then falls 
in 1962 ( -4.76%) to 1. 00. 
Trends in the TTL/ and LPTGE Curves: 1954-62 
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The initial years of decline (1954-57) are accounted for mainly by 
TTLI decreasing at a greater rate than LPTGE. In the years 1954-57, 
TTLI fell by 19.63%, while LPTGE fell by only 1.97%. The marked 
increase in the transfer ratio in 1958 is explicable in terms of a 23.83% 
upswing in TTLI. The transfer ratio would have increased even more 
markedly if not for the counterbalancing effect of a 10.26% increase in 
LPTGE. The percentage increase in TTLI then slows to 4. 83 in 1959, 
but LPTGE increases by a further 16.72%, which accounts for the 
sharp drop in the transfer ratio in 1959. In 1960, the percentage 
increase in LPTGE tapers off to 2. 03 and the percentage increase in 
TTLI falls to -1.51, leading to a convergence in the two curves which 
causes the transfer ratio to fall to its second lowest point. In 1961, a 
7.51% increase in TTLI relative to a 3.48% increase in LPTGE leads to 
an upswing in t11e transfer ratio, which t11en falls to its lowest point in 
1962 as the result of TTLI decreasing (-1.05%) and LPTGE increasing 
(+4.13%). 
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Trends in the Transfer Ratio: 1962-75 
The years 1962-75 are distinguished from the two previous periods 
by a dramatic change in the pattern of income redistribution. From the 
low-point of 1.00 in 1962 the transfer ratio increases by 13.5% in the 
years 1962-64 to a level of 1.12 in 1964. The percentage change then 
drops in the years 1964-65 to -9.63, and the level of the transfer ratio 
declines to 1.11 in 1965. The transfer ratio fluctuates in 1966 (+4.50%) 
and 1967 (-3.45%), and then continues its upward trend. From 1.12 in 
1967 to 1.30 in 1970, the transfer ratio increases by 12.69%; it then 
drops in the years 1970-72 (-13.09%), falling to a level of 1.25 in 1972. 
The curve increases in 1972-73 by 7.05% to 1.29 in 1973, and increases 
by a further 1.55% in 1974 to 1. 31, which is the curve's apex. The 
curve then declines in 1975, leaving the transfer ratio at the level of 
1.20 (marking an increase of -8.4% over the previous year) in the final 
year of the data series. 
Trends in the TTL/ and LPTGE Curves: 1962-75 
The overall increase in the transfer ratio in this period is caused by 
the marked divergence in the TTLI and LPTGE curves evident in 
Graph 4:4, the gap between the two curves being at its widest in 1974 
(the highest point in the transfer ratio). The overall tendency is for the 
two curves to increase together, but TTLI at a greater rate than 
LPTGE. Graph 4:5 demonstrates that the percentage change in the two 
curves is reasonably parallel, but fluctuations (upswings and 
downturns) are more marked in the TTLI curve. On the whole though, 
increases in LPTGE are more than counterbalanced by parallel 
increases in TTL!. Witltin tltis period, two broad phases in the 
progression of the TTLI and LPTGE curves are apparent: from 1962-
69, then from 1969-75. The upturn in both curves in 1969 is extremely 
sharp. 
In the years 1962-64 TTLI increases by 11.49% and LPTGE by 
2.36%. Similarly, TTLI increases in 1965 by 5. 73% and in 1966 by 
8. 72;%, and then decreases in 1967 (-1.37%). From 1967-70, TTLI 
increases by 23.2%, reflecting the sharp upswing in 1969. The curve 
then increases in 1971 (14.49%), 1972 (10.48%), 1973 (15.07%). In 
1974-75, however, the curve decreases by 14.64%. LPTGE increases in 
1965 (6:39%), 1966 (4.48%), 1967 (1.89%), and 1968 (2.66%). Then 
from 1969-72, LPTGE increases by 10.71%, impelled by a sharp 
upswing in 1969. The curve further increases in 1973 (11.99%), 1974 
(11.25%), and 1975 (8.21 %). 
(4.3) Explanatory Comments on Observed Pattern of Income 
Redistribution 
Having completed the somewhat tedious task of describing trends in 
the data, it remains to offer an explanation of the trends identified. 
Insofar as TTLI and LPTGE are the variables underlying the pattern of 
income redistribution depicted in the transfer ratio, one approach to 
this aspect of the data analysis would be to draw out the links between 
the actions of the state in the realms of taxation and state expenditure 
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and economic trends in this period. However, this would require taking 
the transfer ratio apart in a fashion that risks diverting attention away 
from the insights afforded by the concept of 'net-tax', by drawing state 
expenditure and taxation together in an analysis of income 
redistribution in the first place. The latter, after all, is the object of this 
study, not an analysis of taxation or state expenditure per se. Thus, the 
subsequent explanation of the results will be restricted to trends in the 
transfer ratio itself. 
Whilst the Marxist notion that the economic base 'determines' the 
superstructure (or at least that it structurally circumscribes the 
parameters that the elements of the superstructure operate within) is 
adhered to in this study, in explaining yearly variations in the 
redistributive activities of the state it cannot merely be invoked in an 
axiomatic fashion; rather, any such causal relationship must be sought, 
and demonstrated, e1npirically. To this end, the first step in the 
explanation of the trends in the transfer ratio outlined above is to 
empirically quantify trends in New Zealand's economic base in the 
years 1949-75. In tltis task, the work of Pearce - the most rigorous and 
extensive Marxist analysis of tlte New Zealand economy to date- will be 
relied upon. The next step in the analysis involves comparing trends in 
the transfer ratio to economic trends, in order to discover whether the 
redistributive activities of the state correlate with the dynamics of 
capital accumulation. 
Pearce bases his analysis on Trotsky's interpretation of the 'base-
superstructure' schema; more specifically, on the latter theorist's notion 
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of the "curve of capitalist development", as quantitatively expressing 
the economic base.l Pearce sets out to empirically identify the curve of 
capitalist development in New Zealand, and then on this basis proceeds 
to rigorously delineate economic trends and to compare them to trends 
in various superstructural phenomena. 
Insofar as t11is study is based on the national accounts, the principal 
estimate of national income used to calculate net-tax (National Income 
at Factor Cost) may seem the obvious choice in mapping the contours of 
capital accumulation in the New Zealand economy as a whole. Pearce, 
however, rejects it in favour of one of the three other aggregate 
measures of national income available in New Zealand (National 
Income at Market Prices, Gross National Product, and Gross Domestic 
Product). From these he selects National Income at Market Price 
(NIMP) as the best indicator of the "curve of capitalist development in 
New Zealand".2 His reasons for doing so are threefold. 
First, whilst subsidies are included in NIFC, they are excluded from 
NIMP. It is better to use the latter measure of national income because 
"the inclusion of subsidies bas a counter-cyclical effect on the data, i.e. , 
obscures the degree of fluctuations in economic activity. "3 Second, 
1L. Trotsky, 'The curve of Captta11st Development', Problems of Everudau Life. 
New Vork, Monad Press, 1973, pp.:273-:280. 
2pearce, p.11 0. It w111 be recalled from Chapter Three that NIFC 1s defined as 
"private Income plus Government trading Income less transfer lncomes"(OENIE 
1957-58, p.6). Pearce summarily defines the other measures of national Income 
thus: "NIMP = NIFC + (Indirect Tax -Subsidies); GNP = NIMP + (Depreciation 
Allowances); GOP =GNP +Income generated In New Zealand but accrufng to 
overseas resldents"(p. 11 0). 
3pearce, p.117. 
GRAPH 4:6 NIMP PERIODISATION AFfER ADJUSTMENT FOR WAR 
35 000 ~----~----~----~----~------~----~.----~ 
~30 000 
0 
0 
~ 
~25 000 
(J) 
-+-' 
§20 000 
....... 
en 
c 
0 
(.) 
'015 000 
rJ] 
c 
0 
·-
=1o ooo ~ 
.. . . 
.  . . 
. 
5 000 s.----::;;__-'---~---'----.1----1------L---' 
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
YEAR K~y: Dots = War Adj. NIMP, Une = Constant Growth Curves 
140 
depreciation allowances are also excluded from NIMP, but they are 
included in GNP. Depreciation allowances obscure "real economic 
trends" because the Government has periodically used them "to 
stimulate investment in new equipment during downturns. "1 For this 
reason, Pearce argues, NIMP is also more suitable than GNP. Third, 
GDP includes depreciation allowances, but this is counterbalanced by 
the fact that it includes income accruing to non-residents of New 
Zealand, which must be treated as income generated by New Zealand's 
economy and therefore must be included in the national income of this 
country.2 However, the series of NIMP data is broader in scope than the 
GDP data and for this reason the former is selected by Pearce as the 
basis from which to develop the curve of capitalist development. 
A series of adjustments are then made to the NIMP data. Notably, 
Pearce subtracts the components 'Pay and Allowances of Armed 
Forces' and 'Lump Sum Payments from the United Kingdom'.3 The 
resultant, the 'curve of capitalist development in New Zealand' is in this 
sense 'war-adjusted'. It is reproduced in this study as Graph 4:6: 
The solid line is the principal trend line, linking the figures in 
three separate constant growth series at the years identified as 
breaking points, 1946 and 1973.· The solid line, therefore, 
reveals the overall economic character of epochs. 4 
1 Pearce, p.118. 
2pearce, pp.11B-119. 
3The reasons for these adjustments are outlined in Chapter Three above. 
4pearce, p. 142. 
Pearce identifies within the curve 11 three distinct economic epochs .. , 
labelled Period A (1926-1946), Period 8 (1946-1973) and Period 
C(1973-1983).1 The distinguishing feature of each is the average rate of 
economic growth: 2. 991% in Period A; 4.5545% in Period 8; and 
0.4760% in Period C.2 He notes: 
the rate of growth in A is around 66% of that in 8; development 
in A, relative to 8, is sluggish. As the growth rate inC is only 
10% of the prevailing rate in 8, development inC is in crisis.3 
Period 8 equates with the long boom, the most intense and sustained 
period of economic growth in New Zealand's history. 
It must now be established whether there is a causal relationship 
between the economic trends captured in the curve of capitalist 
development and the redistributive activities of the state. Sophisticated 
statistical tests aside, this is best achieved by juxtaposing the two curves 
and comparing the fluctuations in each. Pearce, following Trotsky, 
terms this the task of 'synchronizing' trends in the base and 
superstructure. 4 Let us begin with a comparison of the absolute levels of 
the transfer ratio and NIMP. 
Prima facie, the results broadly accord with the pattern of inter-class 
income redistribution that might be expected in light of the pattern of 
economic development in this period. A comparison of the transfer 
lpeerce, p.126. 
2peerce, p. 139. 
3peerce, p. 139. 
4peerce, p. 1 06. 
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Graph 4:1 Transfer Rat1o, 1949-1975 
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ratio curve (Graph 4:1) to the curve of capitalist development (Graph 
4:6) reveals that the transfer ratio was at its nadir in the middle of the 
long boom (the conditions most propitious to the 'welfare state'), and at 
its apex in the years of incipient crisis (which is precisely when the 
'welfare state' cannot be 'afforded') at the end of the long boom. 
Although, it must be reiterated that even at the curve's lowest point, 
redistribution from non-labour to labour did not occur -there was 
merely an equivalence between the amount of tax ceded to tlte state by 
labour and the social wage received from the state by labour. 
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The pattern is not, however, as straightforward as it may first appear 
in that all but two years covered by the transfer ratio(1974 and 1975) 
fall witbi11 the period of the long boom. It is evident that the transfer 
ratio both drops sharply (1954-62) and increases sharply (1949-54 and 
1962-73) within this period. However, insofar as it is only the absolute 
levels of the two curves that are being examined at this point, the true 
level of the fluctuations in each curve is minimized. To further 
illuminate this pattern, yearly percentage changes in the transfer ratio 
must be compared to yearly percentage changes in the NIMP curve. 
A detailed comparison of fluctuations in the transfer ratio to 
economic fluctuations proves particularly instructive, for 
contemporaneous changes in the two curves are evident. From the 
juxtaposition of Graph 4:3 to Graph 4:7, it is apparent that upswings in 
the rate of economic growth tend to equate with downturns in the level 
of percentage change in the transfer ratio, and downturns in the rate of 
economic growth tend to equate with upswings in the level of 
Graph 4:7 Nat1ona1 Income At Market Pr1ce, 1949-1975 
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percentage change in the transfer ratio. In 1952, 1953, 1957, 1959, 
1962, 1972, and 1975 the percentage change in the transfer ratio 
declines and the level of economic activity increases. Similarly, in 1951, 
1954, 1958, 1961, 1964, 1966, and 1973 the opposite holds: the 
percentage cl1ange in the transfer ratio increases while the rate of 
economic growth decreases. 
Undoubtedly, there are exceptions to this pattern. Notable amongst 
these are the years 1967-70 in which both curves increase together. 
Other exceptions are the years 1954-56, in which both curves decline, 
and 1959-60 in which both curves increase. Nonetheless, on the basis of 
the correspondences outlined above, there is a reasonably strong 
positive correlation between changes in the rate of economic growth 
and the degree to which the state transfers income from labour to non-
labour. 
It is all very well to identify a regular relationship between two sets of 
phenomena, but it is anot11er matter altogether to specify the nature of 
the causal relationship between the two or, indeed, whether one exists at 
all. Undoubtedly, the relationship between the redistributive activities 
of the state is more complex t11an it may first appear. The most obvious 
possibility is that the state increasingly subsidizes the capitalist class in 
periods of economic downturn by transferring wealth to it from the 
taxes paid by the working class. However, it cannot be assumed that the 
lines of causality are unidirectional, in the sense that the level of income 
transference is shaped by tl1e vicissitudes of capital accumulation. It is 
equally plausible that cl1anges in t11e level of economic activity could 
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themselves be reinforced by the redistributive activities of the state. The 
response of the state called forth by an economic downturn could, in 
turn, exacerbate the downturn. The state could well be drawing off 
taxes from tl1e capitalist class as well, i.e., net-tax paid by the capitalist 
class may also be positive, leading the state to act as a semi-autonomous 
cause of economic downturns by 'squeezing' profits. 
However, the true effects of the redistributive activities of the state on 
the economy cannot be ascertained because, as a result of not having 
developed a basis from which to estimate net-taxes paid by the capitalist 
class, the extent to which the state itself drains off wealth cannot be 
known. It can only be concluded that economic downturns tend to 
equate with upswings in the degree to which the state redistributes 
income from labour to non-labour and that economic upswings tend to 
equate with downturns in the degree to which the state redistributes 
income from labour to non-labour. 
It cannot be denied that there is in evidence a general correspondence 
between the dynamics of capitalist economic development and the 
degree of income transference indicated by the transfer ratio. This 
could, of course, be a mere coincidence, a product of the fortuitous 
juxtaposition of TTL! and LPTGE (the two variables of which the ratio 
is composed). However, if a causal relationship can be read into the 
number of correspondences between the transfer ratio and the curve of 
capitalist development mapped previously, there is good reason to 
believe that movements in the transfer ratio are more than merely a 
result of the contingent conjunction of the levels of TTLI and LPTGE. 
Rather, they are the outcome of their articulation within the economy, 
characterized as it is by yearly fluctuations in its rate of growth, and 
indeed are congruent with these periodic economic shifts. 
(4.4) A Re-evaluation of the Performance of 'The Welfare 
State' 
Having identified and explained - albeit in a rudimentary fashion -
trends in the net-tax data, it now falls upon this study to use this data as a 
new vantage-point from which to assess the performance of the welfare 
state vis-a-vis the working class. Similarly it can be used to re-evaluate 
the performance of various governments on the 'welfare front', and to 
re-evaluate the way in which Marxist scholars have rated their 
performance. 
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As Tonak himself notes, even in Marxist studies state expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP (or some other measure of national income) is 
typically accepted as the orthodox empirical index of "whether the 
welfare state is advancing" .1 It is not my intention to dispute that state 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP can be used as a general indicator 
of the 'size' of the welfare state. Rat11er, it will be demonstrated that the 
net-tax data provides an altogether different, and indeed more 
sophisticated, means of rating the welfare state's successes or failures. 
lronek, p.57. 
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In light of the foregoing point, two estimates have been generated in 
accordance with the orthodoxy in this area for purposes of comparison 
with the net-tax data. They are plotted in Graph 4:8. The first (solid 
line) is simply the ratio of state expenditure to GDP. It has been 
constructed in t11e following manner: 
State's Share in Economy (a)= state expenditure I GDP 
However, some Marxists regard all state expenditure as unproductive.! 
In this vein, Paul Mattick argues that the ratio of state expenditure to 
GDP, less state expenditure, is a better index of the "increasing [or 
decreasing] role of the state in [the] capitalist economy. "2 Thus, the 
second estimate (broken line) has been generated as follows: 
State's Share in Economy (b)= state expenditure I (GDP- state 
expenditure) 
On the basis of t11e argument that such indicators can be used to 
ascertain whether a welfare state exists in New Zealand, trends in the 
two curves will be identified. An examination of the curve 'State's 
Share in the Economy (a)' reveals that the ratio of state expenditure to 
GDP begins at the level of 0.34 in 1950, falls to 0.28 in 1951, and then 
1There ere, however, e number of divergent positions within this school. For 
instance, Fine end Herris criticize Gough's view thet the stete is 'indirectly 
productive', yet they themselves essert thet stete expenditure is indirectly 
productive, elbeit in e quelitetlvely different sense to Gough (Fine end Herris, 
pp.98-99). 
2-ronek, p.57. The following means of operetionalizing Hettick's argument has 
been drawn from Tonek's work. 
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increases in 1952 to 0.32 and again in 1953 to 0.35. The ratio then drops 
to 0. 31 in 1955 and increases slightly to 0. 32 in 1956. Thereafter, the 
curve flattens out at approximately one-third of GDP - apart from a 
sharp upswing in the final year in the series. Thus, at least according to 
this indicator, the welfare state in New Zealand in the years 1956-74 is 
characterized by stasis, neither advancing nor retreating. 
If, on the other hand, the arguments made by Marxists such as Mattick 
in regards the unproductive role of the state in the economy are 
accepted, the second curve 'State's Share in Economy (b)' must be 
examined as ti1e true indicator of ti1e performance of the welfare state. 
Whilst the degree of fluctuation is amplified in this curve, a similar 
pattern is evident to ti1e one identified above. The curve drops markedly 
from 0.53 in 1950 to 0.40 in 1951, increases to 0.54 in 1953 and then 
drops to 0.45 in 1955. Thereafter, the curve is relatively static at 
approximately one-half of GDP - all apart from a sharp upswing in 
1975. 
Whichever curve is used, it is apparent that a sizable portion of GDP 
has been administered by ti1e state, and ti1is is the material foundation of 
the claim the a welfare state existed in New Zealand. However, if we 
leave the realms of state expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and 
adjudicate this issue from ti1e point of view of the net-tax data generated 
in this study, a substantially different picture emerges. If judged solely 
in terms of income redistribution, it can be argued on the basis of these 
data tlmt a welfare state has never existed in New Zealand. Indeed, the 
closest this country came to the existence of a welfare state was the year 
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of 1962, when the working class as a whole received from the state the 
same amount of wealth as they had paid in. Whilst from 1962 onwards 
both of the ratios of state expenditure to GDP indicate that the status quo 
was maintained (i.e., that the welfare state was holding fast), the 
transfer ratio indicates that New Zealand progressively diverged from 
the conditions necessary to maintain the argument that a welfare state 
existed; namely, enhancing the the living standards of the working class 
as a whole. 
'Some Marxists would· argue, however, that the analysis should be 
restricted to the conventional definition of welfare expenditure (health, 
education and social services), particularly in assessing the performance 
of particular governments in the realm of welfare. Martin's work is the 
most recent indigenous Marxist analysis adhering to the widely held 
opinion that the 'track record' of the welfare state can be adjudicated on 
the basis tracing welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP.l Thus, 
the data generated in this study can be used to evaluate the accuracy of 
the inferences he draws from his empirical analysis. This is rendered all 
the more interesting because, although he approaches the problem in a 
different fashion to this study, his point of departure is much the same: 
"The key political question ... is our response to the 'cuts' -the decline 
in real terms of welfare spending by the state" .2 
1Martin, The Modern Welfare State and Expenditure in New Zealand'. 
2Martin, p.3. 
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In relation to the prevailing political configuration, Martin identifies 
the following trend: 
the profile of development in spending demonstrated that each 
Labour government created a new plateau level of expenditure 
which National then accepted but did not improve upon. 
Increases in spending . . . occurred in a series of discontinuous 
steps until the 1970s.1 
Welfare expenditure as a percentage of GNP increased dramatically 
under the first Labour government, from 5. 9% in 1939 to 13.2% in 
1949.2 This period, however, falls outside of the scope of the net-tax 
data. More important for the purposes of this study is an examination of 
the years 1949-75. It is evident from Graph 4:9 that in the years 1950-
57, under a series of National governments, the level of welfare 
expenditure certainly did not increase above the level established by 
Labour. Welfare expenditure dropped sharply to 11.5% of GDP in 
1951, and then increased to 12.7% in 1952. Thereafter it does not 
exceed 13% of GDP. 
Under the second Labour Government (1957-60), however, the level 
of welfare expenditure increased markedly from 12.8% of GDP in 
1957 to 14.8% in 1960. Again, the trend in the long period of National 
governments from 1960 until 1972 accords with Martin's 'plateau' 
thesis: apart from a slight increase to 14.9% of GDP in 1962, the level 
of welfare expenditure exceeds the level established in the final year of 
the second Labour Government (1960) only once. This occurs in 1971 
1 Mertin, p.69. 
2Merlln, p.22. 
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when welfare expenditure increases again to 14.9% of GDP. The 
intervening period witnesses the level of welfare expenditure drop 
steadily to a low point of 13.7% of GDP in 1966, and then climb slowly 
to 14.7% in 1968. It drops again to 14.4% in 1970 and then slowly 
begins to ascend. On the other hand, in t11e period of the third Labour 
Government, welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP sky-rockets 
from 15.2% in 1972 to 17.8% in 1975.1 
H~nce, using welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP as an 
indicator, up until the mid-1970s the welfare state appears to have 
advanced under Labour and stagnated, and in some years even 
retreated, under National. Before using the transfer ratio to reassess 
these findings, it is pertinent to return to Pearce's study for, innovative 
though it is in many respects, it illustrates the dangers of focussing 
exclusively on taxation, an approach that represents the other side of the 
same coin: neither Martin nor Pearce systematically weaves together 
state expenditure and taxation to the end of fashioning a 'global' 
assessment of the welfare state. 
1Thereefter, es Martin notes, this pattern ends, with National also increasing 
welfare expenditure relative to GOP. He argues that the nascent economic crisis 
triggered e series of changes culminating In e marked upswing .in welfare 
expenditure. Among these changes wes the destabilizing effect the economic 
downturn hed on bourgeois politics. He notes: "Electoral instebflity end insecurity 
favoured election year stimulation of the economy for its short-term political 
pey-off"(p.52). This resulted in the use of welfare expenditure, end fiscal policy 
in general, in "amplifying social fluctuations in tune with the electoral period of 
three yeers"(p.52). Insofar es the period under consideration in this study ends in 
1975, this marked shift in the pattern of welfare expenditure will not be 
considered eny further. 
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State expenditure is not systematically dealt with in Pearce's study. 
Instead, he latches onto the other 'half' of the transfer ratio -the degree 
to which the working class has financed state expenditure via taxation. 
He begins with the contribution of income tax to the tax-pool as a whole 
(Graph 4:10), and notes: 
From 1935, income tax has increased until, in the mid-1960s, it 
becomes the major source of tax revenue; at the end of the 
period [1980], income tax contributes about three-quarters to 
total tax revenue. In the period of the first Labour Government, 
the share of income tax rose from about 14% to almost 40%. 
Apart from the massive increase in the mid-1960s, National 
Party governments have held or even reduced the share of total 
tax collected as income tax. By contrast, each of the first three 
Labour Governments (1935-49; 1957-60; 1972-75) shifted the 
tax burden onto incomes . . . .1 
He then identifies the contribution of 'individuals' (salary and wage 
earners) to the pool of income taxes, on the basis of Graph 4:11. He 
observes: 
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In 1923, individuals paid about one-third of total income tax. By 
tlte end of the 1970s, individuals paid about 85% of total income 
tax. Under the First Labour Government, the share of company 
income tax fell about 10%. Under the Second Labour 
Government, it fell almost 30% and again about 10% under the 
Third. By contrast, during the First National Government, the 
share of income tax paid by companies rose, and in the 12 years 
of the Second National Government it fell only 5%.2 
Finally, be draws attention to the proportion of state revenue that 
taxation represents: 
1 Pearce, p.239. 
2peerce, p.239. 
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For the whole period to World War I, taxation contributed 
around half of state revenue. During the period of the war, it 
rose to more than 60 percent; by 1931, it exceeded 80%. In the 
long recession, it fell back to 70%. Under the First Labour 
Government, it climbed to over 85%. With the exception of the 
war period and 1979, it has oscillated around the 85% mark 
since then.l 
A different picture of the welfare state's performance under the 
various Labour and National governments emerges from Pearce's 
analysis. According to Martin's study, the welfare state advanced under 
Labour. From the point of view of taxes paid, however, Labour also 
increasingly levied taxes on the working class, while National in some 
years even reversed this trend - it increased taxes on the working class 
to a lesser degree, if at all. As far as the working class is concerned, 
Martin's findings must be moderated in light of the fact that increases in 
welfare expenditure under Labour may well have been cancelled out by 
tax increases, i.e., the welfare state appears to be advancing, but it does 
so at the expense of the working class. 
It is in t11is vein that Pearce concludes: 
wage and salary earners not only paid for welfarism but the 
running costs of tl1e state apparatus were also shifted from the 
farmers and captains of industry to them. In this light, the lack 
of opposition by private investors to state management of the 
economy from the end of World War II to the early 1970s is 
understandable. 2 
1 Pearce, pp.240-41. 
2peerce, p.241. 
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However, this conclusion vis-a-vis the welfare state is tenuous in that 
state expenditure received by the working class is not taken into 
account. Workers may well have ceded more taxes to the state, but they 
may also have received more state expenditure back which, at the level 
of the working class as a whole, has the effect of annulling the increases 
in taxation. Indeed, it is at least possible that workers received 
substantially more wealth back from the state than they paid in taxes. An 
examination of the net-tax data (in the form of the transfer ratio) 
reveals that this did not occur, but there is no way of knowing this a 
priori. It has been demonstrated in this study only by carrying out a 
systematic empirical analysis using the net-tax methodology. 
In light of Martin's and Pearce's findings, an examination of 
fluctuations in the transfer ratio in relation to the prevailing political 
configuration in the years 1949-75 proves extremely interesting. Tl1e 
transfer ratio constructed in this study begins in the first Labour 
Government's final year in office (1949). The remainder of this period 
is characterized by National Party incumbency, punctuated by two 
Labour Governments (1957-60 and 1972-75). 
An examination of trends in the pattern of income redistribution in 
the first period in the transfer ratio's progression identified previously, 
the years 1949-54, reveals a small degree of redistribution of income 
away from the working class under Labour, and a marked increase 
under National. Though ushered in by a National government, in the 
initial years (1954-57) of the second period the transfer ratio actually 
decreases. The transfer ratio decreases dramatically in the year Labour 
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came to power (1957) and then, as a result of the curve increasing 
sharply in 1958, exhibits a zig-zag movement. The curve drops to a low 
point in 1960, the final year of the second Labour government, but 
reaches its nadir in 1962, the second year of the National government 
which ascended to power in 1960. 
The years 1962-75, the third period in the transfer ratio's 
progression, are characterized predominantly by National 
governments. An overall tendency to increase is apparent in the curve 
in this period. In the ten years in which National is in power in this 
period (1962-72), the transfer ratio curve tends to increase. It declines 
in the first year of the third Labour government (1972), but then 
continues its upward trend in the following two years, and decreases in 
the final year in the data series. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, the pattern of income 
redistribution depicted in the transfer ratio is all the more surprising 
given that increases in the transfer ratio periodically occurred under 
Labour governments, and decreases in the transfer ratio periodically 
occurred under Natio11al governments. Indeed, the transfer ratio 
reaches its apex under Labour in 1974, and drops to its nadir under 
National in 1962. Thus, New Zealand was farthest from the existence of 
welfare state under the third Labour Government and was closest under 
a National Government. Tbe overall tendency, however, is for the 
transfer ratio to increase under National governments and to fluctuate 
under Labour governments, although typically only around the levels 
established by National. The transfer ratio only marginally exceeds the 
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maximum level under National in the two main years of increase under 
Labour (1958 and 1974). Hence the main periods of increase in the 
transfer ratio are initiated by National governments. Under the second 
Labour Government, the transfer ratio declined, but at no time was 
income redistributed to the working class, while in each year of the 
third Labour Government, excepting 1975, it increased. 
The way Marxists have traditionally evaluated the welfare state is 
fundamentally altered in the light of the net-tax data generated in this 
study. Both Martin's and Pearce's studies illustrate the dangers of 
effecting 'one-sided' analyses of the welfare state. Taxation and state 
expenditure are not systematically combined, therefore a partial and 
even distorted picture of tlte 'success' of the welfare state vis-a-vis the 
working class emerges. The full picture only becomes visible when the 
two are woven together; the contribution of this study to the debate over 
the working class and the welfare state is to do precisely this by 
empirically operationalizing the concept of 'net-tax'. 
The only studies in the New Zealand literature which attempt 
comparisons of taxes paid and state expenditures received by the 
working class as a whole, are those of Bedggood and Pearson et al. It 
was noted in Chapter One that according to the findings of both studies 
the state has not redistributed income to the working class. However, in 
neitlter study was the dispadty between taxes paid and state expenditure 
received empirically quantified in precise terms. Thus, by estimating 
net-tax, this study both lends support to their findings and moves a step 
beyond their work. 
It must be noted, however, that both studies take into account wage-
earners 'access' to the components of social wage, an issue which has 
hitherto been abstracted from in this study. Undoubtedly, this is an 
important factor for, as Gouverneur points out, 
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the accessibility of collective goods or services may be limited 
on statutory grounds (thus social services are intended only for 
the needy) or simply by hard facts (thus motorways are not 
accessible to wage-earners who cannot afford a car, universities 
are closed to all the victims of the educational and social 
1 . 1 se ection process . . . . 
Bedggood argues t11at the accessibility of education, health and housing 
to workers in New Zealand is limited, mostly by what Gouverneur 
terms the 'hard facts' of the capitalist system.2 For instance, Bedggood 
demonstrates that increases in education expenditure have typically 
accrued to tertiruy institutions, yet the overwhelming proportion of the 
set of individuals 'selected' to ascend the educational ladder to 
university are the progeny of t11e ruling class. 3 Pearson et al. also focus 
on workers access to social wage expenditures. In relation to health they 
cite the interesting case of the 'Inverse Law of Health Care' found by 
Salmond to operate in New Zealand, whereby those who need health 
care the most in fact have the least access to it. 4 
1 Gouverneur, p.B2, n.31. 
2sedggood, pp.9B-113. 
3sedggood, pp.1 03-1 04. 
4peerson et el., p.1 00. Fore discussion of the "lew· In quest I on, see: G. Salmond, 
'Inequality of Health Cere Delivery', New Zeeland Journal of Public 
Adm!nlstratlon, v. 37. no. 2, 1975, pp.73-90. 
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In this study, 'shared' expenditures such as health and education have 
been allocated to the working class on the assumption that wage-earners 
consume the same proportion of these expenditures as the share of 
direct taxes they pay. It was noted in Chapter Three that this is merely a 
working hypothesis, and that it need not reflect their actual 
consumption of shared expenditures. If the arguments of the foregoing 
authors are taken into account, workers are unlikely to have consumed 
the portion of shared expenditures allocated to them each year. This is 
especially so, given that the Labour Share of Direct Tax, and hence the 
proportion of shared expenditures workers are considered to consume, 
almost doubles from 27% in 1949 to 52% in 1975. However, any 
overestimate in this regard will underestimate the true level of net-tax, 
i.e., it will mean that the actual amount of income transferred by the 
state from labour to non-labour is even greater than that calculated in 
this study. 
Undoubtedly, the net-tax methodology needs to be further refined in 
this area by developing a more accurate means of estimating the state 
expenditure that accrues to the working class. However, even if the true 
extent to which workers actually consume state expenditure is not 
reflected in tl1e transfer ratio, this study at least provides an empirical 
estimate of the difference between workers consumption of, and 
financing of, state expenditure. In doing so, it moves a step beyond the 
work of Bedggood and Pearson et al., who deal in detail with the thorny 
issue of access to the elements of the social wage but leave the more 
fundamental task, that of empirically quantifying what has been termed 
in this study 'net-tax', largely incomplete. The issue of wage-earners 
access to social wage expenditures can only be factored into the equation 
after an analysis of this type has been carried out; it should not be 
substituted for such an analysis. 
(4.5) Implications of Trends in the Transfer Ratio 
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In light of the results discussed in the preceding sections, and in 
relation to the 'scenarios' outlined in Chapter One, it is apparent that 
Scenario One obtains in all except one year of the time period under 
consideration, to wit workers have indeed surrendered more wealth in 
taxes to the state than the income they received back in the form of the 
state-provided social wage. In the language of the argument developed 
in Chapter Two, the taxes that fund the social wage have consistently 
been a deduction from wages. In other words, the source of income 
funding the social wage has always been located in the taxes paid by the 
working class itself. Further, the social wage (LPTGE) has lagged so 
far behind Total Taxes on Labour Income that, not only has the 
working class funded its own social wage i11 toto, redistribution of 
income from the working class to non-labour (the capitalist class and 
the state) has been the norm throughout the period under consideration. 
Additionally, trends in t11e data indicated a marked change in the 
pattern of inter-class redistribution toward the end of the long boom. 
This is not to deny that increases in the social wage occurred in the years 
of incipient crisis -these have been documented in the LPTGE curve. 
Rather, the trend established in the mid-1960s continued: the cost of 
increases in tl1e social wage has been off-loaded onto the working class 
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by means of increased taxation, i.e. the state has funded increases in the 
social wage by merely redistributing income witl1i11 the working class. 
The net effect of this situation is that the portion of workers• taxation 
that can be considered a social wage declil1ed as the long boom faded. 
Rather than the social wage enabling workers to enhance their living 
standards, taxes and the social wage have been manipulated by the state 
to the extent that the living standards of the working class as a wlwle 
have not risen. To be sure, if the social wage has equalized living 
standards within the working class it may have enabled some workers to 
maintain their living standards, but the arguments discussed in the 
preceding section regarding workers• access to the various elements of 
the social wage suggest otherwise. 
Insofar as net-tax paid by labour consistently has a positive value, a 
portion of workers• taxes have been a form of surplus value (the 
portion redistributed by the state to non;.·Jabour) in every year in the 
data series except 1962. If it is accepted that workers have an interest in 
retrieving the taxes lost to the •other side• (as was argued in Chapter 
Two), the state can be considered to owe them a considerable sum of 
money. In a sense, therefore, this can actually be considered as a debt, 
the size of which is considerable, amounting to 3671.26 million 
(constant 1975) dollars over the twenty-seven years from 1949 to 1975. 
Furthermore, under capitalism it is usual for debts to incur interest, 
which renders the size of tbe state•s debt to the working class even 
greater. 
160 
It should be reiterated at this point that, insofar as 'non-labour' 
includes both the capitalist class and the state itself, a net-tax time series 
comparing the wealth the capitalist class received from the state to the 
taxes paid by this class cannot be calculated. For t11is reason the fact that 
net-tax paid by labour (tl1e working class) has a positive value 
throughout the period under consideration, in all but one year, cannot 
be taken as evidence that the sum of net-tax the capitalist class paid in 
this period has consistently had a negative value. In that the state is 
included in 'non-labour', the wealth transferred from the working class 
to non-labour need not have accrued to the capitalist class- it may have 
been absorbed in toto by the state itself. Nonetheless, given the high 
values toward the end of the data series, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that the state transferred at least a portion of net-tax paid by the 
working class to the capitalist class. 
This yields interesting results vis-a-vis the relationship between the 
direct (or 'private') wage and the social wage. Insofar as wage-earners 
have financed a greater proportion of state expenditure than they 
themselves have consumed, the direct wage has had to absorb more 
than t11e cost of t11e state-provided social services and monetary benefits 
collectively consumed by wage-earners; the direct wage has been 
partially used to finance t11e state expenditure consumed by the capitalist 
class. This lms been the case even during the period of the long boom in 
New Zealand, and it increased drastically as the long boom waned in the 
early 1970s and economic crisis reasserted itself. 
That the transfer of income is merely witl1in the working class is a 
particularly significant finding in light of the jingoistic attitudes toward 
the unemployed and other welfare beneficiaries nurtured amongst the 
more affluent layers of New Zealand society by the crisis in the early 
1970s. Far from the capitalist· class 'subsidizing' the victims of capitalist 
crisis, the burden of 'reproducing' working class individuals forced 
outside of the wage-relation fell upon those within the working class 
'fortunate enough' to be able to to sell their labour-power. Moreover, 
rather than the capitalist class subsidizing the working class, the 
employed segment of the working class has actually subsidized the 
capitalist class. In light of this finding, tl1e reader will be left to decide 
the identity of the truly parasitic element in society. 
(4. 6) International Comparisons 
Only rudimentary comparisons to Tonak.'s and Freeman's data can be 
made, because neither analyses their data in the fashion attempted in this 
study. 1 Additionally, their studies focus on different time-periods. 
Freeman's encapsulates the two recent periods of economic crisis 
(1974-75 and 1981-82) in Britain, whereas Tonak's incorporates the 
period of the long boom and the years of nascent economic crisis at its 
end.2 Nonetheless, some general indications of the differences in the 
lin the unpublished paper from which the transfer ratio constructed by Freeman 
Is drawn, the curve Is not even plotted. 
2Ernest Mandel dates the long boom In the U.S. from 1951 to around 1965 ('Late 
Capitalism', p.178). The recession of 1969-71 was the first in a series of 
economic downturns In the American economy thereafter. Notable amongst them 
was the recession of 1974-75, itself a reflection of a world-wide economic 
downturn ('Late Capitalism', p.122). 
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pattern of income redistribution effected by the state in each of the three 
countries emerges from a comparison of the transfer ratio curves. 
It will be immediately apparent from Tonak.'s curve (Graph 4: 12) 
that the movements of the transfer ratio in the long boom and early 
years of crisis in the U.S. are somewhat different from the pattern in 
New Zealand. Tbe transfer of income from labour to non-labour is at 
its highest point in the first year in his data series (1952), and then 
displays an uneven downward trend. Whilst this is similar to the pattern 
of income redistribution in New Zealand, the transfer ratio constructed 
in this study (Graph 4:1) progressively increases after 1962, whereas 
Tonak's continues its downward trend. Furthermore, at certain points 
in the 1970s there is a small degree of income redistribution from non-
labour to labour in the U.S., as is indicated Tonak's curve dropping 
below 1. 00. Whereas the state in New Zealand i11creasingly effected a 
redistribution of income from labour to non-labour as the crisis 
proceeds, the state in the U.S. does not. Nonetheless, the degree of 
redistribution from non-labour to labour is slight when compared to the 
curve's overall progression, which leads Tonak to conclude that the 
welfare state in the U.S. has 110t benefitted the working class.1 On the 
strength of the results generated in our study, such a claim is all the 
more warranted in relation to New Zealand. 
1Jt must be noted thet Tonek's 'Unadjusted' transfer ratio drops below unity only 
twice ( 1975 end 1976). Fore discussion of the differences between the 
·unadjusted' end 'welfare-adjusted' trensfer ret los, see Chepter Three. 
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The transfer ratio constructed by Freeman and plotted in Graph 4: 13 
exhibits a trend closer to our own, although only six years (1969-75) 
are common to both studies. His curve exceeds 1. 00 only in 1974 -
which, coincidentally, is the highest point in our curve. In Freeman's 
curve, however, it is the only year in which the state effected a 
redistribution of wealth from labour to non-labour, whereas this is the 
normal state of affairs in New Zealand. Further, the highest point in his 
ratio is only marginally greater than the lowest point in ours. 
Nonetheless, his transfer ratio does increase from 1969 to 1974 (the 
years leading up to the crisis), which accords with our transfer ratio, 
and interestingly enough his curve tapers off after the crisis asserts 
itself. Whilst there is a comparable downturn in our transfer ratio in 
1975, as the final year in our data series, the true significance of this 
movement cannot be ascertained. 
Freeman's results can be compared with Tonak.'s over the years 1969-
80. While Freeman's curve increases from 1969 to 1974, Tona.k.'s 
decreases to 1971 (dipping below the 1. 00 level), increases in 1972 and 
1973, and then falls again in 1974. Freeman's transfer ratio dips in the 
late 1970s, flattens out, then begins to decline again in the early 1980s, 
whereas Tonak.'s dips in 1975 and i.t1creases in the late 1970s. 
One of Freeman's stated.aims is to assess whether the state in Britain 
had "buffered the effects of the crisis, made it worse, or made no 
difference ... 1 It must be concluded that the state has worsened the effects 
1 Freemen, p. 1. 
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of the crisis in 1974-75 that Freeman identifies, insofar as it 
increasingly redistributes income from labour to non-labour, whereas 
in the crisis of 1981-82 the state appears to have insulated the working 
class to a certain degree. Similarly, Tonak's data suggest that in the 
recessions of 1969-71 and 1974-75 in the U.S. , the state has to a small 
degree insulated the working class. In New Zealand, however, it is 
patently evident tl1at the state has worsened the effects of the recession 
in 1974-75. 
These points merit further attention, and a more systematic 
comparison of the three data sets would undoubtedly be a worthwhile 
endeavour. But it would require extending the transfer ratio calculated 
in this study beyond 1975 and further unpacking Freeman's and 
Tonak's data. Patterns in the transfer ratio generated in this study were 
linked to the vicissitudes of New Zealand's economy. Undoubtedly a 
similar type of analysis would have to be carried out in order to shed 
greater light on Tonak's and Freeman's data, seeking detailed 
correlations with economic fluctuations. Neither theorist engages in this 
task, and it falls outside the ambit of this study. 
In the absence of such an analysis, only general observations can be 
made. The main point to emerge from the rudimentary comparison of 
the curves above is that it appears tl1at the effect of economic booms and 
crises on tl1e degree and direction of income redistribution effected by 
the state in the U.S. and Britain is different to that in New Zealand. The 
pattern of income redistribution in Britain bears some resemblance to 
that in New Zealand, altltouglt it must be reiterated that only six years 
165 
are common to Freeman's and our studies. On the other hand, the 
pattern of income redistribution in the U.S. depicted in Tonak's curve 
exhibits some similarities to that in New Zealand up until 1962, and 
thereafter is quite dissimilar. 
(4. 7) Summary 
The most salient finding to emerge from the analysis of the net-tax 
data in this chapter is that, in the years 1949-75, workers in New 
Zealand have consistently ceded more taxes to the state than the income 
ret"Urned to them by the state in the form of the social wage. Only in 
1962 did the state transfer income to the working class, but the amount 
transferred was insignificant to the point that it was not even registered 
by the transfer ratio - it merely appears that workers paid the same in 
taxes as state expenditllre received. For the remainder of this period, 
the state has redistributed income from labo"Ur to non-labour in a not 
insubstantial amount. 
From a comparison of the transfer ratio curve to the c"Urve of 
capitalist development in New Zealand, it was found that the degree to 
which the state transfers income away from the working class is related 
to economic trends. If, on the basis of the 'synchronization' (to "Use 
Trotsky's term) attempted in this chapter, the lines of ca"Usality are 
taken as running from tlte economic base to the ruperstructure, it can be 
arg"Ued that changes in the redistrib"Utive activities of the state are 
governed by the tendentia1 movements of the economy. Altho"Ugh the 
"intermediary variables" (to use some positivist jargon) at tl1e heart of 
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the "correlation" between the dynamics of capitalist economic 
development and the degree of income transference cannot be 
identified, the broad correspondences outlined in this chapter do shed 
some light on the determinants of the levels of the transfer ratio in New 
Zealand. The limitations of the data analyses attempted by Tonak and 
Freeman did not allow a detailed comparison of the transfer ratios they 
constructed-to economic fluctuations in the U.S. and in Britain, but the 
analysis that was carried out indicated that, in relation to the patterns of 
economic boom and crisis in these countries, the transfer of income 
effected by the state was on the whole different to that in New Zealand. 
The net-tax data commented on in this chapter move beyond the 
conventional indicators of rating the •success· of the welfare state. Only 
by effecting a synthesis of taxes paid and state expenditure received at 
the level of the working class as a whole, via the net-tax methodology, 
can the true performance of the welfare state vis-a-vis the working 
class be ascertained. Thus, this study supersedes fragmentary analyses 
of the welfare state, which focus either on taxation or on state 
expenditure, and allows the true picture to be seen - an altogether 
dismal one at that. 
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Chapter Five: .. The Question Is Where Should 
This Redistribution Stop? .. 
(S. 1) Introductory Remarks 
The title of this chapter is the concluding comment of a recent essay 
by one of New Zealand's bourgeois economists on the justification for 
redistribution of income by tl1e state in capitalist society. The full 
quotation reads as follows: 
Given these differences [in skills, work effort, educational 
attainment and the like], one could argue that different 
incomes are merited and redistributing incomes could 
equally need justification. Economists would point to the 
conflict between equity and efficiency but note that most 
Western societies have consciously viewed the 
redistribution of income to their most disadvantaged 
members as appropriate. The question is where should this 
redistribution stop?t 
To some readers this may seem to be a magnanimous gesture on the part 
of Messrs the bourgeois economists toward the working class, which is 
generally where the "most disadvantaged members" of capitalist society 
are located, but they fail to ask where the income that is redistributed to 
these workers odginates from. The primary aim of this study was to ask 
that very question. In the course of the analysis an interesting answer 
emerged. 
1 Buurmen, 'Social Welfare', p.269. 
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(5.2) The Research Problem Once Again 
This thesis began by drawing attention to the economic crisis New 
Zealand is presently experiencing and the attendant breakdown of the 
social democratic 'class compromise' which had carried this country 
through the period of the long boom. One of the manifestations of this 
political shift is an onslaught on the welfare state. For over thirty years 
a seemingly monolithic inviolate, in the 1980s this institution became a 
whipping-boy blamed for everything from the economic crisis itself to 
sapping the 'will to work' of a whole generation. 
For Marxists attacks on the welfare state are only of concern insofar 
as they detrimentally affect the living standards of the working class. 
Thus, it was argued in Chapter One that the Marxist reaction to the 
'crisis of the welfare state' must be founded on a critical examination of 
the historical 'track record' of the welfare state in relation to the 
working class. To this end, this study undertook to put the welfare state 
'on trial' so to speak. This task was rendered all the more important by 
the global claims of some Marxists that the welfare state has benefitted 
workers, their claims bearing close resemblance to those of the social 
democrats themselves. 
The term 'welfare state', however, denotes a diverse array of 
institutions and activities. For this reason, the focus of this study was 
restricted to the impact of the state on the redistribution of income 
between social classes. More specifically, in providing a social wage and 
levying taxes, does the state redistribute income to the working class or 
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away from the working class? This question had bitherto scarcely been 
posed by Marxists in New Zealand, let alone been answered on a 
systematic basis. 
To a large extent, however, this was more for the want of a 
methodology with which to quantify the redistributive activities of the 
state in relation to social classes, tban anything else. Faced with this 
problem an American Marxist, E. Ahmet Tonak, recently developed a 
methodology to estimate a quantity termed 'net-tax', defined as taxes 
paid by workers less the state expenditure they receive as a social wage. 
This study sought to apply Tonak's innovative method to New Zealand 
in order to estimate net-tax paid by the working class in this country in 
t11e years 1949-75. 
Whilst Tonak made a metlwdological breakthrough with his 
conceptual category of 'net-tax', particularly in furnisbing techniques 
to establish the social wage as an empirical quantity (thereby solving 
what has been labelled in this study the 'small' problem of estimating the 
social wage), it was felt that there were fundamental tl1eoretical issues 
tbat l1e neglected. He, too readily, took as unproblemmatic the wbole 
notion that workers 'consume' a portion of state expenditure as a social 
wage- which, it was argued in Chapter Two, is based on the assumption 
that the taxes used to finance this expenditure originate in variable 
capital (later broadened to the generic category of 'wages' in light of the 
productive/unproductive labour debate), rather than in surplus value. 
Tbus be neglected what was termed in this study the 'large' problem of 
estimating the social wage and in so doing skipped over a wbole set of 
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Marxist debates regarding taxation and state expenditure. Indeed, he did 
so to the extent that his methodology could be criticized for bearing 
closer resemblance to a neo-Ricardian 'income shares' approach, 
wherein Marxian value-categories are thrown to the wind, than 
something a Marxist might use. 
In light of the foregoing, a detailed theoretical discussion was 
required in Chapter Two in order to clear this 'undergrowth' of debates 
out of the way before the empirical analysis could proceed. In this 
chapter I sought to retain the insights of Marxian value theory as it 
applies to taxation, in order to advance beyond - to repeat Fine and 
Harris's superb little formulation - "the 'bourgeois' ideology that 
taxation falls on the individuals who pay it", while at the same time 
keeping the empirical point of origin of taxes clearly in view; for if this 
is lost sight of the need for an empirical analysis of income 
redistribution also %lips from view. 
It was established that not all taxes need to be considered as 
originating in surplus value as some Marxists claim. Rather, the portion 
of taxes funding the state expenditure accruing to workers as a social 
wage originatesin the 'wages' portion of new value, and not surplus 
value. Chapter Two simultaneously provided the rationale for an 
empirical study of the type attempted using Tonak's method, on the 
basis that the taxes funding t11e social wage can empirically origib.ate in 
workers' own taxes (as a deductio11 from wages) or in the taxes paid by 
the capitalist class (as a form of wages). 
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(5.3) Results of the Empirical Analysis 
In Chapter Tl1ree Tonak's method of estimating net-tax was outlined, 
and a framework was developed to use in empirically operationalizing 
this concept, using New Zealand national accounts data, for the years 
1949-75. Interestingly enough, on examining the results in Chapter 
Four, it transpired that net-tax paid by the working class has had a 
positive value in every year except 1962. Thus, in all but one year of the 
twenty-seven covered in this study, the taxes used by the state to fund 
the social wage have been a deduction from wages, i.e. they have 
empirically originated in taxes paid by workers themselves. 
In response to the comments of the bourgeois economist cited at the 
opening of this chapter, even if wealth has been redistributed by the 
state to the "most disadvantaged" members of society (the lower stratum 
of the working class) the net-tax data prove that it has merely been 
redistributed from other disadvantaged members of capitalist society, 
namely other members of the working class. This study does not dispute 
that redistribution of income witl1h1 the working class has occutTed. To 
the contrary, it has actually been established by calculating net-tax paid 
by the working. class that t11e income redistributed by the state to 
members of the working class has only ever been from ot11er members 
of the working class elsewhere in society. In other words, the 
redistributive activities of the state in relation to the working class are 
such that intra-class income redistribution is the norm for the period 
under consideration. 
172 
The conclusion is readily apparent: the working class as a whole has 
financed its own social wage. Furthermore, insofar as net-tax has a 
positive value, income has consistently been redistributed by the state 
from the working class to 'non-labour' (the capitalist class and the state 
itself). Far from workers having a material 'interest' in the welfare 
state, the state actually owes them a considerable sum of money. The 
size of this debt was empirically quantified in Chapter Four: 3671.26 
million (constant 1975) dollars. 
The amount of income redistributed by the state from labour to non-
labour varied from year to year, although distinct trends were evident 
in the transfer ratio which was constructed using the net-tax data. A 
cursory comparison of trends in the transfer ratio to the curve of 
capitalist development in New Zealand revealed that the extent to which 
income was transferred by the state from labour to non-labour was at its 
lowest point during the period of the long boom and was at its apex in 
the initial years of economic crisis at the end of the long boom. In order 
to explicate this pattern, fluctuations in the transfer ratio were 
compared to fluctuations in t11e economy. In general it was apparent that 
the transfer ratio fluctuates in accordance with economic fluctuations, 
falling in periods of economic growth and increasing in periods of 
economic decline. This suggested that trends in the degree of income 
transference bear some relation to the development of New Zealand's 
economy. 
On the other hand, comparisons to the data generated by Tonak in the 
U.S. and Freeman in Britain yielded divergent results. As the long 
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boom in tl1e U.S. faded, the degree to wl1ich the state redistributed 
income from labour to non-labour declined, and in certain years the 
state actually redistributed income from non-labour to labour. On the 
other hand, the economic crisis in Britain in the early 1970s did 
correspond to an increase in the transfer ratio constructed by Freeman, 
but it indicated a transfer of income from labour to non-labour only 
once in the years 1969-84. In the remainder of this period the state in 
Britain has redistributed income from non-labour to labour, i.e. 
workers have been the recipients of a transfer of income. Further, in 
t11e crisis of 1981-82 the curve actually indicates a slight ilzcrease in the 
amount of income redistributed to the working class. The conclusion 
was drawn that the impact of economic fluctuations on the 
redistributive activities of the state in both the United States and Britain 
differs markedly from that in New Zealand. 
The transfer ratio sheds new light on studies such as Russell's, which 
consider the state-provided social wage to be an important factor in 
securing the reproduction of labour-power.l The results of this study 
suggest that, at least in New Zealand, the reproduction of labour-power 
by the state has been secured at the expense of workers themselves. 
Furthermore, a portion of workers' taxes has been used to 'reproduce' 
the capitalist class and the state! The question is thereby raised: why is 
the state involved in the reproduction of labour-power in the first place, 
if it merely shuffles income within the working class? 
1 B. Russell, The Crisis or the State end the State or the Crisis: The Canadien 
Welfare State Experience', Femilu. Economu and State: The Social Reproduction 
Process Under Capltal!sm, ed. J. Dickinson end B. Russell. London, Croom Helm, 
1966. 
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First, this shuffling of incomes can be economically beneficial to the 
capitalist system in assuring the reproduction of labour-power, which if 
left to the wage relation need not occur. Wayne suggests that 
redistributing incomes within the working class is an important solution 
to a phenomenon he terms "the crisis of working class reproduction": 
The uneven distribution of wages on the one hand and 
consumption needs on the other means that some families 
have a surplus of income over subsistence costs, while 
other families have a deficit.l 
In this context, the redistributive activities of the state can function to 
reproduce 'poor' working class families from the taxes of others that 
are 'not as poor'. Indeed, he asserts that this is the primary "economic 
function of social welfare", namely "to act as a redistributive 
mechanism for money among working class families" .2 Owing to the 
fact that the true degree of intra-class income redistribution cannot be 
ascertained from the transfer ratio, the extent to which Wayne's 
argument holds in the context of New Zealand caruwt be systematically 
tested out. Nonetheless, it does provide a promising avenue for further 
inquiry. 
Second, intervening to manipulate workers' income levels is a potent 
mechanism of social control at t11e state's disposal. Tbis is so in a d<?uble 
lJ. Wayne, The Function of Social Welfare in a Capitalist Economy·, Family. 
Economu end State: The Social Reproduction Process Under Capitalism, ed. J. 
Dickinson and B. Russell. London, Croom Helm, 1966, p.BO. 
2Wayne, p.BO. 
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sense. As noted previously, by redistributing income within the 
working class, the state may well have used the social wage to cajole a 
portion of the working class into accepting the capitalist system as the 
guarantor of a minimum standard of living. However, even if the 
degree of intra-class income redistribution is not great, the social wage 
as ideology can perform an important role in reproducing capitalism. 
It is interesting to note that, more recently, attempts have been made 
by bourgeois politicians in New Zealand to use the notion of the 'social 
wage' to hold increases in 'direct' wages down. For instance, in 1988, 
Deputy Finance Minister Mike Moore - entrusted with the task of 
securing a 'compact' with the trade unions - coined the term 'social 
wage', emphasized its amount and explicitly linked it to the level of 
'direct' wages.t As one commentator insightfully observed at the time: 
"The social wage looks likely to be a part of ... [the] compact", and that 
"the government intends to trade off wage demands (which was what 
Moore hinted) against continued and enhanced social services".2 
By turning t11e 'social wage' on workers as an ideological ploy to hold 
wages proper down, the ideology of the social wage can be useful to the 
bourgeois state in a period of economic crisis. Interestingly enough, this 
1At one point, he even went so fer es to provide en estimate of the sociel wege 
received bye hypothetical furniture factory worker. Interestingly enough, the 
"soclel wege peid by the government", es he puts it, boosted the hypothetlce~ 
workers Income by $321.33 from $369.91 to $691.24 (Appendix to e speech 
delivered by the Honourable Mike Moore on October 20 1 988). But es this study 
demonstrates, at least up until 1975, the sociel wage was funded out of workers' 
own taxes. If this trend continued after 1975, the social wage received by this 
worker will have been paid for by himself or herself end other members of the 
working class out of their own taxes. 
2Net1 onel Bysl ness Reyj ew, September 23, 1 988. 
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parallels similar developments in Britain in the mid-1970s.1 At some 
point, however, problems of legitimation must arise, especially in the 
case of New Zealand where, since the onset of the crisis, workers have 
contributed an ever-increasing amount of tax to the state, yet have 
received an ever-diminishing proportion back as a social wage.2 
Beyond these general statements, however, the answer to why the state 
is involved in the reproduction of labour-power must be sought in a 
systematic diachronic analysis of the origins of the state-provided social 
wage in New Zealand, a topic necessarily beyond the scope of this study. 
(5.4) Limitations of Study and Issues for Subsequent 
Research 
The limitations of this study fall into two categories. The first relates 
to the techniques employed in applying Tonak's method to New 
Zealand. The second involves further refining Tonak's method per se, 
and from this springs the areas in which subsequent research is 
required. Each category will be dealt with in turn. 
Bearing in mind that Tonak developed the net-tax methodology in an 
American milieu, using that country's national accounts, the application 
of Tonak's methodology attempted in Chapter Three involved 
1Gough notes the increasing use of the term 'social wege' by bourgeois politicians 
in Britain. end thet "government ministers ere ... prone to compere the value of 
this social wege with the private end personal wege eemed from labour. According 
to Mr Healey 1n his Apr11 1975 Budget speech. the social wage was then worth the 
equivalent of£ 1000 for every adult member of the working population in the 
United Kingdom"(Gough, p.l 08). 
2for a discussion of legitimation, see C. Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State. 
London, Hutchinson end Co., 1984, pp.130-146. 
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configuring New Zealand's national accounts in accordance with his 
conceptual framework. Greater precision is required in four key areas 
in order to enhance ti1e accuracy of ti1e net-tax data. 
First, a closer approximation of the amount of indirect tax paid by the 
working class is required. In this study, workers were assumed to pay 
the same percentage of indirect taxes as their share of consumption 
expenditure. This overestimates the amount of indirect taxes they pay 
by an unknown amount and it will bias the results by exaggerating the 
extent to which redistribution of income from labour to non-labour 
occurs. Thus, the true net-tax values will in fact be lower than those 
calculated in this study. But it should be noted that this procedure is 
more accurate than Tonak' s. Workers' share of total consumption 
expenditure at least bears some relation to the amount of indirect taxes 
they pay. Tonak simply assumes that workers pay the same percentage 
of indirect taxes as income taxes. Furthermore, ti1e technique he uses to 
estimate the percentage of income taxes workers pay is not very 
accurate. It can be stated with a reasonable degree of confidence that 
taxation is less a source of inaccuracy in this study than in Tonak's, but 
that further work needs to be done in this area. 
Second, capital expenditure by the state needs to be dealt with in a 
more satisfactory manner. It should be reiterated that it is unclear 
whether Tonak excludes or includes capital expenditur~ in the 
estimation of his net-tax time series. For this reason, criteria had to be 
established to use in deciding how capital expenditure should be dealt 
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with in this study. It is certain that simply incorporating gross capital 
formation figures would seriously distort the results. 
For capital expenditure to be included, an accurate functional 
classification of the various components of gross capital expenditure is 
required. Although one is not available in the national accounts 
themselves, the Planning Council, in one of its publications, provides a 
crude classification of gross capital expenditure by function. However, 
a depreciation allowance for each category of gross capital expenditure 
also needs to be calculated for capital expenditure to be included in the 
estimation of net-tax. A portion of the depreciation allowance could 
then be allocated to labour and non-labour reflecting the capital 
expenditure 'consumed' by each. As yet, there is no basis. from which to 
systematically engage in the task of estimating depreciation allowances. 
Therefore, owing to the limitations of the data base, capital expenditure 
has had to be excluded from this study altogether. 
Third, a more sophisticated technique must be devised to allocate 
'shared' state expenditure to the working class. In this study, it has 
simply been assumed that workers consume 'shared' expenditures such 
as health and education in tbe same proportion as tbe percentage of 
direct taxes they pay. Although this follows Tonak's approach to the 
problem, greater accuracy is still required in estimating the portion of 
'shared' expenditures consumed by workers. 
Fourth, the worki11g class needs to be empirically identified with 
greater accuracy in order to gain a more precise estimate of tl1e net-tax 
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it pays. Because the data-base does not allow workers to be separately 
identified, in this study the working class has been equated with all 
salary and wage-earners. However, insofar as this is a result of the 
constraints associated with the source of data, little can be done to 
overcome it. 
Tonak's method, innovative though it is, needs to be further 
developed along a number of axes. Foremost among these is the need 
for the method to be modified in order to estimate net-tax paid by the 
capitalist class, independent of the state. Empirically quantifying both 
the degree to which the state 'subsidizes' the capitalist class from the 
taxes of the working class, and the amount of wealth soaked up by the 
state itself, would facilitate an understanding of the impact of the state's 
redistributive activities on capital accumulation.! 
This modification to the net-tax methodology is likely to shed greater 
light on the correspondences between the degree of income 
redistribution and economic fluctuations identified in Chapter Four. 
Although the lines of causality were assumed to run from the economy 
to the state, such that the degree of income redistribution is governed by. 
economic fluctuations, equally the state's redistributive activities could 
themselves be a semi-autonomous cause of economic fluctuations. 
Tying the redistributive activities of the state into the dynamics of 
capital accumulation would cast further light on whether the··state is 
itself a causally efficacious factor in economic crises, as the 'profit-
lronek himself 1dentlfles this es the prime eree for future research (Tonek, 
p.65). 
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squeeze' school within Marxism (along with the Monetarists) claim. 
Furthermore, it may also provide insights into the international 
differences in the patterns of income redistribution highlighted in the 
previous chapter. 
Another area where further work needs to be done is that of 
separating out net-tax paid by elements of the class structure other than 
workers and capitalists. Undoubtedly, the 'two-class schema' adhered to 
in this study oversimplifies the contours of New Zealand's class 
structure. In light of the matrix of class forces in New Zealand in the 
period under consideration, it would be of particular interest to 
estimate net-tax paid by farmers and by the petty bourgeoisie. However, 
this would of course require that the modification to Tonak's method 
outlined in the preceding paragraph first be made. 
There is also a pressing need to tease out the extent and nature of the 
degree to which the state redistributes income within the working class. 
While it can be ascertained from the transfer ratio that the working 
class as a whole has not benefitted from increases in the social wage, this 
would facilitate an understanding of whether some groups of workers 
have benefitted at the expense of others. More specifically, whether 
income has been redistributed from the upper stratum to the lower 
stratum of the working class or vice-versa. Similarly, it would prove 
worthwhile to estimate net-tax paid by the various strata within the 
working class along the lines of race and gender. This would provide 
evidence to use in assessing whether, in securing the so-called social 
democratic 'class compromise' at the heart of the long boom in New 
1 B 1 
Zealand, distinct groups within the working class have been 'bought off' 
via increases in the social wage. Whilst modifying Tonak's method to 
estimate net-tax paid by certain groups of workers would be a relatively 
simple task, unfortunately the data-base used in this study does not allow 
such distinctions to be drawn. 
(5.5) Retrospective and Prospective Remarks 
The point was made in Chapter One that the intention of this study is 
not to determine the appropriate reaction by Marxists to attacks on the 
welfare state, but instead to supply cold, hard evidence to be taken into 
account in formulating this reaction. In light of the findings of this 
study, it can be concluded that the welfare state has not materially 
benefitted the working class in New Zealand. This conclusion 
necessarily ramifies into the sphere of political praxis. 
But Marxists are having to react to attacks on the welfare state here 
and now, and the net-tax time series ends in 1975. The possibility has to 
be entertained that the pattern of income redistribution may have 
markedly changed in the years that ensued, and any conjectural remarks 
must be tempered by ti1e fact titat ti1e extent of the state's redistribution 
of income after 1975 is simply not known. Indeed, the strength of 
Tonak's method is that it affords a precise empirical quantifica~on of 
the redistributive activities of the state, allowing the debate to move 
beyond mere speculation- which is the largely the level it has proceeded 
on up until now. Therefore, rather than speculating at length on 
developments after 1975, l1aving demonstrated the validity and utility 
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of Tonak's method, it now remains to apply it to the 'new' set of 
national accounts in New Zealand (the 'New Zealand System of National 
Accounts') in order to bring the net-tax time series up to date. 
Nonetheless, a few prospective remarks are in order. 
If the pattern identified in Chapter Four continues, with the transfer 
ratio falling in periods of economic growth and increasing in periods of 
economic stagnation, the degree of income redistribution from labour 
to non-labour is unlikely to have decreased to any significant degree 
given that New Zealand's economy has largely stagnated in the fourteen 
years from 1975 to 1989.1 Certainly there is little likelihood that the 
state began to redistribute income wholesale from non-labour to labour 
-this did not occur even during the long boom. In any case, even if it 
did happen after 1975, the amount of income redistributed is unlikely to 
have been of a magnitude sufficient for the state to have repaid its 'debt' 
to the working class, accumulated over the twenty-six years prior to 
1975. 
In light of the foregoing, one answer to the question posed in the title 
to this chapter is t11at whether the pattern of income redistribution will 
swing back in fa~our of workers ultimately depends on the dynamics of 
capital accumulation. There is, of course, anot11er answer that can be 
given. For altl10ugh the focus of this study bas been on the role of the 
state in redistributing income between the classes in New Zealand, it 
must not be allowed to divert attention away from the set of' social 
1For Instance, In the years 1976-86, GOP Increased ate yearly rete of only 
1.54% (Roper, p.30). 
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structural arrangements determining the initial distribution of income. 
In Marx's ow11 words: 
Any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is 
only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of 
production themselves. The latter distribution, however, is 
a feature of the mode of production itself. The capitalist 
mode of production, for example, rests on the fact that the 
material conditions of production are in the hands of non-
workers in the form of property in capital and land, while 
the masses are only owners of the personal condition of 
production, of labour power. If the elements of production 
are so distributed, then the present-day distribution of the 
means of consumption results automatically.! 
Thus, the potential for the "means of consumption" to be 
redistributed by the state is necessarily subject to the constraints 
imposed by the social organization of production in capitalist society. In 
this light, even if workers in New Zealand were able to turn the tide of 
income redistribution back in their favour, it would not be a permanent 
solution to their plight; at best it would serve only to temporarily 
mitigate the worst excesses of the capitalist system. The social wage 
under capitalism is only a pale reflection of a true system of social 
wages, wherein tl1is type of redistribution would be put paid to once and 
for all. However, realizing this latter system requires our attention to 
remain focussed on the realm of production - the true locale of the class 
struggle - and not the realm of distribution, to the end of effecting a 
qualitative transformation in the state and society such tl1at wealth can 
lK. Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Program·, The Marx-Engels Reeder. ed. R. 
Tucker. New Vork, W. W. Norton, 1976, p.531. 
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be distributed according to the principle best enunciated by Marx: 
"From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!" 
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Appendix One: Calculation of Net-Tax 
Format of the Data 
The ma.nn.er in which the categories of the national accounts have 
been conceptually configured in accordance with the net-tax 
methodology, in order to provide the basis from which to empirically 
operationalize the concept of 'net-tax', is outlined in Appendix 3.1. 
Although the conceptual presentation of the steps involved in estimating 
net-tax contained therein is based on the statistics department 
publication entitled 'Official Estimates of National Income and 
Expenditure 1957-58', the source of data for each category used in the 
actual empirical estimation of net-tax varies from year to year. All 
sources of these data are identified below. 
Following the sources of data are located the spreadsheets in which 
the net-tax category is empirically operationalized. Within the 
spreadsheets, the method of estimating net-tax is set out in the following 
manner. Each category of the data set has been assigned a column, and 
each column has been assigned a number in the row labelled 'Column 
No.'. Using these column numbers, all calculations (made in accordance 
with the net-tax methodology outlined in Appendix 3.1) are identified 
in the row labelled 'Operation'. 
Cells in the 'Operation' row in which only one column number (and 
hence no arithmetic operation) appears, indicate that the column in 
question contains data whicl1 has simply been reproduced from another 
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column. For instance, insofar as 'Salary and Wage Payments' (Column 
1) is the sole constituent component of 'Gross Labour Income' (Column 
3), this latter column contains a set of data replicated exactly from 
Column 1. A blank 'Operation' cell indicates that the column in question 
contains raw data drawn directly from the national accounts for use in 
the calculation of the various sub-categories of the phases involved in 
estimating net-true 
The source of all data (except 'Labour Share of Consumption 
Expenditure' 1949-71) are the 'Official Estimates of National Income 
and Expenditure' (henceforth 'OENIE') reports. Prior to the 1966-67 
OENIE report, the categories in these reports are denominated in 
millions of nominal pounds. On the basis that one pound is equal to two 
dollars, these figures have been converted to millions of nominal 
dollars by multiplying by a factor of two. Hence all of the categories in 
the spreadsheets are denominated in millions of nominal dollars. 
Sources of Data 
The method of presentation is as follows. The various categories used 
in the estimation of net-tax are first identified, and then the OENIE 
report, and the table within the report, from which the data has been 
drawn is listed, along with the years covered by each data source. 
Figures in parentheses indicate the column in the spreadsheet in which 
the data for each category is located; hence 'C1' refers to column 1, and 
so on and so forth. 
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Salary and Wage Pay1ne11ts (C1), Pay and Allowru1ces of Ar1ned Forces 
(C5), Co1npru1y I11C01ne (C8). 
OENIE 1938/39-1954/55 (Table 13 'Private Income and Incidence of 
Direct Taxation'): 1949-51 
OENIE 1957-58 (Table 10 'Private Income'): 1952-56 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 2 'Gross National Product and Expenditure'): 
1957-75 
Re11tal Value of Owner Occupied Houses (C6), Otlzer Personal I11coJne 
(C7). 
OENIE 1938/39-1954/55 (Table 3 'National Income and Expenditure'): 
1949-51 
OENIE 1957-58 (Table 13 'Private Income and Incidence of Direct 
Taxation'): 1952-56 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 2 'Gross National Product and Expenditure'): 
1957-75 
Gover111ne11t ru1d Local Autlwrity Tradi11g l11coJne (C9). 
OENIE 1938/39-1954/55 (Table 3 'National Income and Expenditure'): 
1949-51 
OENIE 1957-58 (Table 3 'National Income and Expenditure'): 1952-56 
OENIE 1964-65 (Table 3 'Gross National Product and Expenditure'): 
1957-63 
OENIE 1972-73 (Table 2 'Gross National Product and Expenditure'): 
1964 
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OENIE 1975-76 (Table 2 •Gross National Product and Expenditure•): 
1965-75 
Depreciatio11 A1lowru1ces (C16). 
OENIE 1938/39-1954/55 (Table 3 •National Income and Expenditure•): 
1949-51 
OENIE 1957-58 (Table 3 •National Income and Expenditure•): 1952-56 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 2 •aross National Product and Expenditure•): 
1957-75 
Direct taxes 011: Salary ru1d Wage Payme11ts (C2), Pay and Allowru1ces 
of Ar1ned Forces (Cl 0), Ot11er PersOJzallJicome (iJ1cludes Re11tal Value 
of Owner-Occupied Houses) (C11), Compru1y b1come (C12). 
OENIE 1957-58 (Table 13 •private Income and Incidence of Direct 
Taxation·): 1949-56 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 9 •private Income and Direct Taxation•): 1957-
75 
Direct taxes 011 Govenune11t a11d Local Autlwrity Trading !J1come 
(C13). 
OENIE 1938-39 (Table 7 ·aeneral Government Revenue Account•, 
Item 4): 1949-51 
OENIE 1957-58 (Table 7 •General Government Revenue Account•, 
Item 4): 1952-56 
OENIE 1964-65 (Table 8 ·central Goverrunent Revenue Account, Item 
4): 1957-58 
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OENIE 1972-73 (Table 7 'Central Goverrunent Revenue Account, Item 
4): 1959-64 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 7 'Central Goverrunent Revenue Account, Item 
4): 1965-75 
Totall11direct Taxes (C20). 
OENIE 1957-58 (Table 11 'Private Income and Total Taxation'): 1949-
56 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 2 'Gross National Product and Expenditure', 
Item 10): 1957-75 
Labour Share of CoJlSU1nptio11 Expe11diture (C21). 
Data series supplied by Mr Bob Calkin, Sociology Department, 
University of Canterbury: 1949-71 
Calculated from OENIE 1975-76 (Table 2 'Gross National Product and 
Expenditure'): 1972-75 
Mo11etary Social Security Be11efits ru1d Pe11sioJ1S (C29). 
OENIE 1957-58 (Table 10 'Private Income'): 1949-56 
OENIE 1964-65 (Table 8 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1957-58 
OENIE 1972-73 (Table 7 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1959-64 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 7 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1964-75 
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Ge11eral Admi11istratio11 (C31), I11terest on General Gover111ne11t Debt 
Paid Overseas (C32), Law and Order (C33), Developme11t of Primary 
ru1d Seco11dary l11dustry (C34), Defe11ce ru1d vVar (C35), l11terest 011 
Ge11eral Gover111ne11t Debt Paid i11 New Zeala11d (C36), Subsidies 
(C37), L1terest 011 Local Autlwrity Debt Paid in New Zealru1d (C38). 
OENIE 1938/39-1954/55 (Table 7 'General Government Revenue 
Account'): 1949-51 
OENIE 1957-58 (Table 7 'General Government Revenue Account'): 
1952-56 
OENIE 1964-65 (Table 8 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1957-58 
OENIE 1972-73 (Table 7 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1959-64 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 7 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1965-75 
Net Trru1sfers to Rest of World (C39). 
OENIE 1966-67 (Table 8 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1950-65 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 3 'Private Income and Outlay'): 1965-75 
Healtl1 (C42), Educatio11 (C43 ), No11-M011etary Social Security Be11efits 
(C44), Otller Social Services (C45), Relmbilitatio11 (C46), Mai11te11ance 
of Public Works and Set-vices (C47), Local AutJwrity Cost of Provisio11 
of Goods ru1d Services (C48), Trru1sfers to Local Autlwrities (C49). 
OENIE 1938/39-1954/55 (Table 7 'General Government Revenue 
Account'): 1949-51 
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OENIE 1957-58 (Table 7 'General Government Revenue Account'): 
1952-56 
OENIE 1964-65 (Table 8 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1957-58 
OENIE 1972-73 (Table 7 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1959-64 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 7 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1965-75 
Frunily Be11efit Advru1ces (C41). 
OENIE 1972-73 (Table 7 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1959-65 
OENIE 1975-76 (Table 7 'Central Government Revenue Account'): 
1965-75 
Column No.: (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
!;!~~.:.!.nc. Ca_~~-~~- ......... ~~.!.~r..Y.~~~----··· Direct Taxes on Gross Labour Direct Taxes on .!:~'!'_.~ ... ~.!.!.?.~.~-~~~-~-............................................. ................... _. _________ 
···-··----······--·-·· ·--······-····-···--·-·-·· -·····--·--·-·-· Millions of Wage Payments Salary and Wage Income (GLJ) Labour Income of armed forces 
Nom ina I Dollars Payments <DTLI) 
Operation: (I ) (2) 
1949 499.80 53.00 499.80 53.00 9.20 
1950 556.40 65.00 556.40 65.00 1 1.80 
1951 655.20 72.00 655.20 72.00 16.80 
1952 695.40 88.00 695.40 88.00 21.20 
···········----........ 
............................................ ............................................. ............................ _ ........ 
···---···--·-·······-- ·--········--·····----- --···--····--·-·-· -----···-··-····-·-··-·· 1953 768.00 92.80 768.00 92.80 23.80 
1954 861.40 100.00 861.40 100.00 24.20 
1955 936.20 104.40 936.20 104.40 24.00 
1956 989.40 123.00 989.40 123.00 25.20 
1957 1068.00 93.00 1068.00 93.00 26.00 
1958 1 116.00 134.00 1 116.00 134.00 25.00 
1959 1181.00 146.00 1 181.00 146.00 26.00 
1960 1277.00 148.00 1277.00 148.00 27.00 
·············---···· ···-·--·-···-·······-··-·····-··· ····-··-··-··········--···-··-· 
.................. _. __ .. ., __ 
______ , ___ .........  _.. , :---....... _______
---- ·-·-·---··-··-·-·· 1961 1365.00 168.00 1365.00 168.00 27.00 
1962 1445.00 173.00 1445.00 173.00 29.00 
1963 I 554.00 177.00 1554.00 177.00 30.00 
1964 1723.00 206.00 1723.00 206.00 32.00 
1965 1890.00 236.00 1890.00 236.00 36.00 
1966 2041.00 269.00 2041.00 269.00 40.00 
1967 2127.00 283.00 2127.00 283.00 42.00 
1968 2240.00 308.00 2240.00 308.00 45.00 
-··-··--········ ·······-·············-··-·····--·--·· 
............................................ 
·····-···-··-······················ --·--···--··-············ ·--··-····-··-···········--··-- -····----··---· -·---·-··-··· .. -··-·-·--1969 2493.00 346.00 2493.00 346.00 47.00 
1970 3004.00 463.00 3004.00 463.00 56.00 
1971 3555.00 609.00 3555.00 609.00 68.00 
1972 3993.00 688.00 3993.00 688.00 70.00 
1973 4767.00 873.00 4767.00 873.00 79.00 
1974 5678.00 .1195.00 5678.00 1195.00 84.00 
1975 6476.00 1328.00 6476.00 1328.00 95.00 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (I 0) (I I ) 
B.:.~~-~ ... Y..~.~~~-~---~-~-~: .. Other Personal __ £?.!:'2P~~---- Govt. and Local Direct Taxes on Direct Taxes on 
····----··-·-·-- -············-·······-····-·-- ····-·······-··-·······-···-·-· 
.......................................... _ 
-···-···--·-······-·-········· 
occupied houses Income (OPI) Income Authority Trading Pay and Allowances OPI & Rental Val. 
Income of Armed Forces Own. Occ. Houses 
26.00 316.00 116.00 28.00 1.00 79.00 
28.00 486.00 142.20 32.00 1.00 95.80 
30.00 3'82.00 160.20 38.00 1.20 131.80 
32.60 407.20 155.20 36.00 
,.. ....... -........... - .......... -.. 
1.60 120.20 
--··--··--·-············--·-··-· 
_____ , ___ , __ , __ 
,.._ ............................. _ . .. -............ _____ , ____
···-··-······-··-·---···-·-·--· ·-·-··· .. -·-·--·--··-······ 36.80 447.00 180.80 48.00 1.60 131.20 
39.60 463.80 194.80 56.00 2.00 143.00 
43.40 473.00 188.40 60.00 2.00 141.60 
47.40 496.20 196.60 58.00 2.00 144.00 
48.00 567.00 21 1.00 66.00 2.00 147.00 
50.00 522.00 219.00 74.00 3.00 200.00 
51.00 561.00 242.00 82.00 3.00 164.00 
51.00 609.00 291.00 92.00 3.00 218.00 1-----·-·----.. -·-·- ... .. - ·-·-···-···········-····-··-· ·-··-···-····--·-·-··-·-· -··-·-··--·-··-··-·· .. --. ······-······-···-··-·---- ······-·-···-··-··-·-········ 60.00 586.00 288.00 100.00 3.00 214.00 
81.00 623.00 323.00 106.00 3.00 187.00 
86.00 691.00 370.00 124.00 3.00 202.00 
96.00 681.00 418.00 136.00 4.00 226.00 
109.00 748.00 480.00 147.00 4.00 243.00 
114.00 720.00 474.00 147.00 5.00 253.00 
124.00 717.00 464.00 167.00 5.00 249.00 
130.00 714.00 525.00 185.00 6.00 264.00 
----·-·-·---· ·----·-·-·-.. ·-·-
____ ..................... , ___ 
··-·····-······-········---··--
.............. _ ....................... _ 
...... ____ , .. ,_ .... ,. ____
-·--·-··-·-·· .. ···· 140.00 766.00 605.00 202.00 6.00 297.00 
156.00 810.00 644.00 171.00 9.00 323.00 
169.00 1017.00 653.00 199.00 11.00 369.00 
201.00 1277.00 913.00 220.00 12.00 461.00 
217.00 1390.00 1021.00 250.00 13.00 580.00 
253.00 1262.00 989.00 .158.00 18.00 676.00 
304.00. 1628.00 1174.00 123.00 20.00 767.00 
( 12) ( 13) ( 14) (15) ( 16) 
Direct Taxes on Direct Taxes on Gross Non-Labour Direct Taxes on -~.!£!..!.:2.~!!..~.~--
···········-·····-··-·······-····· ·················-·--········-··- ····----·---····-·· ~···-··-·---·--··-·-· ···············-··-·····-·--- ·······················-·-··-·· ............................. _._ Company Income Cent. Govt. Income <GNLI l Non-Labour Allowances 
Trading Income Income <DTNLI l 
(5)+(6)+(7)+(8)+ (10)+(11)+(12) 
(9) +( 13) 
58.20 3.00 495.20 141.20 70.00 
64.20 3.00 700.00 164.00 78.00 
79.00 3.80 627.00 215.80 86.00 
81.80 4.80 652.20 208.40 96.00 
··········-······--···········- ·--···-···--·-·-········-··-··· ·······--······---·-········ -·-·······-···--·--····- ·-···-·····--···--·-·-· -······-···---···---· .. ·· ····-··-··-··-···-····- -················-········-·-81.80 4.00 736.40 218.60 110.00 
92.00 5.20 778.40 242.20 126.00 
100.00 6.00 788.80 249.60 138.00 
101.00 6.00 823.40 253.00 144.00 
102.00 4.40 918.00 255.40 158.00 
106.00 5.00 890.00 314.00 166.00 
106.00 5.60 962.00 278.60 168.00 
123.00 6.80 1070.00 350.80 185.00 
··-··-·--·-··-··-·--·-··-······-·-·-·····-·-··· ·-·------·-··-····-· :------·--·-·--··-·- ·-·······---·-···---··-·· ····-···-·······-···-··-··-·· ··-···-·-··-···--·-· -··-··-·-·--·····--· 147.00 7.10 I 061.00 371.10 204.00 
141.00 7.50 1162.00 338.50 219.00 
160.00 8.80 1301.00 373.80 232.00 
193.00 11.00 1363.00 434.00 249.00 
208.00 I 1.10 1520.00 466.10 273.00 
227.00 11.00 1495.00 496.00 300.00 
230.00 12.40 1514.00 496.40 319.00 
215.00 14.20 1599.00 499.20 333.00 
······-·-····---·-··--- ... -··········--··-···--··-- -·····-·--······-···-···-······· -·-···-·--·-···- -···-······-··--·---·--·· ··-·-···-·············-·-·· -·-·-··--·····-·-·-
............. _. __________ 
238.00 16.00 1760.00 557.00 364.00 
284.00 14.60 1837.00 630.60 440.00 
297.00 13.70 2106.00 690.70 465.00 
299.00 18.00 2681.00 790.00 515.00 
388.00 20.70 2957.00 I 001.70 590.00 
442.00 18.10 2746.00 1154.10 675.00 
428.00 21.60 3324.00 1236.60 764.00 
( 1 7) (18) ( 19) 
Total Direct Tax Labour Share of Non-Labour Share 
·················--·········-·· ... -··- ·-·······-·-··-··········--··-- ··-·-·--··--··-·-···--on GLI and GNLI Direct Taxes of Direct Taxes 
<TOT> (LSDT> (NLSIT) 
(4)+( 15) (4)/( 17) (15)/(17) 
194.20 0.27 0.73 
229.00 0.28 0.72 
287.80 0.25 0.75 
296.40 0.30 0.70 
·············---··············-····-··· ···-·······-··-···-····-····-·-· ·······-·····-·-···-·--·-··--311.40 0.30 0.70 
342.20 0.29 0.71 
354.00 0.29 0.71 
376.00 0.33 0.67 
348.40 0.27 0.73 
448.00 0.30 0.70 
424.60 0.34 0.66 
498.80 0.30 0.70 
·-···-··-···-·--··-·-··- -·----·-··-·--- ·-·-·--···-·--·-·--539.10 0.31 0.69 
51 1.50 0.34 0.66 
550.80 0.32 0.68 
640.00 0.32 0.68 
702.10 0.34 0.66 
765.00 0.35 0.65 
779.40 0.36 0.64 
807.20 0.38 0.62 
·-··-········-·--··-···-··---·· ····-··----·····---· ---··-··--··--··-· 903.00 0.38 0.62 
1093.60 0.42 0.58 
1299.70 0.47 0.53 
1478.00 0.47 0.53 
1874.70 0.47 0.53 
2349.10 0.51 0.49 
2564.60 0.52 0.48 
(20) 
Total Indirect 
-··-············-······· --··--·-··--- -··-··-···-·-···-····-·· Taxes 
TINT 
99.60 
II 1.20 
142.00 
134.00 
--······················· ·---···-·-··-·-··-···-- -······-··-··-··-········· 135.00 
161.40 
170.60 
168.20 
182.00 
208.00 
217.00 
226.00 
~··-·········-·-···-·· --·-····-·-·····-- -·-··-····-··-··-········ 231.00 
228.00 
254.00 
276.00 
289.00 
301.00 
316.00 
--···· ... ~············· ···--·-·······-··~~~6~-···-···-···-·-···--·-··· 
462.00 
537.00 
603.00 
687.00 
725.00 
87t.ool 
(21) 
Labour Share 
··-·······-···-·········--··---
of Consumption 
Expenditure 
60.68 
58.26 
58.99 
62.31 
···············-······--·--62.12 
62.10 
63.27 
63.71 
63.42 
65.23 
67.95 
63.28 
················-·-···--···---65.12 
65.95 
66.87 
68.98 
68.23 
71.51 
70.69 
72.40 
··-············--···-·--··--74.66 
76.00 
78.23 
87.46 
93.23 
98.01 
95.75 
(22) 
Labour Share •...................•....•••...••.....•.•...... 
of Indirect Taxes 
(LSIT) 
(20)*(21 )/I 00 
60.44 
64.79 
83.77 
83.50 
········-·-·······-···········-········· 83.86 
100.23 
107.94 
107.16 
115.42 
135.68 
147.45 
143.01 
··········-···-· .. ·-···········-········ 150.43 
150.37 
169.85 
190.38 
197.18 
215.25 
223.38 
248.33 
···········-······-······················ 281.47 
351.12 
420.10 
527.38 
640.49 
710.57 
833.98 1.0 U1 
(23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
Non-Labour Share Total Taxes on Total Taxes on Labour After-Tax Non-Labour After- Non-Labour After-!--···-·····--····-················· ·········---·····-······ ··············-··················-·-···-··-· ······························-········-·-· ····-·--·-·······--- !------·-··-·-····-·-·-·- ---··-···············-···········-·· ·····-···························--·-····· 
of Indirect Taxes Labour I nco me Non-Labour I nco me Income <LATI) Tax Income (a) Tax Income (b) 
CNLSIT> TTLI TTNLI (NLATI) (a) <NLATI) (b) 
(20)..:.(22) (4)+(22) ( 15)+(23) (3)-(24) ( 14)-(25) (27)-( 16) 
39.16 113.44 180.36 386.36 314.84 244.84 
46.41 129.79 210.41 426.61 489.59 41 1.59 
58.23 155.77 274.03 499.43 352.97 266.97 
50.50 171.50 258.90 523.90 393.30 297.30 
r---·-·······-···-·······-············· ············--··············· ..................................................... ························-·····-·····-·-··· .............................. ··--···-··-····----- ---·········-··················· ..................................................... 51.14 176.66 269.74 591.34 466.66 356.66 
61.17 200.23 303.37 661.17 475.03 349.03 
62.66 212.34 312.26 723.86 476.54 338.54 
61.04 230.16 314.04 759.24 509.36 365.36 
66.58 208.42 321.98 859.58 596.02 438.02 
72.32 269.68 386.32 846.32 503.68 337.68 
69.55 293.45 348.15 887.55 613.85 445.85 
82.99 291.01 433.79 985.99 636.21 451.21 !----·-·-·-·-···-··-··-··· ··-·······---··-··-······ ·········-···········-········-·······-··-- ·-··-·-···-···········-·····--·--· ··········-·-·······-··-- -·--·-·····---·- ------···-·······-···-··-···-· .................................................. 80.57 318.43 451.67 1046.57 609.33 405.33 
77.63 323.37 416.13 1121.63 745.87 526.87 
84.15 346.85 457.95 1207.15 843.05 61 1.05 
85.62 396.38 519.62 1326.62 843.38 594.38 
91.82 433.18 557.92 1456.82 962.08 689.08 
85.75 484.25 581.75 1556.75 913.25 613.25 
92.62 506.38 589.02 1620.62 924.98 605.98 
94.67 556.33 593.87 1683.67 1005.13 672.13 
--·-·····--·········-········ 
............ - ............... 
········-······-········-··-··-····-··· 
................................................. 
-··-···-··-·-········- ---··--·-·-··---· -···-··-····-··---·-····-····· 
................................................. 
95.53 627.47 652.53 1865.53 1107.47 743.47 
110.88 814.12 741.48 2189.88 1095.52 655.52 
116.90 1029.10 807.60 2525.90 1298.40 833.40 
75.62 1215.38 865.62 2777.62 1815.38 1300.38 
46.51 1513.49 1048.21 3253.51 1908.79 1318.79 
14.43 1905.57 1168.53 3772.43 1577.47 902.47 
37.02 2161.98 1273.62 4314.02 2050.38 1286.38 
(29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) 
···--r:!.~~~-~-~-~L~~~-~~.! ..... _ --~_?.~-~: .... ~~P..:. .. Ac £!'U i.~-~-- General Interest on General Law and Order Development of 
················--··-···· ... --·-·---······ 
.............................. -·--·-···· ........................ -.. -................ _ .
.............. _ ............................. 
-·-····-·····················-······ Security Benefits to Labour Alone Administration Govt. Debt Paid Prim. & Second. 
and Pensions (GEALA) Overseas Industry 
(29) 
84.40 84.40 18.60 5.40 3.60 9.80 
94.20 94.20 21.40 5.00 3.00 10.00 
106.00 106.00 26.40 5.00 3.40 I 0.60 
107.40 107.40 27.20 5.00 2.80 12.80 
··············-·-·-·-··· 
......................... _ .......................... .............................. -. _________ 
·-··--·--·-·-· ·················-······-··-·-··--··· ·-···-···-··-·····-·-··········-···---· -··-··············-········--········· ····•·•····•····••·······••·•····•······· 115.40 115.40 27.40 5.00 3.20 13.20 
122.60 122.60 30.00 5.60 3.80 13.00 
128.80 128.80 30.40 6.60 4.00 14.20 
132.60 132.60 31.20 6.80 5.00 18.20 
139.40 139.40 30.00 7.40 6.40 19.00 
159.60 159.60 31.80 9.20 6.20 19.80 
190.20 190.20 32.00 1 1.20 6.80 20.60 
199.20 199.20 33.20 10.40 7.80 22.60 
·-·············-·-···- ··-·-···-···---·-··-···-··-·········- ---···-·---·············-----····- -··-·-----·· ··-··························-·-··-···· ················-·····--··-··-···-···-· 
............................... --·-·-····· .......................................... 
207.00 207.00 39.40 10.20 7.60 23.00 
208.60 208.60 40.60 13.00 8.60 25.60 
220.80 220.80 42.40 14.00 9.20 26.60 
225.60 225.60 45.00 15.20 10.40 32.20 
234.80 234.80 52.00 15.20 10.60 35.40 
245.40 245.40 53.50 17.20 12.80 38.40 
263.00 263.00 53.00 21.60 13.40 40.00 
270.90 270.90 55.20 28.80 13.00 42.30 
···-·····-··----·-··· 
...................................................... 
·-····--·-·····--·--··-·-- ·-··-··-·---- --··-·················--··-······· ······-··-···-·-···-···-·······-·······- ·-·-···-···-·--·--·············· 
.......................................... 
292.40 292.40 63.20 30.80 16.30 49.10 
319.50 319.50 73.40 32.10 20.70 64.50 
361.40 361.40 93.50 36.30 26.60 64.20 
483.90 483.90 107.70 38.30 31.50 83.40 
590.30 590.30 130.70 34.10 39.10 98.90 
671.10 671.10 168.50 41.30 49.90 12 1.60 
839.60 839.60 199.10 68.80 64.60 151.20 
(35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) 
Defence & War Interest on Subsidies Interest on Net Transfers to 
........... ..?..~~~: ... ~~.P.: ... ~£.£!._~_!.'29.-......... 
···········-··-···-··-··--·-···-·· 
........................... __________ 
·-·-·-····-··-··-·- ·-·--····-···-···-···-·-·-··· ·····-·······-·---·-·-···-···· ··············-·-··-··············· General Govt. Debt Local Authority Rest of World to Non-Labour 
Paid in N.Z. Debt Paid In N.Z. Alone (GEANLA) 
(31 )+(32)+(33)+(34)+(35) 
+(36 )+(37)+(38)+(39) 
16.40 28.00 29.20 4.40 115.40 
21.20 29.60 18.80 4.40 2.00 115.40 
35.40 30.40 32.20 4.40 3.60 151.40 
51.40 29.60 30.00 4.60 3.00 166.40 
·············-····--············--- ··-·-········----···----···--· -·-·-···-·--·······-· ---·······-·······-·--·-· 
.................... ---··-··-··-··- ·-··-···-··-························-····-·--········· ... ·· 
............................................. 
56.20 31.20 31.00 5.40 3.00 175.60 
47.20 34.40 26.80 6.00 4.00 170.80 
50.00 35.40 24.80 6.40 3.20 175.00 
52.20 38.80 26.60 8.00 4.20 191.00 
49.80 43.20 27.20 9.40 4.00 196.40 
51.40 45.40 27.00 I 1.40 4.20 206.40 
55.60 46.40 25.60 13.00 4.20 215.40 
56.80 49.70 30.60 15.30 4.00 230.40 
........ ·-----··-··-·-· 
.................... _______
··---·--·---· -·--··-·-···-······-·-·· 
.................... ____________ 
··-···-··-·······-······--·-···-·······-··--···-···-· ··-···············---················· 53.40 53.20 28.30 17.00 4.60 236.70 
54.20 58.70 29.40 18.60 4.20 252.90 
56.20 67.80 30.20 20.80 5.00 272.20 
72.20 72.00 35.30 22.90 4.80 310.00 
79.40 79.20 39.20 24.60 5.80 341.40 
86.20 88.70 39.20 27.00 6.30 369.30 
83.70 94.20 21.00 30.10 6.40 363.40 
95.90 103.60 18.90 32.30 6.60 396.60 
······-··--···--··-···-- ···-··---···-------·-··-·· ---···-·-·-···-- ·--···-·-············-··-· ···-··--······--·-···-···-·-···- ··-·······-·-···-········ .. ·-·-···········-···-····-···· ··········-·····················-········ 102.60 113.40 28.50 35.00 7.70 446.60 
122.80 120.90 51.60 37.50 9.30 532.80 
121.80 130.50 89.40 40.60 10.70 613.60 
135.50 146.50 100.70 44.00 15.10 702.70 
140.50 166.20 133.70 53.20 21.40 817.80 
165.50 179.70 131.80 52.90 34.70 945.90 
193.20 201.20 229.40 57.80 49.30 1214.60 
(41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) 
···-·~·~!!.!.!!L~-~.~~.!..~~ ...... Health Education Non-Monetary Other Social Rehab!! ftation Maintenance of Local Auth. Cost 
..... ·--····---······---· ·---·-··-·····--··-- ;-..... ---····-··---··-- ·····--·-·······-··----··· ··-·-·-···-···-··-··-····· ·-··--·-···-··-···-····---- ··-···--·--···-···--··----······ Advances Social Security Services Public Works & of Provision of 
Benefits Services Goods & Services 
6.80 22.00 17.00 1.20 4.20 8.00 28.80 
7.20 24.60 17.40 1.20 4.20 6.60 33.40 
8.60 29.20 18.80 1.80 3.00 10.00 37.60 
8.80 31.40 20.80 2.00 2.40 10.20 39.80 
··············----····-·····-········ ···-···-·-·······-·········-·· 
..................................... __ >--·-·--·-···-····-··· ·-··-·---··--···-··-·· ·-·-·-··-···-·-···-··- -·-··-··-·······-··-··-··- ···-···-·-·-·········---···-·· 9.40 34.60 21.20 2.60 1.60 8.60 45.40 
9.80 38.40 25.20 2.60 2.00 6.20 44.40 
10.80 42.40 31.00 2.80 2.00 7.20 50.20 
11.80 46.20 33.60 3.20 2.00 8.80 55.20 
47.40 51.40 3.20 1.60 6.60 64.60 
51.40 55.80 3.20 1.60 5.80 66.20 
7.80 55.20 59.80 3.60 1.60 4.60 72.60 
13.80 58 20 67 20 400 2.40 400 79 00 
··············---·--·-·······- -···-·---······--·- ~-·-···-··--···---..:.._ --···---·-······-·-···- ·----·······-······-···-··· ·-·-·-··-········-·······- ·---··-····----· - --·-·--····-·-·········· 11.20 63.40 71.00 4.00 1.60 6.80 82.80 
10.00 67.40 78.80 4.60 1.60 7.80 91.90 
8.60 70.20 87.00 4.60 1.60 8.40 96.40 
8.00 58.80 99.00 5.20 1.40 7.40 112.90 
7.40 64.20 110.40 4.60 1.40 7.80 135.00 
6.20 69.20 124.40 3.40 1.30 12.00 146.90 
6.10 73.30 136.80 5.20 1.20 14.20 155.30 
6.60 77.70 145.60 7.00 1.10 18.20 164.70 
.............. 
··--······ ·····---······--····-····-·· -·-········-······-·······- ·-···---···············- -······-··-··-··-········-··· ··-·--·-··---·-· --··-··········-··--··-
........... _______________ .. .....
6.00 86.80 168.40 4.90 1.10 16.10 181.60 
8.50 103.70 214.90 5.80 1.00 18.90 202.80 
4.50 114.00 279.60 7.80 0.90 21.50 270.70 
3.60 103.00 309.10 20.30 0.80 41.10 269.60 
3.30 120.50 367.20 24.40 0.80 43.70 356.00 
4.10 151.90 432.60 27.00 0.90 56.70 461.50 
6.80 187.90 499.30 44.70 66.50 557.80 
(49) (50) (51) 
Transfers -~J~.~!.P..: .. ~~-~:..=~···-········ Lab. Share of MO--MO_M __ ·····-·---··-·· -···········-···-··-···-··· to Local Between Lab. & Direct Taxes 
Authorities Non-Lab. (SGE) 
(41 )+(42)+(43)+(44)+(45) ( 18) 
+(46)+(47)+(48)+(49) 
15.20 103.20 0.27 
16.00 110.60 0.28 
21.00 130.00 0.25 
24.20 139.60 0.30 
···--·-·--· ·---···-··-··-················-··················· -·······--··---··- ······-·······-·-··-········· 26.40 149.80 0.30 
32.60 161.20 0.29 
33.80 180.20 0.29 
39.80 200.60 0.33 
53.00 227.80 0.27 
55.60 239.60 0.30 
60.20 265.40 0.34 
67.80 296.40 0.30 
····-- -·--··-····-·······-·-···-··-··- n••·-·-·--·- -··-············---··-··· 70.40 311.20 0.31 
78.20 340.30 0.34 
84.80 361.60 0.32 
109.60 402.30 0.32 
124.60 455.40 0.34 
131.40 494.80 0.35 
133.40 525.50 0.36 
140.40 561.30 0.38 
·--·-··-··-················· ·--·-----·--·-
........................ _. _____ 
155.20 620.10 0.38 
179.00 734.60 0.42 
217.00 916.00 0.47 
287.00 1034.50 0.47 
329.70 1245.60 0.47 
398.20 1532.90 0.51 
490.40 1853.40 0.52 
(52) (53) 
Labour Portion 00~£~:..!.2!:.~!~.~-MML.OOOOM--OM--
·-··-········-····-... ··-·--·-· 
of Shared Govt. of Total Govt. Exp. 
Exp. (LPSGE) (LPTGE) 
(50)*(51) (52)+(30) 
27.86 112.26 
30.97 125.17 
32.50 138.50 
41.88 149.28 
·-···-········--·--·-----
OM--MMOOMMO--o-oO ........ ............ ________ 
44.94 160.34 
46.75 169.35 
52.26 181.06 
66.20 198.80 
61.5 I 200.91 
71.88 231.48 
90.24 280.44 
88.92 288.12 
··-···········--···-·-·-· -----·-·--··-·--
__ .. ______ 
96.47 303.47 
115.70 324.30 
115.71 336.51 
128.74 354.34 
154.84 389.64 
173.18 418.58 
189.18 452.18 
213.29 484.19 
·--·········-·-··--····-·-·-· ··--·-··--·--··--- ······-·-·-.. ...._ __ 235.64 528.04 
308.53 628.03 
430.52 791.92 
486.22 970.12 
585.43 1175.73 
781.78 1452.88 
963.77 1803.37 
(54) 
Total Govt. 
·-···-···-······················· ExpendIture 
CTGE) 
(30)+(40)+(50) 
303.00 
320.20 
387.40 
413.40 
~000MOOOMOOOM000000000000oooOOOOOoooo 
440.80 
454.60 
484.00 
524.20 
563.60 
605.60 
671.00 
726.00 
·-···········-··-·············-···· 754.90 
801.80 
854.60 
937.90 
1031.60 
1109.50 
1151.90 
1228.80 
............... _ .... _ ...... _ ............ 
1359.10 
1586.90 
189 1.00 
2221.10 
2653.70 
3149.90 
3907.60 
1'0 
0 
0 
(55) (56) 
Net-Tax Transfer Ratio 
·················-···· .. ····· ··········-··-···-··-··-···· ···-·-·-··-···-············-· ··········-········---
(24)-(53) (24)/(53) 
1.18 1.01 
4.62 1.04 
17.27 1.12 
22.22 1.15 
···-········-··--···-··- ······-··-··-··--·-··-··· ··-·······-··-···-············- ····-··-···-······-16.32 1.10 
30.88 1.18 
31.28 1.17 
31.36 1.16 
7.51 1.04 
38.20 1.17 
13.01 1.05 
2.89 1.0 I 
·············---····· -··-·-·-·--··· ·-··-···-·······-···········-· ····-···-····-·····--14.96 1.05 
-0.93 1.00 
10.34 1.03 
42.04 1.12 
43.54 1. 1 I 
65.67 1.16 
54.20 1.12 
72.14 1.15 
····-······-·--···-···· ·····-·····--······--·· ··-·-··-···-··-··-··········· ··-··········-···-·-99.43 1.19 
186.09 1.30 
237.18 1.30 
245.26 1.25 
337.76 1.29 
452.69 1.31 
358.61 1.20 
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Appendix Two: Tables of Data 
All graphs are numbered according to their order of appearance 
within each chapter in the body of this thesis. Each table in this appendix 
contains the data presented in the graph which has the same number in 
the text. T1te source of data for each graph is identified at the bottom of 
each table. It will be noted that most of the sources of data are 
themselves columns of the spreadsheet in Appendix One in which 'net-
tax' is estimated. Where this is the case, the source of data is not 
replicated; instead the column number is simply listed. The source of 
data for each column can be easily located by referring back to 
Appendix One. The only exceptions to this method of presentation are 
three graphs which were not generated in this study, having merely 
been reproduced directly from the following source: G. Pearce, Where 
is New Zealand Goifii? They are: Graph 4:6 (Pearce, p.141); Graph 
4:10 (Pearce, p.236); and Graph 4:11 (Pearce, p.236). 
Table 3:1 Constituent Components of Total Direct Taxes 
Year Pers. Inc. Tax Comp. Inc. Tax Land EsVGift Duty Rates 
1950 5288 29.71 1.02 5.87 10.50 
1951 54.66 28.40 0.87 6.36 9.68 
1952 56.66 27.84 0.76 5.62 9.02 
1953 56.37 27.52 0.87 5.93 9.37 
1954 57.58 26.28 1.02 5.59 9.51 
1955. 57.69 26.81 0.58 5.49 9.47 
1956 57.00 28.07 0.67 4.80 9.43 
1957 58.43 26.51 0.74 4.41 9.89 
1958 53.17 29.26 0.74 5.14 I 1.67 
195S 61.49 23.47 0.62 4.65 9.70 
1960 57.56 25.12 0.70 5.78 10.76 
I 96 I. 58.02 24.82 0.72 6.68 9.73 
1962 57.65 27.25 0.74 4.83 9.51 
1963 56.75 27.80 0.46 4.21 10.81 
1964 55.62 29.06 0.41 3.90 I 1.00 
1965 55.31 30.31 0.40 3.20 10.75 
1966 56.63 29.71 0.45 3.17 10.01 
1967 57.01 29.64 0.45 2.93 9.95 
1968 56.79 29.48 0.56 2.74 10.41 
1969 58.99 26.74 0.33 2.92 10.98 
1970 59.89 26.33 0.32 2.88 10.56 
1971 61.62 25.95 0.28 2.67 9.47 
1972 66.43 22.86 0.29 1.90 8.49 
1973 68.72 20.21 0.23 1.92 8.90 
1974 69.82 20.68 0.17 1.80 7.50 
1975 72.10 18.81 0.14 1.74 7.17 
1976 72.93 Hi.72 0.13 2.11 8.08 
1977 73.12 16.95 0.21 1.74 7.82 
1978 75.25 . 15.51 0.22 1.26 7.74 
1979 78.63 I 1.23 0.22 1.30 8.60 
tV 
Source: New Zealand Planning Council, Public Expenditure and Its Financing 1950-79. 0 VI 
June 1979, Table 9. 
Table 3:2 Labour Share of Consumption Expenditure 
Year Lab. Share Cons. Exp. 
1949 60.680 
1950 58.260 
1951 58.990 
1952 62.310 
1953 62.120 
1954 62.100 
1955 63.270 
1956 63.710 
1957 63.420 
1958 65.230 
1959 67.950 
1960 63.280 
1961 65.120 
1962 65.950 
1963 66.870 
1964 68.980 
1965 68.230 
1966 71.510 
1967 70.690 
1968 72.400 
1969 74.660 
1970 76.000 
1971 78.230 
1972 87.460 
1973 93.230 
1974 98.010 
1975 95.750 
Source: Appendix One, Column 21. 
tV 
0 
~ 
Table 3:3 Labour Share of Indirect Taxes as Percentage of 
Total Taxes on Labour Income 
Year (I) LSIT (2) TTLI (I )/(2)*1 00 
1949 60.440 I 13.440 53.280 
1950 64.790 129.790 49.920 
1951 83.770 I 55.770 53.780 
1952 83.500 171.500 48.690 
1953 83.860 176.660 47.470 
1954 100.230 200.230 50.060 
1955 107.940 212.340 50.830 
1956 107.160 230.160 46.560 
1957 I 15.420 208.420 55.380 
1958 135.680 269.680 50.310 
1959 147.450 293.450 50.250 
1960 143.010 291.0 I 0 49.140 
1961 150.430 318.430 47.240 
1962 150.370 323.370 46.500 
1963 169.850 346.850 48.970 
1964 190.380 396.380 48.030 
1965 197.180 433.180 45.600 
1966 215.250 484.250 44.450 
1967 223.380 506.380 44.110 
1968 248.330 556.330 44.640 
1969 28 I .470 627.470 44.860 
1970 351.120 814.120 43.130 
1971 420.100 1029. I 00 40.820 
1972 527.380 1215.380 43.390 
1973 640.490 1513.490 42.320 
1974 710.570 !905.570 37.290 
1975 833.980 2161.980 38.570 
Source: Appendix One, Column 22 (LSIT)and Column 24 (TTL!). 
tv 
0 
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Table 3:4 Labour Share of Direct Tax 
Year 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Lab. Share Dir. Tax 
27.00 
28.00 
25.00 
30.00 
30.00 
29.00 
:29.00 
33.00 
27.00 
30.00 
34.00 
30.00 
31.00 
34.00 
32.00 
32.00 
34.00 
35.00 
36.00 
38.00 
38.00 
42.00 
47 . .00 
47.00 
47.00 
51.00 
52.00 
Source: Appendix One, Column 18. 
Table 4:1 Transfer Ratio 
Year Transfer Ratio 
1949 1.010 
1950 1.040 
1951 1.120 
1952 1.150 
1953 1.100 
1954 1.180 
1955 1.170 
1956 1.160 
1957 1.040 
1958 1.170 
1959 1.050 
1960 1.010 
1961 1.050 
1962 1.000 
1963 1.030 
1964 1.120 
1965 1.110 
1966 1.160 
1967 1.120 
1968 1.150 
1969 1.190 
1970 1.300 
1971 1.300 
1972 1.250 
1973 1.290 
1974 1.310 
1975 1.200 
Source: Appendix One, Column 56. 
Table 4:2 Net-tax 
Year Net-tax 
1949 1.180 
1950 4.620 
1951 17.270 
1952 22.220 
1953 16.320 
1954 30.880 
1955 31.280 
1956 31.360 
1957 7.510 
1958 38.200 
1959 13.010 
1960- 2.890 
1961 14.960 
1962 -0.930 
1963 10.340 
1964 42.040 
1965 43.540 
1966 65.670 
1967 54.200 
1968 72.140 
1969 99.430 
1970 186.090 
1971 237.180 
1972 245.260 
1973 337.760 
1974 452.690 
1975 358.610 
Source: Appendix One, Column 55. 
1\) 
0 
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Table 4:3 Transfer Ratio Percentage Change 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1'971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
TR% Change 
2.970 
7.690 
2.680 
-4.350 
7.270 
-0.850 
-0.850 
-10.340 
12.500 
-10.250 
-3.800 
3.960 
-4.760 
3.000 
8.740 
-0.890 
4.500 
-3.450 
2.680 
3.480 
9.240 
0.000 
-3.850 
3.200 
1.550 
-8.400 
Source: calculated from Appendix One, Column 56. 
Table 4:4 TTLI and LPTGK (millions of constant 1975 dollars) 
Year TTL! :Con st. 75$ LPTGE:Const. 75$ 
1949 437.480 434.240 
1950 473.970 457.100 
1951 512.280 455.490 
195:2: 523.480 455.660 
1953 515.880 468.230 
1954 558.630 472.480 
1955 577.890 492.760 
1956 605.310 522.840 
1957 536.650 517.310 
1958 664.540 570.410 
1959 696.670 665.780 
1960 686.140 679.320 
1961 737.640 702.990 
1962 729.920 732.020 
1963 767.310 744.430 
1964 847.450 757.570 
1965 896.050 805.990 
1966 974.160 842.060 
1967 960.810 857.970 
1968 1012.040 880.810 
1969 1087.400 915.090 
1970 1324.770 1021.960 
1971 1516.750 1167.180 
1972 1675.710 1337.560 
1973 1928.306 1497.970 
1974 2185.780 1666.520 
1975 2161.980 1803.370 
I'\) 
Source: Appendix One, Column 24 (TTLI) and Column 53. (LPTGE). 0 
Table 4:5 TTLI and LPTGE Percentage Change 
Year TTLI 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
·:%Change LPTGE 
8.340 
8.080 
2.190 
-1.450 
8.290 
3.450 
4.740 
-11.340 
23.830 
4.830 
-1.510 
7.510 
-1.050 
5.120 
10.440 
5.730 
8.720 
-1.370 
5.330 
7.450 
21.830 
14.490 
10.480 
15.070 
13.350 
-1.090 
%Change 
5.260 
-0.350 
0.040 
2.760 
0.910 
4.290 
6.100 
-1.060 
10.260 
16.720 
2.030 
3.480 
4.130 
1.700 
1.770 
6.390 
4.480 
1.890 
2.660 
3.890 
11.680 
14.210 
14.600 
11.990 
11.250 
8.210 
Source: calculated from Appendix One, Column 24 (TTLI) and Column 53 (LPTGE). 
Table 4:7 National Income at Market Price Percentage Change 
Year NIMP%Change 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
10.960 
21.250 
-7.320 
-2.720 
5.820 
5.570 
3.030 
0.980 
4.710 
-0.390 
3.670 
6.740 
1.340 
4.570 
7.640 
5.770 
4.410 
0.820 
-2.160 
1.280 
5.110 
7.750 
6.310 
9.130 
6.780 
-2.100 
1.170 
Source: G. Pearce, Where is New Zealand Going? Table 2:7. 
Table 4:8 State's Share in the Economy 
Pub 1 i c.Exp%GDP 
Year ( 1) Tot. Public. Exp. (2) GDP ( 1 )/(2) ( 1 )/[(2)-( 1 )] 
1950 381.10 1107.00 0.34 0.53 
1951 401.10 1408.00 0.28 0.40 
1952 467.70 1459.00 0.32 0.47 
1953 532.90 1528.00 0.35 0.54 
1954 569.10 1690.00 0.34 0.51 
1955 584.10 1877.00 0.31 0.45 
1956 633.30 1979.00 0.32 0.47 
1957 686.40 2078.00 0.33 0.49 
1958 723.90 2225.00 0.33 0.48 
1959 761.80 2321.00 0.33 0.49 
1960 836.50 2482.00 0.34 0.51 
1961 890.70 2687.00 0.33 0.50 
1962 925.70 2783.00 0.33 0.50 
1963 978.90 2999.00 0.33 0.48 
1964 1056.40 3273.00 0.32 0.48 
1965 1140.60 3589.00 0.32 0.47 
1966 1249.80 3877.00 0.32 0.48 
1967 1348.90 4039.00 0.33 0.50 
1968 1387.60 4183.00 0.33 0.50 
1969 1461.50 4436.00 0.33 0.49 
1970 1586.10 4907.00 0.32 0.48 
1971 1836.00 5609.00 0.33 0.49 
1972 2171.00 6526.00 0.33 0.50 
1973 2526.10 7617.00 0.33 0.50 
1974 2909.00 8813.00 0.33 0.49 tV 
1975 3526.70 9578.00 0.37 0.58 
~ 
Source: New Zealand Planning Council, Public Ex2enditure and Its Financing 1950-79. 
June 1979. Table 5. 
Table 4:9 Welfare Expenditure as Percentage of GDP 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974. 
1975 
1976 
1977 
197e 
1979 
13.150 
11.490 
12.730 
12.990 
12.710 
12.250 
12.570 
12.810 
12.880 
13.580 
14.780 
14.830 
14.900 
14.480 
14.180 
13.810 
13.740 
14.140 
14.650 
14.460 
14.410 
14.860 
15.150 
15.940 
16.390 
17.790 
18.840 
18.680 
21.400 
22.680 
Source: J. Martin, The Modern Welfare State and Expenditure in New Zealand. 
Table 9. 
Table 4:12 Tonak's (Welfare-Adjusted) Transfer Ratio 
Year TR 
1952 1.650 
1953 1.600 
1954 1.300 
1955 1.340 
1956 1.340 
1957 1.280 
1958 1.110 
1959 1.170 
1960 1.220 
1961 1.120 
1962 1.1 so 
1963 1.180 
1964 1.100 
1965 1.080 
1966 1.130 
1967 1.090 
1968 1.120 
1969 1.180 
1970 1.040 
1971 0.940 
1972 1.010 
1973 1.020 
1974 0.980 
1975 0.840 
1976 0.890 
1977 0.940 
1978 0.980 
1979 1.020 
1980 0.970. 
Source: E.A. Tonak, The u.s. Welfare State and the Working Class 1952-1980. 
Table 10. 
Table 4:13 Freeman's Transfer Ratio 
Year TR 
1969 0.880 
1970 0.880 
1971 0.900 
1972 0.980 
1973 0.990 
1974 1.040 
1975 0.970 
1976 0.960 
1977 0.910 
1978 0.970 
1979 0.970 
1980 0.970 
1981 0.960 
1982 0.960 
1983 0.940 
1984 0.910 
Source: A. Freeman, The Effect of the State on the Living Standards of 
Wage-earners in Britain 1969-1984. Table 2.1. 
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